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8	UNITED STA	TES I	DISTRICT COUR	RT
9	NORTHERN DIS	STRI	CT OF CALIFOR	NIA
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11	IN RE: MCKINSEY & CO., INC. NATIONAL PRESCRIPTION OPIATE	(Case No. 21-md-0	2996-CRB (SK)
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I. PREAMBLE

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This Complaint is an administrative device as described in *In re Propulsid Prods. Liab.* Litig., 208 F.R.D.133, 142 (E.D. La. 2002), for the specific purposes of enabling the Court to address the threshold issues it articulated in its statements and Orders to date, and does not supersede the complaints filed in the individual actions consolidated in this multi-district litigation for pretrial proceedings only. See Gelboim v. Bank of Am., 574 U.S. 405, 413 n.3 (2015). Upon the conclusion of pretrial proceedings, and absent agreement of any bellwether process to occur in this Court, the underlying cases will be remanded back to their transferor districts for trial.

10 This Complaint is not intended to consolidate for trial the separate claims of the Plaintiffs 11 and the State Classes they seek to represent. This complaint does not include every Plaintiff-12 specific or State Class-specific fact alleged in the underlying complaints, including facts related 13 to individual and State Class damages. This Complaint incorporates by reference the complaints 14 filed by individual school districts pending in this MDL as of November 22, 2021: Board of 15 Educ. Of Mason County et al. v. McKinsey & Co., Inc. No. 3:21-cv-00280 (S.D. W. Va.) and 16 Board of Educ. Of Jefferson County v. McKinsey & Co., Inc., No. 3:21-CV-282-DJH (W.D. Ky).

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II.

INTRODUCTION

18 1. For more than two decades, the opioid crisis has raged across this country. An opioid-related public health emergency was declared by the President in 2017. Last year was the worst on record, with drug overdoses soaring nearly 30%.¹ Today, there are increasingly few Americans whose lives have not been affected by the consequences of opioid dependency, addiction, and overdoses.

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2. McKinsey is a management consulting firm with operations across the globe. It played a central role in the unfolding, propagation, and exploitation of the opioid crisis by advising multiple opioid manufacturers and other industry participants how to sell as many

¹ Betsy McKay, "U.S. Drug-Overdose Deaths Soared Nearly 30% in 2020, Driven by Synthetic Opioids," Wall Street 28 Journal, July 14, 2021, available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-drug-overdose-deaths-soared-nearly-30-in-2020-11626271200.

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opioids as conceivably possible. Knowing that its clients' products were highly addictive,
ineffective, and unsafe for the treatment of long-term chronic pain, non-acute pain, and noncancer pain, McKinsey developed a singular focus on increasing opioid sales, no matter the
resultant cost to society. McKinsey did this for well over a decade, despite knowing full well the
risk to public health and safety and the widespread economic harm from developing and
implementing the transformation of strictly-controlled substances into top-selling blockbuster
drugs.

- 3. The purpose of McKinsey's work with its opioids clients was at all times to
 maximize return on investment. The whole point for those clients (and hence McKinsey) was to
 make as much money as possible. They all did. This relentless drive to increase sales and create
 greater availability of opioids was made with no concern about the parallel, known, and inevitable
 increase in opioid-related deaths, addiction, abuse, diversion, and misuse.
- In the world of management consulting, McKinsey is preeminent. It is one of the
 world's oldest, largest, and most lucrative consulting firms and is generally seen as the most
 prestigious firm in the industry. More consiglieri than one-off advisor, McKinsey touts its model
 of engaging in "transformational partnerships" with its clients. McKinsey learns each client's
 business intimately, embeds itself into all levels of the corporate hierarchy, and provides granular
 strategies to achieve transformative goals for its clients.
- Marvin Bower, the managing director of McKinsey from 1950 to 1967, was "the
 father of the consulting profession."² He "turned the business of selling management advice into a
 keystone of American corporate culture," and is "credited with taking a fledgling industry and
 setting its course not only as to the kinds of services it could sell but also the standards it must
 uphold for its work to be respected."³ A lawyer by trade, Bower stressed that management
 consulting should be seen as an emergent profession, akin to the law or accounting, with
 obligations to clients and to the broader society that extend beyond the mere commercial.
- 26

 ² Douglas Martin, *Marvin Bower*, *99; Built McKinsey & Co.*, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 2003, *available at:* https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/24/business/marvin-bower-99-built-mckinsey-co.html

 $^{^{3}}$ Id.

1	6. Bower instilled an ethos at McKinsey that has been reinforced throughout the
2	decades as a core value of the firm: "Deliver the bad news if you must, but deliver it properly." ⁴
3	Bower's principles, and the values he imparted within McKinsey, are said to guide the firm to the
4	present day. "In many ways, certainly in spirit and soul, Marvin continued to lead it after he
5	retired, and he leads it still," eulogized Rajat Gupta, McKinsey's then-global managing partner, at
6	Bower's funeral in 2003. ⁵
7	7. This case is, in large part, about the firm's failure to adhere to Bower's simple,
8	foundational tenet. It arises instead from the firm's steadfast and continual work to maximize
9	opioid sales in partnership with numerous clients during the pendency of the worst man-made
10	epidemic in modern medical history. It is about McKinsey never delivering the "bad news" of
11	opioids' devastating impact on Plaintiffs and the public, properly or otherwise, and instead
12	looking the other way for money.
13	8. When it came to opioids, McKinsey did far more than just give advice. Not only
14	did it suggest courses of action that its clients should adopt, the firm remained in place and
15	worked collaboratively alongside its clients to actually implement McKinsey's recommendations
16	to achieve objectives jointly identified by the clients and McKinsey. McKinsey stood alongside
17	its clients in the arena doing the deeds.
18	
19	$\frac{4}{2}$ D (SM D = 11 T = 5 (2014)
20	⁴ Duff McDonald, <i>The Firm</i> 35 (2014). ⁵ <i>Id.</i> at 270. In many ways, Gupta was an interesting figure to opine on Bower's legacy. Indeed, Gupta's leadership of
21	McKinsey is in many respects to be <i>contrasted</i> with Bower's legacy. Many of the values Bower emphasized—an emphasis on professionalism over commercial exploitation, for example—were jettisoned under Gupta's tenure as
22	managing partner of the firm, which ended in 2003. "Under his watch, McKinsey began to chase top billings in a way it never had before." <i>Id.</i> at 234. For instance, McKinsey first began accepting equity stakes in clients as a form of incertain during for the particular during f
23	incentive compensation during Gupta's tenure. Previously, McKinsey only charged standard fees for its consulting services as Bower disdained the notion of taking equity stakes in clients. <i>Id.</i> at 234. Under Gupta, McKinsey also
24	began to allow consultants' compensation to be tied to client performance. <i>Id</i> . Consistent with Gupta's efforts to monetize McKinsey's consulting business in ways previous firm
25	leadership had not, McKinsey also began to expand its client base. "While the firm would never admit as much, under Gupta, McKinsey began working for just about anyone with a fat bank account and a checkbook." <i>Id.</i> at 266.
26	Institutions age, and by the time Gupta came to lead the firm in 1994, McKinsey was a mature institution. It had built up significant value in its <i>reputation</i> by historically advising <i>only</i> "blue chip" companies "at the top of the corporate paramid," <i>Id</i> Under Gupta, McKinsey began the process of realizing that value. For McKinsey, the way to
27	corporate pyramid." <i>Id.</i> Under Gupta, McKinsey began the process of realizing that value. For McKinsey, the way to monetize an elite reputation was to start advising those it historically may have shunned as clients—to start offering its <i>imprimatur</i> , in addition to its services, for money. McKinsey's work with opioid manufacturers began under
28	Gupta's leadership.

I

9. The deceptive marketing strategies that McKinsey and its clients invented,
 developed, deployed, and continually refined for years to expand the market for opioids are
 foundational to the epidemic.

McKinsey worked hand-in-hand with major opioid manufacturers, including
Purdue Pharma L.P., Endo Pharmaceuticals,⁶ Johnson & Johnson,⁷ and Mallinckrodt⁸ for years.
At the same time, McKinsey advised other participants in the opioid supply chain, including
distributors, pharmacies, and even regulators.

- 8 11. In particular, McKinsey advised the Sackler family and their company, Purdue, for
 9 years while Purdue aggressively marketed OxyContin, widely viewed as the taproot of the opioid
 10 crisis. The relationship began no later than 2004. In the years following Purdue's 2007 guilty plea
 11 for misleadingly marketing OxyContin, McKinsey continued to work closely with Purdue to
 12 dramatically increase OxyContin sales, notwithstanding the existence of a five-year Corporate
 13 Integrity Agreement that Purdue entered as part of its guilty plea.
- 14 12. McKinsey knew of the dangers of opioids and in particular the prior misconduct of
 Purdue but nonetheless advised Purdue and other opioid manufacturers to improperly market and
 sell OxyContin and other prescription opioids, supplying granular sales and marketing strategies
 and remaining intimately involved throughout implementation of those strategies. McKinsey's
 actions resulted in a surge in sales of OxyContin and other opioids that fueled and prolonged the
 opioid crisis.
- 13. For years, McKinsey advised Purdue on, designed, and helped to implement
 various strategies to raise sales of OxyContin by focusing on high dose sales and deceptively
 messaging to physicians that OxyContin would improve function and quality of life. For example,
 McKinsey urged Purdue to maximize sales by dictating, to a greater degree, which prescribers its
 sales representatives would target, exploring ways to increase the amount of time those sales
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⁶ "Endo Pharmaceuticals" or "Endo" refers to Endo Health Solutions Inc., Endo International plc, and Endo
 Pharmaceuticals Inc., collectively.

 ⁷ "Johnson & Johnson" refers to Johnson & Johnson Services, Inc. and its wholly-owned subsidiary Janssen
 Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Janssen").

⁸ "Mallinckrodt" refers to Mallinckrodt LLC and Mallinckrodt plc, together.

representatives spent in the field increasing opioid sales and prioritizing OxyContin in incentive
 compensation targets.⁹

3	14. McKinsey's partnership with Purdue reached its fever pitch in the summer of
4	2013. In January of that year, Purdue's Corporate Integrity Agreement expired, and Purdue was
5	no longer bound by its constraints. Within months, the Sacklers tasked McKinsey with
6	transforming Purdue's approach to OxyContin sales in order to extract as much money as
7	possible from the remaining patent life of the drug. ¹⁰
8	15. In response, McKinsey developed and proposed Project Turbocharge, a series of
9	transformational changes that McKinsey proposed to implement at Purdue to dramatically
10	increase OxyContin sales by re-tooling Purdue's sales force and investing large amounts of
11	capital to "turbocharge" it. "[O]ur recommendation is that Purdue makes a clear go-no-go
12	decision to 'Turbocharge the Sales Engine'," McKinsey told Purdue on August 8, 2013.
13	16. The Sacklers chose "go," and McKinsey subsequently implemented and
14	continually refined Project Turbocharge at Purdue over the course of years, to devastating, but
15	profitable, effect.
16	17. McKinsey has recently been the subject of scrutiny for its various business
17	practices, including its work facilitating the opioid crisis with Purdue. ¹¹ On March 7, 2019, Kevin
18	Sneader, McKinsey's then-global managing partner, addressed all McKinsey employees
19	regarding this scrutiny. Drawing inspiration from Theodore Roosevelt, Sneader stated,
20	[W]e cannot return to a time when we were in the background and unobserved.
21	Those days have gone. Indeed, I have little doubt that scrutiny—fair and unfair— will continue. It is the price we pay for being "in the arena" and working on what
22	matters. ¹²
23	⁹ PPLPC012000437346 ¹⁰ OxyContin, like any branded pharmaceutical, is subject to eventual patent expiration and competition from generic
24	opioid manufacturers. ¹¹ See Michael Forsythe and Walt Bogdanich, <i>McKinsey Advised Purdue Pharma How to 'Turbocharge' Opioid</i>
25	<i>Sales, Lawsuit Says,</i> N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 2019, <i>available at:</i> https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/01/business/purdue-pharma-mckinsey-oxycontin-opiods.html.
26	¹² See "The Price We Pay for Being 'In the Arena'": McKinsey's Chief Writes to Staff About Media Scrutiny and Scandal, Fortune Magazine, March 8, 2019, available at https://fortune.com/2019/03/08/mckinsey-staff-letter-kevin-
27	sneader/. The "arena" reference is to <i>Citizenship in a Republic</i> , a speech delivered by Theodore Roosevelt at the <i>Sorbonne</i> on April 23, 1910:
28	It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doers of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the

1 18. Weeks later, McKinsey announced that it would no longer work for any opioid
 2 manufacturer. "Opioid abuse and addiction are having a tragic and devastating impact on our
 3 communities. We are no longer advising clients on any opioid-specific business and are
 4 continuing to support key stakeholders working to combat the crisis."¹³

5 19. The price for being in the arena is more than mere scrutiny. McKinsey is liable for its misconduct and the harms it caused or exacerbated. McKinsey is liable for its successful 6 7 efforts to increase opioid sales for years. It continued this work unabated and with alacrity despite 8 events as stunning as Purdue's 2007 guilty plea for misbranding OxyContin, Purdue's 2015 9 settlement with the State of Kentucky, and numerous other enforcement actions related to opioid sales and marketing by McKinsey clients. Through it all, McKinsey remained steadfast in its 10 11 efforts to promote opioid sales for all of its clients for the purpose of maximizing return on investment without regard to the obvious implications of what they were doing. Indeed, the firm 12 13 endeavored alongside its clients to increase the size of the *overall* opioid market for *nearly two decades*, until as late as March 22, 2019, despite increasingly blood-red flags along the way.¹⁴ 14 20. 15 American public schools perform an indispensable function, central to the health of American democracy, by providing a free education to every student who comes through their 16 17 doors. But, for the last decade at least, public schools' ability to succeed has been taxed by the

18 devastation of the opioid epidemic.

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arena [here, McKinsey; and the arena, opioid sales], whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor defeat.

As it happens, Mr. Sneader is not the only McKinsey person to draw inspiration from Roosevelt. *Citizenship in a Republic* similarly inspired Dominic Barton, the man Mr. Sneader succeeded as McKinsey's global managing partner. It served as the basis for his 2017 address to the Ivey Business School in Canada. *See* Dominic Barton *In the Arena: Leadership in an Age of Disruption*, October 17, 2017, *available at:* https://www.ivey.uwo.ca/media/

^{25 3780710/}daquino_lecture2017.pdf. While McKinsey continues to preach the values of corporate integrity from the Bower area, its actions show that it has moved far afield from its professed moral compass.

 ¹³ See Paul La Monica, Consulting firm McKinsey no longer working with opioid maker Purdue Pharma, CNN, May 24, 2019, available at: https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/24/business/mckinsey-purdue-pharma-oxycontin/index.html.
 The statement was attributed to McKinsey as an entity. No individual's name was attributed.

 ¹⁴ See "About McKinsey's past work for opioid manufacturers," *last updated March 22, 2021, available at:* https://www.mckinseyopioidfacts.com ("We decided nearly two years ago to end all work on opioid-specific

business")

1	21. The connection between McKinsey's role as the architect of a scheme to
2	"turbocharge" opioid sales and substantial harms to public schools is direct and proximate. As a
3	result of McKinsey's actions, the market was flooded with opioids. That increased the number of
4	women using opioids during pregnancy—and the number of women giving birth to infants born
5	with Neonatal Opioid Withdrawal Syndrome ("NOWS"). NOWS is a group of adverse
6	neurodevelopmental conditions that occur when infants are born with opioid withdrawal
7	symptoms. ¹⁵ Four or five years after birth, those children enter the schools. Because of the
8	adverse neurodevelopmental consequences of NOWS, they disproportionately need and receive
9	mandated costly "special education" services, 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320-300.328, often from pre-
10	kindergarten all the way through high school. The average per pupil expenditure on special
11	education services is almost twice the per pupil cost for other students. ¹⁶ By "turbocharging"
12	opioid sales, McKinsey increased NOWS births, saddling many public schools with large,
13	increased, unfunded costs.
14	22. The effect of McKinsey's efforts to increase opioid sales has been staggering.
15	Between 1999 and 2014, the number of women using opioids during pregnancy increased by
16	333%. ¹⁷ A newborn is now diagnosed with NOWS every 15-25 minutes in the United States. ¹⁸
17	The incidence of NOWS increased more than fivefold among infants covered by Medicaid. ¹⁹ The
18	financial and other consequences for public schools as a result of the increased incidence of
19	NOWS have been very serious—and were foreseeable.
20	23. For years, research has reported that fetal exposure to opioids can produce adverse
21	changes in brain structure and function. ²⁰ And the link between those problems and educational
22	¹⁵ Neonatal Opioid Withdrawal Syndrome ("NOWS") is also referred to as Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome ("NAS").
23	For present purposes, the two labels—NOWS and NAS—refer to the same diagnosed medical condition. ¹⁶ Jay G. Chambers et al., <i>Total Expenditures for Students with Disabilities, 1999-2000: Spending Variation by</i>
24	<i>Disability</i> , Special Education Expenditure Project 4 (June 2003), https://www.air.org/sites/default/files/SEEP5-Total-Expenditures.pdf.
25	¹⁷ Sarah C. Haight et al., <i>Opioid Use Disorder Documented at Delivery Hospitalization - United States, 1999-2014</i> , 67 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 845, 846 (2018).
26	¹⁸ Saminathan Anbalagan & Magda D. Mendez, <i>Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome</i> (2021), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK551498/.
27	¹⁹ Tyler N. A. Winkelman et al., <i>Incidence and Costs of Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome Among Infants With Medicaid: 2004-2014</i> , 141 Pediatrics e20173520 (2018).
28	²⁰ See generally, Emily J. Ross et al., <i>Developmental Consequences of Fetal Exposure to Drugs: What We Know and What We Still Must Learn</i> , 40 Neuropsychopharmacology 61, 76 (2015) (discussing research results dating back to 1994).

outcomes is not surprising: there is a direct relationship between infants born with NOWS and the
 need for special education and related services once these children are in school.²¹

3 24. In addition, the need for special education services because of the opioid epidemic
4 is not limited to children born with NOWS. Many children living in households battling addiction
5 require special education interventions as well. The children of opioid abusing parents are at risk
6 for a wide variety of adverse outcomes, even if they were not exposed to opioids in utero.²²

7 25. The opioid epidemic has required many public school districts, including the
8 Plaintiffs named in this Complaint, to expend or divert already scarce resources to support
9 children born with NOWS or whose families are struggling with opioid addiction and death.
10 These students disproportionately require mandated special education and related services or
11 present behavioral and emotional challenges that disrupt classrooms, which in turn places burdenss
12 on schools.

13

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

14 26. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action for the reasons stated in
15 each underlying complaint.

16 27. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants for the reasons stated in each
17 underlying complaint.

18 28. Venue is appropriate for pretrial proceedings under *In re McKinsey & Co., Inc.,*

Nat'l Prescription Opiate Consultant Litig., MDL No. 2996, 2021 WL 2351628 (J.P.M.L. June 7, 2021).

- 21 IV. PARTIES
- 22

A. <u>School District Plaintiffs</u>

23 29. West Virginia: The Boards of Education of Mason County, Marion County, and
24 Wyoming County on behalf of themselves and all independent school districts of the State of
25 West Virginia.²³

 ²¹ Mary-Margaret A Fill et al., *Educational Disabilities Among Children Born With Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome*, 142 Pediatrics e20180562 (2018); *see also* Ju Lee Oei et al., *Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome and High School* Performance, 139 Pediatrics 2 (2017).

 ²² Gemma Sanjuan Herranz et al., *Children Born to Heroin-Addicted Mothers: What's the Outcome 25 Years Later*, 5
 J. Addiction Res. & Therapy 180 (2014).

²³ Board of Educ. Of Mason County et al. v. McKinsey & Co., Inc. No. 3:21-cv-00280 (S.D. W. Va.).

30. Kentucky: The Board of Education of Jefferson County on behalf of itself and all 1 independent public school districts in the State of Kentucky.²⁴ 2 3 B. Defendants 31. Defendant McKinsey & Company, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws 4 5 of the state of New York. McKinsey's principal place of business is located at 711 Third Avenue, 6 New York, NY 10017. It may be served with process via its registered agent, Corporation Service 7 Company, at 80 State Street, Albany, NY 12207. 8 32. Defendant McKinsey Holdings, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal 9 place of business is located at 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017. It may be served with

process via its registered agent, Corporation Service Company, 251 Little Falls Drive,

11 Wilmington, DE 19808

33. Defendant McKinsey & Company, Inc. United States is a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business is located at 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017. It may
be served with process via its registered agent, Corporation Service Company, 251 Little Falls
Drive, Wilmington, DE 19808

34. Defendant McKinsey & Company, Inc. Washington D.C. is a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business is located at 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY
10017. It may be served with process via its registered agent, Corporation Service Company, 251
Little Falls Drive, Wilmington, DE 19808.

35. Upon information and belief, McKinsey & Company, Inc. is the parent company
of McKinsey & Company Holdings, Inc., which is itself the parent company of both McKinsey &
Company, Inc. United States and McKinsey & Company, Inc. Washington D.C. Upon
information and belief, each subsidiary corporation is wholly-owned by its parent. Despite the
corporate form, McKinsey began as a partnership and still refers to its senior employees as
"partners." Those partners are the firm's shareholders. Collectively, these four Defendants are
referenced throughout as "McKinsey."

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²⁴ Board of Educ. Of Jefferson County v. McKinsey & Co., Inc., No. 3:21-CV-282-DJH (W.D. Ky).

36. McKinsey a is global management consultancy with offices in over 130 cities in 1 2 65 countries, including the following United States cities: Atlanta, GA; Austin, TX; Houston, TX; 3 Dallas, TX; San Francisco, CA; Los Angeles, CA; Redwood City, CA; Boston, MA; Charlotte, 4 NC; Chicago, IL; Cleveland, OH; Denver, CO; Detroit, MI; Miami, FL; Miramar, FL; Tampa, FL; Minneapolis, MN; Summit, NJ; New York, NY; Philadelphia, PA; Pittsburgh, PA; Seattle, 5 6 WA; St. Louis, MO; Stamford, CT; Waltham, MA; and Washington, D.C. 7 37. McKinsey is registered to do business in all fifty states. 8 V. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL CLAIMS 9 A. The Opioid Crisis 38. The term "opioid" refers to a class of drugs that bind with opioid receptors in the 10 11 brain and includes natural, synthetic, and semi-synthetic opioids. Natural opioids are derived from 12 the opium poppy. Generally used to treat pain, opioids produce multiple effects on the human 13 body, the most significant of which are analgesia, euphoria, and respiratory depression. 39. 14 The opium poppy contains various opium alkaloids, three of which are used in the 15 pharmaceutical industry today: morphine, codeine, and thebaine. Early use of opium in Western medicine was a tincture of opium and alcohol called laudanum, which contains all of the opium 16 17 alkaloids and is still available by prescription today. Chemists first isolated the morphine and 18 codeine alkaloids in the early 1800s. 40. 19 In 1827, the pharmaceutical company Merck began large-scale production and 20 commercial marketing of morphine. During the American Civil War, field medics commonly 21 used morphine, laudanum, and opium pills to treat the wounded, and many veterans were left 22 with morphine addictions. By 1900, an estimated 300,000 people were addicted to opioids in the 23 United States, and many doctors prescribed opioids solely to prevent their patients from suffering 24 withdrawal symptoms. The nation's first Opium Commissioner, Hamilton Wright, remarked in 25 1911: "The habit has this nation in its grip to an astonishing extent Our prisons and our 26 hospitals are full of victims of it, it has robbed ten thousand businessmen of moral sense and

- 27 made them beasts who prey upon their fellows . . . it has become one of the most fertile causes
- 28 of unhappiness and sin in the United States."

41. Pharmaceutical companies have long tried to develop substitutes for opium and
 morphine that would provide the same analgesic effects without the addictive properties. In 1898,
 Bayer Pharmaceutical Company began marketing diacetylmorphine (obtained from acetylation of
 morphine) under the trade name "Heroin." Bayer advertised heroin as a non-addictive cough and
 cold remedy suitable for children, but as its addictive nature became clear, heroin distribution in
 the United States was limited to prescription only in 1914 and then banned altogether a decade
 later.

8 42. Although heroin and opium became classified as illicit drugs, there is little
9 difference between them and prescription opioids. Prescription opioids are synthesized from the
10 same plant as heroin, have similar molecular structures, and bind to the same receptors in the
11 human brain.

43. Due to concerns about their addictive properties, prescription opioids have usually
been regulated at the federal level as Schedule II controlled substances by the Drug Enforcement
Administration since 1970.

44. Throughout the twentieth century, pharmaceutical companies continued to develop
prescription opioids like Percodan, Percocet, and Vicodin, but these opioids were generally
produced in combination with other drugs, with relatively low opioid content.

45. In contrast, OxyContin, the product whose launch in 1996 ushered in the modern
opioid epidemic, is pure oxycodone. Purdue initially made it available in the following strengths:
10 mg, 15 mg, 20 mg, 30 mg, 40 mg, 60 mg, 80 mg, and 160 mg. The weakest OxyContin
delivers as much narcotic as the strongest Percocet, and some OxyContin tablets delivered sixteen
times that.

46. The effects of opioids vary by duration. Long-acting opioids, such as Purdue's
OxyContin and MS Contin, Janssen's Nucynta ER and Duragesic, Endo's Opana ER, and
Actavis's Kadian, are designed to be taken once or twice daily and are purported to provide
continuous opioid therapy for, in general, twelve hours. Short-acting opioids, such as Cephalon's
Actiq and Fentora, are designed to be taken in addition to long-acting opioids to address "episodic
pain" (also referred to as "breakthrough pain") and provide fast-acting, supplemental opioid

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therapy lasting approximately four to six hours. Still other short-term opioids, such as Insys's
 Subsys, are designed to be taken in addition to long-acting opioids to specifically address
 breakthrough cancer pain, excruciating pain suffered by some patients with end-stage cancer. The
 opioid manufacturers promoted the idea that pain should be treated by taking long-acting opioids
 continuously and supplementing them by also taking short-acting, rapid-onset opioids for
 episodic or "breakthrough" pain.

47. Patients develop tolerance to the analgesic effect of opioids relatively quickly. As
tolerance increases, a patient typically requires progressively higher doses in order to obtain the
same perceived level of pain reduction. The same is true of the euphoric effects of opioids—the
"high." However, opioids depress respiration and, at very high doses, can, and often do, arrest
respiration altogether. At higher doses, the effects of withdrawal are more severe. Long-term
opioid use can also cause hyperalgesia, a heightened sensitivity to pain.

48. Discontinuing opioids after more than just a few weeks of therapy will cause most
patients to experience withdrawal symptoms. These withdrawal symptoms include severe anxiety,
nausea, vomiting, headaches, agitation, insomnia, tremors, hallucinations, delirium, pain, and
other serious symptoms, which may persist for months after a complete withdrawal from opioids,
depending on how long the opioids were used.

49. As one doctor put it, the widespread long-term use of opioids "was an experiment
on the population of the United States. It wasn't randomized, it wasn't controlled, and no data
was collected until they started gathering death statistics."

50. The results were devastating, and the nation continues to reach ever grimmer
milestones. In 2020, drug-overdose deaths in the United States soared nearly 30%, reaching alltime highs.²⁵

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 ²⁵ Betsy McKay, "U.S. Drug-Overdose Deaths Soared Nearly 30% in 2020, Driven by Synthetic Opioids," *Wall Street Journal*, July 14, 2020, *available at*: https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-drug-overdose-deaths-soared-nearly-30-in-2020-11626271200.

B. Marketing and the Origins of the Opioid Crisis

1 51. OxyContin, manufactured by Purdue Pharma L.P., was introduced to the market in 2 1996. Within six years of its introduction, the increasingly widespread misuse and abuse of 3 4 OxyContin and similar opioids had drawn the attention of the United States Senate. 52. Two decades ago, Dr. Art Van Zee traveled from the rural coal town of St. 5 Charles, in the southwestern corner of Virginia, to Washington D.C. to provide testimony to the 6 United States Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions. On February 12, 7 2002, that Committee held a hearing entitled "Examining the Effects of the Painkiller OxyContin, 8 Focusing on Federal, State, and Local Efforts to Decrease Abuse and Misuse of this Product 9 While Assuring Availability for Patients Who Suffer Daily from Chronic Moderate to Severe 10 Pain."26 11 53. Today, OxyContin—and the methods used to sell it—is widely seen as a principal 12 taproot of the opioid crisis. In those early days of the unfolding opioid epidemic, Dr. Van Zee's 13

medical practice in St. Charles put him in a position to offer informed, first-hand observations of 14

the toll that the pharmaceutical industry's efforts to market opioids was exacting from his 15

community. He testified: 16

17 In the 25 years I have practiced as a general internist in St. Charles, which is a small Appalachian coal mining town, there has never been anything to compare to the 18 epidemic of drug abuse and addiction that we have seen the last 3 years with OxyContin. Contrary to what is sometimes portrayed in the media as long-term 19 addicts switching to the drug *du jour*, what we have seen for the most part is numerous young people recreationally using OxyContin and then becoming very 20 rapidly addicted. Many of these kids are good kids, good families with bright, 21 promising futures that are being destroyed in every way by their opioid addiction.²⁷

22

Further, Dr. Van Zee identified the sales and marketing practices of the 54.

23 pharmaceutical industry when selling controlled substances as a primary cause of the problem:

24 My own personal view of the complicated OxyContin abuse problem is that there are at least three major elements involved. First, there has been an obvious problem 25 with physician misprescribing and overprescribing of this drug. Second, this epidemic has been a vicious indicator of the alarming degree of prescription drug 26 abuse in our society. Third and perhaps the one closest to this committee and the 27

²⁶ A transcript of the hearing is *available at:* https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-107shrg77770/html/ 28 CHRG-107shrg77770.htm

²⁷ See https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-107shrg77770/html/CHRG-107shrg77770.htm

FDA is that the promotion and marketing of OxyContin by Purdue Pharma has played a major role in this problem.²⁸

- 2 55. Five years after Dr. Van Zee's testimony and eighty miles from his hometown of 3 St. Charles, United States Attorney John Brownlee announced in Abingdon, Virginia, the guilty 4 plea of the Purdue Frederick Company, the parent of Purdue Pharma, L.P., relating to the 5 misbranding of OxyContin. Brownlee stated, "Even in the face of warnings from health care 6 professionals, the media, and members of its own sales force that OxyContin was being widely 7 abused and causing harm to our citizens, Purdue, under the leadership of its top executives, 8 continued to push a fraudulent marketing campaign that promoted OxyContin as less addictive, 9 less subject to abuse, and less likely to cause withdrawal. In the process, scores died as a result of 10 OxyContin abuse and an even greater number of people became addicted to OxyContin; a drug 11 that Purdue led many to believe was safer, less subject to abuse, and less addictive than other pain 12 medications on the market." 13 56. Two years later, in 2009, Dr. Van Zee published The Promotion and Marketing of 14 OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Tragedy in the American Journal of Public 15 Health. 16 57. In his paper, Dr. Van Zee stated the matter plainly: "Compared with noncontrolled 17 drugs, controlled drugs, with their potential for abuse and diversion, pose different public health 18 risks when they are overpromoted and highly prescribed."²⁹ In one sense, Dr. Van Zee's 19 observation is not particularly novel. Indeed, it approaches tautology: controlled substances are 20 *controlled* precisely because they should not be sold to maximize volume and profits. This did not 21 prevent McKinsey and Purdue from marketing Purdue's opioids full hilt, however. By 2004, 22 "OxyContin had become the most prevalent prescription opioid in the United States."³⁰
- 23 24

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- 26

 28 Id. (emphasis added).

58.

 ²⁹ Art Van Zee, *The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Tragedy,* American Journal of Public Health, February 2009, *available at* https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
 28 PMC2622774/pdf/221.pdf

³⁰ Id.

source of OxyContin misuse and abuse-the exact tactics McKinsey identified and promoted-

Dr. Van Zee identified the three principal marketing tactics Purdue employed as a

and suggested that regulation may be appropriate to curtail its use. The first was the use of
granular sales and marketing data to profile individual prescribers and identify those that already
prescribe large amounts of opioids. "Through these profiles, a drug company can identify the
highest and lowest prescribers of particular drugs on a single zip code, county, state, or the entire
country. One of the critical foundations of Purdue's marketing plan for OxyContin was to target
the physicians who were the highest prescribers for opioids across the country."³¹

59. The second tactic was the use of incentive compensation structures to encourage
the salesforce to sell ever more prescriptions of OxyContin. Bonuses at Purdue were "uncapped,"
meaning there was no upper limit to what an OxyContin salesperson could earn. Rather,
salesforce remuneration was a direct function of overall OxyContin sales—the more you sell, the
more you make. "A lucrative bonus system encouraged sales representatives to increase sales of
OxyContin in their territories, resulting in large numbers of visits to physicians with high rates of
opioid prescriptions, as well as a multifaceted information campaign aimed at them."³²

14 60. The third tactic was to increase the overall number of individual calls that the
15 salesforce placed to prescribers. "From 1996 to 2000, Purdue increased its internal sales force
16 from 318 sales representatives to 671, and its total physician call list from approximately 33,400
17 to 44,500 to approximately 70,500 to 94,000 physicians."³³

61. When combined, these tactics produced the intended result. "The use of prescriber
profiling data to target high-opioid prescribers—coupled with very lucrative incentives for sales
representatives—would seem to fuel increased prescribing by some physicians—perhaps the most
liberal prescribers of opioids and, in some cases, the least discriminate."³⁴

62. Dr. Van Zee's observations regarding the direct link between OxyContin
marketing and overall opioid overdose mortality would, in time, be confirmed by further
academic work, including empirical research published by the National Bureau of Economic
Research in 2019.

- 26
- 27 3^{31} Id.
- $\begin{array}{c} {}^{32} Id. \\ {}^{33} Id. \end{array}$
 - ³³ Id. ³⁴ Id.

1 63. McKinsey played a central role in the sales and marketing of these Schedule II 2 controlled substances in the United States for many years. Throughout that time, the purpose of 3 McKinsey's actions was singular: making the most money possible no matter the resultant cost to 4 society. Indeed, no significant concern was given to the fact that greater availability of drugs 5 correlates to opioid-related deaths, addiction, abuse, and misuse. Return on investment was 6 McKinsey's guiding light. McKinsey partnered with numerous opioid manufacturers and other 7 opioid industry participants to maximize the return on investment in sales and marketing efforts 8 for numerous opioid products, and did so contemporaneously. Despite the fact that the Schedule 9 II controlled substances were designed for a small, narrowly defined group—patients with acute, terminal, or cancer-related pain—McKinsey's goal, in all instances, was to sell as many pills as 10 conceivably possible. 11

12

C. What McKinsey Does: "Consulting is more than giving advice."

64. McKinsey is a global consulting firm with many areas of expertise, including the
pharmaceutical industry. As a management consulting firm, McKinsey provides plans to
managers, directors, and owners on how to run their companies or other enterprises, and helps
implement those plans.

17 65. Management consulting is the business of providing solutions to clients. Solutions
18 take many forms, depending on the client's needs. "Management consulting includes a broad
19 range of activities, and the many firms and their members often define these practices quite
20 differently."³⁵

66. Broadly speaking, there are two schools of management consulting. "Strategy"
consulting provides big-picture advice to clients about how they approach their business: how the
business is structured, which markets to compete in, potential new business lines, and mergers
and acquisitions. The strategy consultant provides a plan to the client that the client may choose
to adopt or not.

26

^{28 35} Arthur Turner, *Consulting is More Than Giving Advice*, Harvard Business Review, September 1982, *available at:* https://hbr.org/1982/09/consulting-is-more-than-giving-advice

1	67. "Implementation" consulting is what comes next. If strategy consulting is
2	providing advice to a client, "implementation" work is what happens once the client has adopted
3	the consultant's plan. After a client has adopted the strategy consultant's recommendations, the
4	implementation consultant remains in place with the client to actually do the necessary work and
5	execute on the plan.
6	68. In his 1982 <i>Harvard Business Review</i> article entitled "Consulting is More Than
7	Giving Advice," Professor Arthur Turner of the Harvard Business School described the then-
8	current state of the consulting industry's attitude toward implementation work:
9	The consultant's proper role in implementation is a matter of considerable debate in
10	the profession. Some argue that one who helps put recommendations into effect takes on the role of manager and thus exceeds consulting's legitimate bounds.
11	Others believe that those who regard implementation solely as the client's responsibility lack a professional attitude, since recommendations that are not
12	implemented (or implemented badly) are a waste of money and time. And just as
13	the client may participate in diagnosis without diminishing the value of the consultant's role, so there are many ways in which the consultant may assist in
14	implementation without usurping the manager's job. ³⁶
15	69. Although McKinsey has historically been regarded as a "strategy" consulting firm,
16	by the time it was working with Purdue, implementation services were a core component of the
17	suite of services that McKinsey provided within the "transformational relationship" it developed
18	with its clients. ³⁷ Indeed, writing in 2013, Harvard Business School Professor Clayton
19	Christensen observed the decline in "pure" strategy work performed by consultants, as the
20	industry sought to diversify its income streams by offering implementation and other services to
21	clients. "For example, at traditional strategy-consulting firms, the share of work that is classic
22	strategy has been steadily decreasing and is now about 20%, down from 60% of 70% some 30
23	years ago." ³⁸
24	70. When partnering with clients, a core component of the McKinsey relationship is
25	discretion. "The basis of any client relationship with the firm is trust. Companies share their most
26	³⁶ <i>Id</i> .
27	³⁷ For McKinsey's own description of its implementation services, <i>See https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/mckinsey-accelerate/how-we-help-clients/implementation</i> (last accessed October 19, 2020).
28	³⁸ Clayton Christensen, Dina Wang, and Derek van Bever, "Consulting on the Cusp of Disruption," <i>Harvard</i>

^{28 &}lt;sup>38</sup> Clayton Christensen, Dina Wang, and Derek van Bever, "Consulting on the Cusp of Disruption," *Harvard Business Review*, October 2013, *available at* https://hbr.org/2013/10/consulting-on-the-cusp-of-disruption

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competitive secrets with McKinsey with the understanding that confidentiality is paramount.
 McKinsey consultants aren't even supposed to tell their own spouses about their client work."³⁹
 McKinsey recognizes it must have its clients' trust and make confidentiality "paramount," as
 "[c]ompanies share their most competitive secrets with McKinsey" for McKinsey to do its
 work.⁴⁰

71. During the implementation phase, McKinsey essentially bonds with the client.
Describing McKinsey's approach to implementation, one McKinsey consultant stated, "In some
of the most successful engagements I've seen, you can't even tell the difference between a
McKinsey team member and one of our clients because we working that cohesively together."⁴¹

10 72. Another McKinsey Senior Implementation Coach described McKinsey's
11 approach: "We're in there interacting with every element of that organization, from the welders or
12 mechanics on the front line, all the way up to the board of directors."⁴²

McKinsey's implementation team even has a symbol: a rowing team.

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 CC Ċ 23 24 McKinsey Careers: what's behind McKinsey Implementation's logo and success? 5,507 views · Oct 22, 2018 1 → 20 5 1 → SHARE =+ SAVE 25 26 27 ³⁹ McDonald, *The Firm*, Pg. 308. ⁴⁰ *Id.* at 308. ⁴¹ McKinsey on Implementation, April 30, 2017, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rEQOGVpl9CY 28 ⁴² *Id*.

13

73.

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1	74 Jonny a Practice Manager at McKingey, explained its significances "The reward
1	74. Jenny, a Practice Manager at McKinsey, explained its significance: "The rowers
2	symbolized to us being in the boat with the clients, doing real work and being jointly responsible
3	for the success." ⁴³
4	75. Eugene, a partner, further offered:
5	The reason McKinsey implementation works is because clients love it. The fact that we are staying longer with them, the fact that we're getting in to the trenches, the
6	fact that we are there to walk the emotional journey with them when they're going
7	through the tough times and really changing their companies, is what makes McKinsey implementation truly distinctive. ⁴⁴
8	
9	76. In the broadest of generalities, then, McKinsey's business model, as a provider of
10	strategy and implementation consulting services, is to partner with clients to pursue business
11	objectives identified by McKinsey. Once an objective is identified, the client and McKinsey then
12	engage in concerted action as a seamless and cohesive unit in order to implement the necessary
13	means to achieve it.
14	1. <u>McKinsey's Long-Term Partnership with the Pharmaceuticals</u>
15	Industry
15	<u>Industry</u>
15 16 17	Industry 77. Today, McKinsey's website explains "How We Help Clients" in the
15 16 17	Industry 77. Today, McKinsey's website explains "How We Help Clients" in the pharmaceuticals industry: "Helping clients maximize commercial value by assisting with product
15 16 17 18 19	Industry77.Today, McKinsey's website explains "How We Help Clients" in thepharmaceuticals industry: "Helping clients maximize commercial value by assisting with productlaunch, marketing, sales, and market access."45 McKinsey helps numerous clients throughout the
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 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	Industry77.Today, McKinsey's website explains "How We Help Clients" in thepharmaceuticals industry: "Helping clients maximize commercial value by assisting with productlaunch, marketing, sales, and market access." ⁴⁵ McKinsey helps numerous clients throughout thepharmaceutical industry, from manufacturers to distributors and pharmacies. It often does socontemporaneously. For instance, McKinsey might advise multiple opioid manufacturers on thesales and marketing of competing branded opioid products.78.McKinsey's dominance of the consulting space in the pharmaceutical industry
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 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 	Industry77.Today, McKinsey's website explains "How We Help Clients" in thepharmaceuticals industry: "Helping clients maximize commercial value by assisting with productlaunch, marketing, sales, and market access." ⁴⁵ McKinsey helps numerous clients throughout thepharmaceutical industry, from manufacturers to distributors and pharmacies. It often does socontemporaneously. For instance, McKinsey might advise multiple opioid manufacturers on thesales and marketing of competing branded opioid products.78.McKinsey's dominance of the consulting space in the pharmaceutical industrypresents its own opportunity for further client service. Specifically, McKinsey also helps its

1 79. For example, McKinsey pitched its services to Purdue on the basis that it was able to "bring examples from other successful companies" and perform "detailed analytics."⁴⁶ 2 3 2. The McKinsey Pharmaceuticals and Medical Products Practice Group 80. 4 Like most management consulting companies, McKinsey organizes itself into 5 practice groups that specialize in a given industry. 6 81. McKinsey has long maintained a Pharmaceuticals and Medical Products ("PMP") 7 industry practice group dedicated to working with pharmaceutical companies. In 2004, when 8 McKinsey's relationship with Purdue began, the PMP group was led by Michael Pearson. Pearson 9 worked for McKinsey for twenty-three years and was a member of the firm's shareholder council (McKinsey's equivalent of a board of directors) in addition to leading PMP before departing 10 McKinsey in 2008 to helm Valeant Pharmaceuticals.⁴⁷ 11 82. Pearson stated: "At McKinsey pharmaceuticals was one of our biggest industry 12 groups."⁴⁸ Pearson was "not the quintessential suave and intellectual McKinsey partner. He was 13 14 loud and profane and was seen, in the words of one former colleague, as 'sharp-edged and sharp elbowed.""49 15 83. Under his leadership, McKinsey's knowledge and expertise in the pharmaceutical 16 17 industry was significant. By 2009, McKinsey described its capabilities: "We have an unparalleled 18 depth of both functional and industry expertise as well as breadth of geographical reach. Our 19 scale, scope, and knowledge allow us to address problems that no one else can. At heart, we are a 20 network of people who are passionate about taking on immense challenges that matter to leading 21 organizations, and often, to the world." 22 23 ⁴⁶ PPLPC021000601208 (emphasis added). 24 ⁴⁷ John Gapper, *McKinsey's fingerprints are all over Valeant*, Financial Times, March 23, 2016, *available at:* https://www.ft.com/content/0bb37fd2-ef63-11e5-aff5-19b4e253664a Notably, Rob Rosiello, a McKinsey partner who was a Director of Client Services (or "DCS") of the Purdue 25 account alongside co-DCS'es Maria Gordian and Martin Elling, went on to join Pearson at Valeant in 2015 as Chief 26 Financial Officer. The DCS is the partner in charge of the client account. ⁴⁸ Michael Peltz, *Mike Pearson's New Prescription for the Pharmaceuticals Industry*, Institutional Investor,

²⁷ September 3, 2014, *available at:* https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b14zbjfm8nf1c4/mike-pearsons-new-prescription-for-the-pharmaceuticals-industry

^{28 &}lt;sup>49</sup> John Gapper, *McKinsey's fingerprints are all over Valeant*, Financial Times, March 23, 2016, *available at:* https://www.ft.com/content/0bb37fd2-ef63-11e5-aff5-19b4e253664a

In 2012, while advising Purdue, McKinsey described PMP and its health care
 capabilities thusly: "Indeed, there is a doctor in the house. We have more than 1,700 consultants
 with significant healthcare experience, including more than 150 physicians and 250 consultants
 with advanced degrees in genetics, immunology, biochemical engineering, neurobiology, and
 other life sciences. We also have 75 consultants with advanced degrees in public health,
 healthcare management, and related fields."

85. That same year, the PMP group published a report entitled "Death of a Sales
Model, or Not: Perspectives on the Evolution of Pharmaceutical Field Based Selling."⁵⁰ In it,
McKinsey partner Laura Moran co-authored a segment called "The Few, The Proud, The SuperProductive: How a 'smart field force' can better drive sales." In the segment, Moran and her coauthors described various ways a pharmaceutical company could optimize its sales force. Moran
worked on the Purdue account, where the strategies outlined in her article were incorporated into
Project Turbocharge two years later.

14 86. With respect to pharmaceutical marketing, the PMP group states, "We support
15 clients in creating high-impact strategies that maximize value, using customized tools. We also
16 have detailed market data for all major geographic regions."⁵¹ PMP also works with pharma
17 clients regarding their sales force: "Our efforts span the entire organization—we can help train
18 and restructure sales forces, work directly in the field to provide coaching, maximize value from
19 back-office services, develop strategies to accelerate short-term sales, and assist with company20 wide commercial transformations."⁵²

87. McKinsey has long considered itself a "leadership factory" for good reason.⁵³
Nowhere is this more apparent than the pharmaceutical industry, where, thanks to PMP's efforts
under Pearson's leadership, McKinsey continues to reign as the dominant management
consultant.

 ⁵⁰ "Death of a Sales Model, or Not," Pharmaceutical and Medical Product Practice, McKinsey, *available at* https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client_service/pharma%20and%20medical%20products/pmp %20new/pdfs/2012%20death%20of%20a%20sales%20model%20or%20not.pdf

^{27 &}lt;sup>51</sup> See https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/how-we-help-clients/commercial ⁵² *Id*.

^{28 &}lt;sup>53</sup> See Adam Jones, "Should business schools fear McKinsey's leadership factory?," *Financial Times*, May 22, 2016, *available at:* https://www.ft.com/content/0d17f670-1612-11e6-b197-a4af20d5575e

88. Consistent with PMP's ambition that McKinsey be the dominant consultant in the
 pharmaceutical industry, McKinsey has blanketed the entire pharmaceutical supply chain with
 alumni.

89. Rajiv de Silva, for instance, was appointed CEO of Endo Pharmaceutical in
March 2013. Endo's two top-selling drugs were pain medications. Endo—and de Silva,
individually—have been named in multiple lawsuits related to the ongoing opioid crisis.
Previously, de Silva worked with Pearson in a leadership position within PMP at McKinsey
before joining Rob Rosiello, a former McKinsey partner, and Pearson at Valeant.⁵⁴ McKinsey
advised Endo on its opioid business.

90. Likewise, Frank Scholz was a partner at McKinsey and a leader in the PMP group
for seventeen years prior to departing in 2013 to join Mallinckrodt, another opioid manufacturer
presently in bankruptcy after being named in numerous lawsuits relating to the ongoing opioid
crisis. In fact, Scholz was the President of the "Specialty Generics" division of Mallinckrodt
(formerly SpecGX LLC), which is the division that sold generic opioids. McKinsey advised
Mallinckrodt on its opioid business.

16 91. Teva Pharmaceuticals,⁵⁵ another opioid manufacturer named in numerous lawsuits
17 for its role in the opioid crisis, is led by President and Chief Executive Officer and McKinsey
18 alumnus, Kare Schultz. He joined the company in 2017, at which point he was also appointed to
19 Teva's board of directors. Through an asset manager named Deerfield, McKinsey's in-house
20 hedge fund held a financial stake in Teva Pharmaceuticals while McKinsey advised its numerous
21 clients on how to maximize opioid sales.⁵⁶

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92. McKinsey's involvement with Teva has been long-term. In 2006, upon his

- 23 retirement from McKinsey, Roger Abravanel joined Teva's board of directors the following
- 24

⁵⁴ David Sell, *"Endo CEO downplays Valeant link,"* Philadelphia Inquirer, November 5, 2015, *available at* https://www.inquirer.com/philly/business/20151106_Endo_CEO_downplays_Valeant_link.html

 ⁵⁵ "Teva Pharmaceuticals" or "Teva" refers to Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., together.

⁵⁶ Gretchen Morgenson, "Consulting giant McKinsey allegedly fed the opioid crisis. Now an affiliate may profit from treating addicts.," *NBC News*, February 8, 2021, *available at* https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/consulting-

²⁸ giant-mckinsey-allegedly-fed-opioid-crisis-now-affiliate-may-n1256969 McKinsey's in-house hedge fund is discussed further, below.

year.⁵⁷ By 2011, Teva had acquired Cephalon, Inc., another manufacturer of opioids, as "a core
part of [Teva's] strategy" of "growth through acquisitions."⁵⁸ Befitting the pattern, Cephalon had
its own long-standing ties to McKinsey before being acquired by Teva. In 2008, when Cephalon's
Executive Vice President, General Counsel, and Secretary John E. Osborn retired, he accepted a
job as "an advisor on life sciences regulatory and compliance matters to the international
consulting firm McKinsey & Company, Inc."⁵⁹

7 93. McKinsey has ties to another notable opioid industry combination: the 2012 acquisition of Actavis, Inc.by Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Watson") for €4.25 billion. In the 8 9 aftermath of the acquisition of the large European pharmaceutical company, Watson created a "Global Integration Management Office" reporting directly to its CEO, Paul Bisaro, to focus "on 10 planning and implementing the integration of Actavis."⁶⁰ In order to achieve this critical task, 11 Watson hired Marc Lehnen: "We were very pleased to recruit Marc from McKinsey & Company, 12 13 Inc. to lead the Integration Management Office. Marc has years of experience in the generic industry and knows our culture and way of operating."⁶¹ Notably, the press release indicates that 14 15 McKinsey was already advising Watson regarding the acquisition: "Although Marc does not formally join our Company until July, he will nevertheless be involved in the integration planning 16 during this interim period."62 17 Allergan.⁶³ another opioid manufacturer and defendant in the nationwide opioid 18 94. 19 litigation, has also relied on McKinsey as a source of management candidates. McKinsey Senior 20 Adviser Christopher J. Coughlin joined Allergan's board in 2014 and remains there today. 21 22 23 ⁵⁷ Form 20-F dated December 31, 2012, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, available at 24 https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/818686/000119312513050510/d450498d20f.htm ⁵⁸ Id. 25 ⁵⁹ "Cephalon General Counsel John E. Osborn to Resign Position," February 8, 2008, available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/873364/000110465908008569/a08-5085_1ex99d1.htm 26 ⁶⁰ "Watson Announces Formation of Global Integration Management Office to Support ending Actavis Acquisition," PR Newswire, May 9, 2012, available at https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/watson-announces-formation-27 of-global-integration-management-office-to-support-pending-actavis-acquisition-150755565.html ⁶¹ *Id*. 28 ⁶² *Id.* (emphasis added). ⁶³ Allergan is part of the same corporate family as Actavis and Watson.

1 95. Abbott Labs, which partnered with Purdue in the early years of OxyContin to use 2 Abbott's sales force to market Purdue's drug, has been led by CEO Miles White since 1998. White began his career at McKinsey around 1980.

3

4 96. As the preceding paragraphs make clear, McKinsey was in a truly unique position: 5 given its dominance of pharmaceutical management consulting through PMP, practically all 6 opioid industry participants were its clients. And those same clients routinely hire McKinsey 7 consultants to leadership positions within their companies. While advising multiple industry 8 participants regarding the sales of competing products, McKinsey was in a position to know 9 confidential information and trade secrets of these clients "with the understanding that confidentiality is paramount."⁶⁴ 10

97. Because of its client relationships, McKinsey was, quite literally, the sole 11 repository on Earth of this collective knowledge of industry-wide tactics regarding the sales and 12 13 marketing of opioids, and the outcomes thereof. This unique collection of knowledge and 14 expertise made McKinsey a hub: even if any two given industry participants did not know what 15 each other was doing, McKinsey knew exactly what *both* were doing because both were clients. 98. 16 McKinsey's relationships and influence carry far beyond the manufacturers. For 17 instance, current McKinsey director Nancy Killefer has also been an independent director of 18 Cardinal Health, Inc. ("Cardinal") —one of the "Big Three" Distributor Defendants in the 19 ongoing nationwide opioid litigation—since 2015. Chunhui Moi, Cardinal's current Vice 20 President of Corporate Strategy, was previously an associate principal at McKinsey, where he 21 worked for nine years. Michele Holcomb, Cardinal's current Executive Vice President, Chief 22 Strategy and Business Development Officer, was a partner in the Global Pharmaceutical Practice 23 at McKinsey.

99. McKinsey populates the "strategy" positions at the other opioid distributors as 24 25 well. At AmerisourceBergen, the "Director of Corporate Development and Strategy" was hired 26 away from McKinsey, where she had previously been a senior associate. AmerisourceBergen's 27 Executive Vice President and Chief Strategy Officer had previously been a partner at McKinsey.

⁶⁴ McDonald, *The Firm*, Pg. 308.

1	100. At McKesson Corporation ("McKesson"), another McKinsey client, the President
2	of McKesson Specialty Health and, previously Vice President of Corporate Strategy, was Marc
3	Owen. "Prior to joining McKesson, Owen was a senior partner at McKinsey, advising
4	pharmaceutical manufacturers, healthcare providers, distributors and technology companies,
5	including McKesson, for more than a decade."65 After Owen was promoted in 2012, McKesson
6	hired yet another Vice President of Corporate Strategy away from McKinsey.
7	101. In short, one way McKinsey adds value for a client is by knowing what all of its
8	competitors are doing. It possesses a greater body of knowledge about any given industry in
9	which it advises multiple participants than any individual participant does itself.
10	3. <u>The Transformational Relationship</u>
11	102. McKinsey has long touted the notion of a "transformational relationship." It is the
12	goal of every client relationship McKinsey develops and, McKinsey argues, the best way to
13	extract value from a client's use of McKinsey's services. McKinsey is not a one-off seller of
14	advice for any given CEO's problem of the day. Rather, McKinsey argues that real value for the
15	client derives from an ongoing "transformational" relationship with the firm. ⁶⁶
16	103. At its core, the "transformational relationship" is <i>long-term</i> . It is the antithesis of a
17	one-off contract wherein McKinsey performs one discreet project for a client and then concludes
18	its business. Rather, "once McKinsey is inside a client, its consultants are adept at artfully
19	creating a feedback loop through their work that purports to ease executive anxiety but actually
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26	⁶⁵ "Marc Owen Appointed President of McKesson Specialty Health," McKesson, January 31, 2012, <i>available at</i> https://www.mckesson.com/about-mckesson/newsroom/press-releases/2012/marc-owen-appointed-president-of-
27	 mttps://www.mckesson.com/about-mckesson/newsroom/press-releases/2012/marc-owen-appointed-president-or-mckesson-specialty-health/ (emphasis added) ⁶⁶ Duff McDonald, <i>The Firm</i>, Pg. 136-37 ("McKinsey no longer pitched itself as a project-to-project firm; from this
28	point forth [the late 1970s], it sold itself to clients as an ongoing prodder of change, the kind a smart CEO would keep ground indefinitely.")

keep around indefinitely.").

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1	creates more of it." ⁶⁷ The long term result can be "dependence" on the McKinsey consultants.
2	"We insinuate ourselves," Ron Daniel, McKinsey's then-managing partner, told Forbes in 1987.68
3	104. "They have follow-on work not just because they're good at what they do, but
4	because they are trained in how to manage these kinds of client relationships. They understand
5	that the core reality is the relationship and the conversation, and that any particular engagement is
6	merely epiphenomenal," explained Alan Kantrow, formerly the editor of McKinsey Quarterly. ⁶⁹
7	105. This strategy of weaving itself into all aspects of its clients' business proved
8	enormously successful for McKinsey over the years. It was a strategy McKinsey encouraged its
9	consultants to take with clients to great effect:
10	The sell worked: Once ensconced in the boardrooms of the biggest corporate players
11	in the world, McKinsey rarely left, ensuring a steady and growing flow of billings for years if not decades. In 2002, for example, <i>BusinessWeek</i> noted that at that
12	moment, the firm had served four hundred clients for fifteen years or more. ⁷⁰
13	106. Another aspect of the transformational relationship McKinsey develops with
14	clients is the development and marketing of "leave-behind" products, such as software
15	applications, that are sold to clients as tools that can be used by the business on an on-going and
16	recurring basis, separate and apart from McKinsey's project-based consulting work. As described
17	by Harvard Business School Professor Clayton Christensen, starting in 2007, "McKinsey &
18	Company initiated a series of business model innovations that could reshape the way the global
19	consulting firm engages with clients. One of the most intriguing of these is McKinsey Solutions,
20	software and technology-based analytics and tools that can be embedded at a client, providing
21	ongoing engagement outside the traditional project-based model."71
22	⁶⁷ <i>Id.</i> at pg. 6. Purdue provides a fine example of this feedback loop in action. In 2008, when McKinsey was advising
23	Purdue regarding Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies ("REMS") for OxyContin required by the FDA, McKinsey partner Maria Gordian wrote to fellow partners Martin Elling and Rob Rosiello regarding progress in the
24	"REMS work" as well as "Broader Strategy work." Regarding the latter, Gordian noted that Purdue board members Jonathan Sackler and Peter Boer "basically 'blessed' [Craig Landau] to do whatever he thinks is necessary to 'save
25	the business.' <i>I believe there is a good opportunity to get another project here.</i> " MCK-MAAG-0117875 (emphasis added). Indeed, after the REMS work was completed, McKinsey continued to work on "Broader Strategy
26	 work" for another decade. ⁶⁸ John Merwin, "We Don't Learn from Our Clients, We Learn from Each Other," <i>Forbes</i>, October 19, 1987.
27	⁶⁹ Duff McDonald, <i>The Firm</i> , Pg. 185.

 ⁶⁹ Duff McDonald, *The Firm*, Pg. 185.
 ⁷⁰ *Id.* at pg. 136.
 ⁷¹ Clayton Christensen, Dina Wang, and Derek van Bever, "Consulting on the Cusp of Disruption," *Harvard Business Review*, October 2013, *available at* https://hbr.org/2013/10/consulting-on-the-cusp-of-disruption 28

107. McKinsey's relationship with Purdue provides an example of the deployment of 1 2 these "leave-behind" products. One McKinsey Solution is a pharmaceutical sales and marketing 3 workforce optimization tool called FieldGuide, a proprietary software application McKinsey sells 4 to clients. "The FieldGuide tool optimizes salesforce deployment and territory design through advanced geospatial analysis that leverages both market-potential insights across device 5 6 categories and advanced sales-response curve analysis."⁷² McKinsey sold it to Purdue for the 7 purpose of optimizing Purdue's OxyContin salesforce.

8

D. **McKinsev and Purdue: A Case Study in Transformation**

9 108. Indeed, McKinsey's work with Purdue is a prime example of the transformational 10 relationship in action. McKinsey counted Purdue as a client at least as early as 2004, three years 11 *before* Purdue's parent and officers first pleaded guilty to misbranding OxyContin in 2007. McKinsey was actively working with Purdue to increase OxyContin sales despite that guilty plea 12 13 and continued to do so throughout the time period that Purdue and its advisors were bound by the terms of the Corporate Integrity Agreement entered in to alongside the guilty plea. McKinsey's 14 15 work with Purdue continued through at least 2018.

McKinsey staffed at least forty known consultants to Purdue, from senior partners 16 109. 17 all the way down through engagement managers and entry-level associates. Throughout the 18 unfolding of the nationwide opioid crisis that only continued to worsen after the 2007 guilty plea, 19 McKinsey remained steadfast alongside the Sacklers and Purdue every step of the way. The *mea* 20 culpas would come only later.

McKinsey partner Maria Gordian, in her March 26, 2009 "EY 2009 Impact 21 110. 22 Summary" internal report to McKinsey director Olivier Hamoir and McKinsey's Personnel 23 Committee, recounted her accomplishments that year on the Purdue account. The document is an annual self-assessment produced by McKinsey partners. In it, Gordian described the state of 24 25 firm's relationship for Purdue:

26

27

With client work extending through the 3rd quarter, and several additional proposals in progress, we continue to expand the depth and breadth of our relationships at

²⁸ ⁷² https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/how-we-helpclients/medtech/marketing-and-sales

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1 2	Purdue. We look forward to deepening our relationships with the Sackler family and serving them on key business development issues, and to expanding our relationship with [John] Stewart and other members of the senior management team. ⁷³
3	111. Gordian even described herself as a counselor to Richard Sackler in the same
4	memorandum, in addition to being a "point of contact for the Board and Sackler family." ⁷⁴
5	112. The continued expansion of the depth and breadth of McKinsey's relationship with
6	Purdue was an ever-present internal goal for McKinsey, as it was accompanied by recurring and
7	ever-increasing client billings.
8	113. By 2014, both the breadth and depth of McKinsey's relationship with Purdue had
9	expanded dramatically. During the 2009 to 2014 period in particular, Purdue relied extensively on
10	McKinsey to develop and implement its sales and marketing strategy for OxyContin. But
11	McKinsey's work for Purdue involved many other facets of Purdue's business beyond sales and
12	marketing, including general and administrative consulting, review of product acquisition,
13	evaluation of research and development, advising Purdue on the design of clinical studies, risk
14	management, and interactions with regulators.
15	114. McKinsey's sales and marketing work for Purdue focused on creating and
16	implementing strategies and tactics to bolster the sales of OxyContin, a Schedule II drug that is
17	widely recognized as among the most frequently diverted and abused opioids. As Purdue faced
18	growing scrutiny, McKinsey also helped the company protect its public image and profit from the
19	market for illicit opioids, which McKinsey's industry-wide efforts helped to promote and
20	maintain.
21	115. McKinsey understood the Sacklers' goals for Purdue and the work it would need
22	to perform to maintain and grow Purdue's opioid profits amidst a growing epidemic of addiction
23	and abuse. Part of McKinsey's work involved assessing the "underlying drivers" of OxyContin's
24	(financial) performance. As described below, these drivers boil down to two things: (1) a
25	widespread deceptive marketing campaign and (2) fueling an illicit market for non-medical use.
26	
27	⁷³ The Ad Hoc Group of Non-Consenting States' Statement in Support of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors' Motions to Compel Production of Purportedly Privileged Documents for <i>In Camera</i> Review, Doc. No.
28	2012, <i>In re Purdue Pharma, Inc.</i> , filed November 18, 2020, Case No. 19-23649 (S.D.N.Y.), Ex 7, Pg. 48; MCK-MAAG 0118669.
I	⁷⁴ Id.

1 Purdue entered into guilty pleas arising out of both types of conduct in 2007 and 2020, respectively. McKinsey delved into the "granular" aspects of Purdue's sales and promotion. And, 2 3 throughout the two companies' long-term relationship, McKinsey understood Purdue's business "both in terms of content and culture," as its own renewed consulting agreement assured in 2013. 4 5 1. **2004: McKinsey and Purdue Meet** 116. On March 1, 2004, McKinsey entered into a Master Consulting Agreement with 6 Purdue for services that would be defined from time to time.⁷⁵ The Agreement was signed on 7 8 McKinsey's behalf by Rob Rosiello, then a senior partner in the PMP practice group. After a ruling that held patents on OxyContin unenforceable due to Purdue misleading the patent office. 9 McKinsey stepped in to help Purdue.⁷⁶ 10 The Master Consulting Agreement 11 117. 12 13 ,,77 14 15 16 **,,**78 17 From 2004 through 2008, McKinsey advised Purdue on research and development, 18 118. business development, and product licensing related to Purdue's opioid products.⁷⁹ Consistent 19 with its business model, McKinsey leveraged these projects into growth of its "Broader Strategy 20 work" also underway with Purdue.⁸⁰ Specifically, in October 2008, Purdue retained McKinsey for 21 broad strategy work after two board members "blessed" Purdue executive Craig Landau with 22 doing "whatever he thinks is necessary to 'save the business" after the 2007 criminal plea and 23 introduction of generic competition to the older OxyContin.⁸¹ 24 25 ⁷⁵ PPLPC012000069192 26 ⁷⁶ Id. ⁷⁷ Id. 27 ⁷⁸ PPLPC020000034087 ⁷⁹ PPLPC013000116218; PPLP004401340 28 ⁸⁰ MCK-MAAG-0117875 ⁸¹ Id.

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1	2. <u>2007: Purdue Pleads Guilty to Misbranding OxyContin and is Bound</u>
2	by a Corporate Integrity Agreement
3	119. On May 10, 2007, John Brownlee, United States Attorney for the Western District
4	of Virginia, announced the guilty plea of the Purdue Frederick Company, the parent of Purdue
5	Pharma, relating to the misbranding of OxyContin. Brownlee stated,
6	Even in the face of warnings from health care professionals, the media, and members
7	of its own sales force that OxyContin was being widely abused and causing harm to our citizens, Purdue, under the leadership of its top executives, continued to push a
8	fraudulent marketing campaign that promoted OxyContin as less addictive, less subject to abuse, and less likely to cause withdrawal. In the process, scores died as
9	a result of OxyContin abuse and an even greater number of people became addicted
10	to OxyContin; a drug that Purdue led many to believe was safer, less subject to abuse, and less addictive than other pain medications on the market.
11	120. Purdue Frederick Company as well as three of Purdue's officers, pleaded guilty to
12	the misbranding of OxyContin pursuant to various provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and
13	Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, et seq.
14	121. Purdue admitted that "supervisors and employees, with the intent to defraud or
15	mislead, marketed and promoted OxyContin as less addictive, less subject to abuse and diversion,
16	and less likely to cause tolerance and withdrawal than other pain medications." Part of this
17	deceptive messaging included highlighting OxyContin as a long-acting ("LA") or extended
18	release ("ER") opioid and suggesting it created less chance for addiction than "immediate
19	release" opioids because it had fewer "peak and trough" blood level effects or "did not cause a
20	'buzz' or euphoria" in the same manner as these other opioids.
21	122. Concurrent with its guilty plea, Purdue entered into a Corporate Integrity
22	Agreement with the Office of Inspector General of the United States Department of Health and
23	Human Services on May 7, 2007. Purdue's compliance obligations under the Corporate Integrity
24	Agreement ran for a period of five years, and ultimately terminated in January 2013. ⁸²
25	123. Pursuant to the Corporate Integrity Agreement, Purdue was obligated to implement
26	written policies regarding its compliance program and compliance with federal health care
27	program and Food and Drug Administration requirements, including:
28	82 G 1

28 || ⁸² See https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1329576/download

"selling, marketing, promoting, advertising, and disseminating Materials or 1 a. 2 information about Purdue's products in compliance with all applicable FDA requirements, 3 including requirements relating to the dissemination of information that is fair and accurate ... 4 including, but not limited to information concerning the withdrawal, drug tolerance, drug 5 addiction or drug abuse of Purdue's products"; b. "compensation (including salaries and bonuses) for Relevant Covered 6 7 Persons engaged in promoting and selling Purdue's products that are designed to ensure that 8 financial incentives do not inappropriately motivate such individuals to engage in the improper 9 promotion or sales of Purdue's products"; and "the process by which and standards according to which Purdue sales 10 c. 11 representatives provide Materials or respond to requests from [health care providers] for 12 information about Purdue's products, including information concerning withdrawal, drug 13 tolerance, drug addiction, or drug abuse of Purdue's products," including "the form and content of Materials disseminated by sales representatives," and "the internal review process for the 14 15 Materials and information disseminated by sales representatives." 124. Purdue was obligated to engage an Independent Review Organization to ensure its 16 17 compliance with the strictures of the Corporate Integrity Agreement and to file compliance 18 reports on an annual basis with the Inspector General. 19 125. In the wake of its accession to the Corporate Integrity Agreement, Purdue faced 20 newly imposed constraints on its sales and marketing practices. The Corporate Integrity 21 Agreement was a problem to solve. Despite the agreement's constraints (i.e., do not lie about 22 OxyContin), Purdue and its controlling owners, the Sackler family, still intended to maximize 23 OxyContin sales. 24 The Sacklers React to the "Concentration of Risk" Posed to Them by 3. the Opioid Business. 25 26 126. The Sackler family has owned and controlled Purdue and its predecessors since 27 1952. At all times relevant to this Complaint, individual Sackler family members occupied either 28 six or seven of the seats on Purdue's board of directors, and at all times held a majority of Board

seats. To advise the board of directors of Purdue Pharma was to advise the Sackler family. The 1 interests of the Sackler family and the Purdue board of directors, and Purdue itself, as a privately 2 3 held company, were all aligned. Practically, they were indistinguishable.⁸³ As a result of the 2007 guilty plea, the Sacklers made the strategic decision to 4 127. 5 distance the family from Purdue, which was regarded, in the words of Richard Sackler, as an increasingly dangerous "concentration of risk" for Purdue's owners. Ten days after the guilty plea 6 7 was announced, David Sackler wrote to his father, Richard Sackler, and uncle, Jonathan Sackler, describing precisely what that "risk" was: legal liability for selling OxyContin. In response to 8 9 Jonathan stating that "there is no basis to sue 'the family," David replied: 10 Message 11 From: David Sackler 5/17/2007 11:08:08 PM Sent: I. Sackler, Dr Richard 12 To: Ionathan' CC: Ives, Stephen A. 13 Subject: RE: Idea Attachments: image001.jpg 14 Well I hope you're right, and under logical circumstances I'd agree with you, but we're living in America. This is the land 15 of the free and the home of the blameless. We will be sued. Read the op-ed stuff in these local papers and ask yourself how long it will take these lawyers to figure out that we might settle with them if they can freeze our assets and threaten 16 us. 17 128. Given concern over this "concentration of risk," the two sides of the Sackler 18 family spent considerable time and energy debating the best way to achieve distance from Purdue, 19 and collectively considered a variety of options for doing so. One option was to sell the company 20 to or merge the company with another pharmaceutical manufacturer. They discussed Shire as a 21 possible target, as were Cephalon, UCB, and Sepracor, Inc. The proceeds of such a transaction 22 could then be re-invested in diversified assets, thereby achieving the Sacklers' desired distance 23 from opioids. 24 129. Mortimer D.A. Sackler advocated for a sale or merger in a February 21, 2008 25 email to Richard Sackler (a former president and co-chairman of Purdue) and several others, 26 writing, "The pharmaceutical industry has become far too volatile and risky for a family to hold 27 ⁸³ Craig Landau, soon to become CEO of Purdue, acknowledged in May 2017 that Purdue operated with "the Board 28 of Directors serving as the 'de facto' CEO." The future CEO of the company, in other words, understood that he would have little practical power despite his new title. The owners ran the business.

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95% of its wealth in. It simply is not prudent for us to stay in the business given the future risks
 we are sure to face and the impact they will have on the shareholder value of the business and
 hence the family's wealth." The risk he referred to was, at least in significant part, further liability
 related to OxyContin.

130. Another option was to have Purdue borrow money in order to assure Purdue had
adequate funds to continue operating while the Sacklers, as owners, began to make substantial
distributions of money from the company to themselves. Once again, the proceeds of the
distributions could then be re-invested in diversified assets, thereby achieving the Sacklers'
desired distance.

10 131. In order to pursue either of these options, the Sacklers needed to maximize opioid
11 sales in the short term so as to make Purdue==by then the subject of substantial public scrutiny—
12 appear either as an attractive acquisition target or merger partner to another pharmaceutical
13 manufacturer or as a creditworthy borrower to a lender.

14 132. In short, the Sacklers planned to engage in a final flurry of opioid pushing in order
15 to rid themselves of their pharmaceutical company dependency for good.

16 133. In fact, in the years after the 2007 guilty plea, Purdue would retain only the
absolute minimum amount of money within it as possible: \$300 million. Purdue was required to
retain that amount pursuant to a partnership agreement with separate company. Otherwise, all the
money was distributed to its owners.⁸⁴

134. Given the complexity of the problem, the Sacklers and Purdue realized that they
would need assistance in achieving these internally contradictory objectives. Purdue did not have
the capabilities in-house to design and implement a sales strategy for OxyContin that would
achieve the Sacklers' objectives. They turned to the global management consulting firm
McKinsey, which had already been advising the Sacklers and Purdue for at least three years, for
help with their new problem.

26

 ⁸⁴ See Jared S. Hopkins, At Purdue Pharma, Business Slumps as Opioid Lawsuits Mount, Wall Street Journal, June
 30, 2019, available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/purdue-pharma-grapples-with-internal-challenges-as-opioid-lawsuits-mount-11561887120?mod=hp_lead_pos6

1 135. Notably, under the terms of Paragraph II.C.1(b) of the Corporate Integrity
 2 Agreement, McKinsey, as a contractor to Purdue performing sales and marketing functions for
 3 the company, was itself a "Covered Person" subject to the strictures of the Agreement.⁸⁵

4. <u>Purdue Tasks McKinsey with Boosting Opioid Sales in Light of the</u> <u>Guilty Plea and Corporate Integrity Agreement.</u>

136. The Sacklers faced a problem: the need to grow OxyContin sales as dramatically 6 7 as possible so as to make Purdue an attractive acquisition target or borrower, while at the same 8 time appearing to comply with the Corporate Integrity Agreement. As one Purdue executive 9 stated of Purdue's attitude toward the Corporate Integrity Agreement: "They did not listen to their critics and insisted they had just a few isolated problems. After the settlement, they didn't 10 change-the way the sales force was managed and incentivized, everything stayed the same."86 11 137. Purdue and the Sacklers were well aware of the constraints posed by the 12 13 Agreement. Indeed, during a May 20, 2009 Executive Committee Meeting, the discussion led to 14 whether Purdue should have a single sales force marketing all Purdue products, including 15 OxyContin, or instead to "create a separate Sales Force for Intermezzo (a sleeping pill) that would be comprised of approximately 300 representatives." John Stewart, Purdue's then-CEO, saw an 16 17 opportunity, and asked if the Corporate Integrity Agreement would apply if Purdue were to 18 launch Intermezzo and another Purdue product, Ryzolt (a branded version of Tramadol, another 19 narcotic painkiller), using the separate sales force. Might the new drug launch fall outside of the Corporate Integrity Agreement, he asked?⁸⁷ 20 138. It would not, he was told by Bert Weinstein, Purdue's Vice President of 21 Compliance.⁸⁸ 22 23 139. Given the tension between compliance with the Corporate Integrity Agreement and the desire to sell more OxyContin, Purdue needed help. 24 25 ⁸⁵ The relevant language in the Corporate Integrity Agreement provides: "Covered Persons' includes . . . all 26 contractors, subcontractors, agents, and other persons who perform sales, marketing, promotional, pricing, government contract, or regulatory functions . . . on behalf of Purdue." PDD1712900096. 27 ⁸⁶ David Crow, *How Purdue's 'one-two' punch fuelled the market for* opioids, Financial Times, September 9, 2018,

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available at: https://www.ft.com/content/8e64ec9c-b133-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c

^{28 &}lt;sup>87</sup> PPLPC012000226606, Purdue Pharma Executive Committee Meeting Notes and Actions, May 20, 2009, Pg. 2. ⁸⁸ *Id*.

1 140. Ethan Rasiel, a former McKinsey consultant, has described the typical way
 2 McKinsey begins working with a client: "An organization has a problem that they cannot solve
 3 with their internal resources. That's the most classic way that McKinsey is brought in."⁸⁹
 4 141. Such was the case with Purdue. Because it did not have the requisite expertise to

address the problems posed by the Corporate Integrity Agreement internally, Purdue expanded on
its already-existing relationship with McKinsey to devise a sales and marketing strategy to
increase opioid sales despite the Corporate Integrity Agreement and growing concern about the
"concentration of risk" that Purdue's business of selling opioids posed to its owners.

9 142. McKinsey's task was to thread the needle: to increase OxyContin sales despite the
10 strictures imposed by the five-year Corporate Integrity Agreement. This McKinsey did,
11 turbocharging⁹⁰ the sales of a drug it knew fully well was addictive and deadly, while purporting
12 to respect to the Corporate Integrity Agreement.

13 143. In short, Purdue would pay money to McKinsey in exchange for McKinsey
14 enabling the company how to sell as much OxyContin as conceivably possible so that the
15 Sacklers could obtain cash to diversify their investment holdings away from Purdue, and keep
16 their money safe from the reach of court judgments, fines, and penalties they feared.

17 144. Consistent with their plan to dissociate themselves from the company, the Sacklers
appointed Mr. Stewart as the CEO of Purdue in 2007. The Sacklers viewed Stewart as someone
loyal to the family. He had previously worked for a division of Purdue in Canada. Stewart's job
was to assist the Sacklers with the divestiture or eventual orderly wind-down of Purdue. Stewart
was paid more than \$25 million for his services to Purdue from 2007 through 2013.

145. Purdue's Executive Committee discussed Stewart's concerns regarding the
constraints posed by the Corporate Integrity Agreement on May 20, 2009. Within weeks,
McKinsey was working with Purdue to devise and implement new marketing strategies for
OxyContin.

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 ⁸⁹ How McKinsey Became One of the Most Powerful Companies in the World, CNBC, June 6, 2019 available at:
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BBmmMj_maII

⁹⁰ If the description is overbearing, note that it is McKinsey's own, as described below.

1	146. Stewart, as CEO, was in charge of the relationship with McKinsey. He controlled
2	workflow to and from McKinsey and required his personal approval for any work orders with
3	McKinsey.
4	147. In addition, Purdue's Vice President of Corporate Compliance, "responsible for
5	developing and implementing policies, procedures, and practices designed to ensure compliance
6	with the requirements set forth in the [Corporate Integrity Agreement]," reported directly to
7	Stewart. ⁹¹
8	148. Throughout their relationship, McKinsey routinely obtained information from,
9	advised, communicated with, and ultimately worked for the Purdue board of directors, controlled
10	by the Sackler family.
11	149. McKinsey would also work in granular detail with the Purdue sales and marketing
12	staff, led during the relevant period by Russell Gasdia, Vice President of Sales and Marketing.
13	150. From as early as June 2009 and continuing at least through July 14, 2014, Purdue
14	routinely relied upon McKinsey to orchestrate its sales and marketing strategy for OxyContin.
15	The relationship was characterized by ongoing interactions between teams from McKinsey and
16	Purdue regarding not only the creation of an OxyContin sales strategy, but also its
17	implementation. McKinsey was a real presence at Purdue. "A team of McKinsey analysts went
18	in-house, camping out in a conference room at Purdue headquarters."92
19	5. <u>Purdue Relies on McKinsey.</u>
20	151. Purdue hired McKinsey not only to give advice, but to devise and then implement
21	a deceptive marketing strategy. For example, for one "major initiative" with Purdue, "McKinsey
22	forecast[ed] a potential incremental increase in sales in the \$200-400mm range" over a three-year
23	period, "[w]hen properly implemented."93
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26	⁹¹ PDD1712900096. ⁹² Patrick Paddan Kasfa, Euning of Pain 202 (2021). In Sontember, McKingey nemed Mr. Kasfa's history of the
27	⁹² Patrick Radden Keefe, <i>Empire of Pain</i> 302 (2021). In September, McKinsey named Mr. Keefe's history of the Sackler family and Purdue and the opioid crisis to its 2021 shortlist for "Business Book of the Year." <i>See https://www.mckinsey.com/about-us/new-at-mckinsey-blog/for-your-reading-list-the-2021-business-book-of-the-year-</i>
28	shortlist 93 PPLPC012000257444

1 152. McKinsey is not cheap, either. Indeed, hiring McKinsey is an expensive
 2 proposition. A single junior consultant—typically a recent college or business school graduate—
 3 runs clients millions of dollars annually.⁹⁴ McKinsey is a highly selective employer and
 4 advertises that its employees join "for the opportunity to apply their talents to complex, important
 5 challenges."⁹⁵ "Talent" is key to McKinsey's model; clients pay for the best and brightest.

6 153. A client does not choose to pay McKinsey unless it expects to receive benefits it
7 could not have obtained within its own organization. McKinsey offers solutions to clients facing
8 challenges they feel they cannot adequately address on their own. This model has been a stunning
9 success for McKinsey. In 2008, McKinsey's annual revenue was \$6 billion. Today, the firm earn
10 more than \$10 billion in revenue each year.⁹⁶

11 154. Clients pay these exorbitant rates for a reason: McKinsey's plans and partnership 12 work. Even critics of the consulting industry recognize the unique efficacy of McKinsey's work. 13 JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon once derided consultants as "substituted management" and 14 stated that "consultants can become a disease for corporations." Dimon made one exception to 15 this rule: McKinsey.⁹⁷ Given unique levels of trust, respect, and access by major corporations 16 across the United States and the world, McKinsey has unmatched power to affect how those 17 corporations behave.

18 155. When Purdue entered into a "Master Consulting Agreement" with McKinsey in
2004, Purdue explicitly recognized McKinsey "has a fine reputation as well as excellent
20 experience and relationships in our industry," which Purdue was counting on to boost its opioids
21 business.⁹⁸

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- 23
- ⁹⁴ Ian MacDougal, *How McKinsey is Making \$100 Million (and Counting) Advising on the Government's Bumbling Coronavirus Response*, ProPublica (July 15, 2020), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-mckinsey-is-making-100-million-and-counting-advising-on-the-governments-bumbling-coronavirus-response.
 ⁹⁵ https://www.mckinsey.com/about-us/overview

 ⁹⁶ Forbes, *McKinsey & Company* (retrieved September 9, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/companies/mckinsey company/?sh=1201a12624c1.

 ⁹⁷ Duff McDonald. *Behind the singular mystique of McKinsey & Co.* The Guest Blog. CNBC. Sept 25, 2013.
 28 Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2013/09/25/behind-the-singular-mystique-of-mckinsey-co.html

⁹⁸ PPLPC012000069192

156. Purdue explicitly recognized that McKinsey stepped in to help Purdue "protect[its] sales and continue to grow our business."99

157. Furthermore, that the Sacklers, as board members of Purdue, relied on McKinsey
in their conduct of Purdue affairs is an admitted fact. In a public filing in the recent Purdue
bankruptcy proceedings, the one side of the Sackler family conceded that they did so: "McKinsey
is widely recognized as 'a leading management consulting firm' and the Former Directors were
statutorily entitled to rely on such expertise."¹⁰⁰

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6. <u>McKinsey Delivers.</u>

9 158. Purdue, as a monoline manufacturer of opioids, relied on McKinsey in practically
10 all aspects of its business.

11

a. Courting the Regulators: "We All Feel Responsible."

12 159. One critical aspect of Purdue's operations, given its status as a producer of
13 controlled substances, was regulatory compliance. McKinsey guided Purdue through practically
14 all of its interactions with regulators whose efforts to protect the public might pose threats to
15 Purdue's business.

16 160. McKinsey advised Purdue on how to approach the FDA in light of its criminal
17 conviction and retain business in light of the reputational damage to the company and to
18 OxyContin after the admissions in its guilty plea.

19 161. In 2008, Purdue submitted a New Drug Application for a reformulation of
20 OxyContin, ostensibly to make it more difficult to abuse by extracting the active ingredient from
21 it or otherwise defeating the time-release mechanism in OxyContin tablets—i.e., another product
22 Purdue would later deceptively promote as safer than and less prone to abuse than it was.

162. Having advised Purdue on the design of tests of reformulated OxyContin as part of
Purdue's FDA submission, McKinsey knew that reformulated OxyContin could still be abused.
Purdue nonetheless touted its introduction of reformulated OxyContin and another ADF opioid as

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¹⁰⁰ In re: Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 19-23649, Doc. 3441-1, at ¶ 328 (Aug. 5, 2021).

^{28 &}lt;sup>99</sup> *Id.* (emphasis added).

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1	evidence of its good corporate citizenship and commitment to protecting the public. McKinsey
2	worked with the Sacklers to prepare for Purdue's meetings with the FDA.
3	163. On January 20, 2009, McKinsey partner Maria Gordian wrote to partners Rob
4	Rosiello and Martin Elling to update them on these ongoing efforts with Purdue:
5	We had a very good FDA rehearsal yesterday with several family members present.
6	The team did an outstanding job on the study. [P]reparing the client and executing the mock meeting. We are off to DC today for the actually (sic) FDA meeting
7	tomorrow. ¹⁰¹
8	164. Gordian's email to Rosiello and Elling forwarded encouraging words from
9	Richard Sackler. He wrote to his daughter, Marianna:
10	I am writing to tell you how impressed I was by the preparation for the FDA meeting.
11	Both the method and the process as well as the content was excellent and a major departure from efforts like this in the past. Please share with the team my views and
12	best wishes for a successful interchange with the FDA. ¹⁰²
13	Marianna forwarded the well-wishes to Gordian and the team at McKinsey.
14	165. In September 2009, Purdue made a presentation to the FDA advisory committee
15	considering its application for its reformulated OxyContin and stated that the new formulation
16	would deter abuse. According to metadata, the PowerPoint presentation was prepared by
17	McKinsey.
18	166. The FDA approved the reformulation of OxyContin in April 2010. ¹⁰³
19	167. Having successfully navigated the approval process with McKinsey's chaperoning,
20	Purdue then proceeded to market the ADF version of OxyContin as a solution to opioid abuse and
21	as a reason that doctors could continue to safely prescribe their opioids.
22	168. In 2020, two FDA advisory committees evaluating the impact of the reformulated
23	OxyContin concluded that reformulated OxyContin did not, in fact, substantially reduce abuse.
24	169. At the same time as it worked to rehabilitate Purdue's image with the FDA,
25	McKinsey, in parallel, advised Purdue on how to limit FDA regulations aimed at mitigating the
26	¹⁰¹ The Ad Hoc Group of Non-Consenting States' Statement in Support of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors' Motions to Compel Production of Purportedly Privileged Documents for <i>In Camera</i> Review, Doc. No.
27	2012, <i>In re Purdue Pharma, Inc.</i> , filed November 18, 2020, Case No. 19-23649 (S.D.N.Y.), Ex D, Pg. 25 (emphasis added).
28	 ¹⁰² Id. ¹⁰³ See https://www.fda.gov/media/126835/download

1	risks of opioid use. In 2008, shortly after Purdue's criminal plea, the FDA requested Purdue
2	submit a proposed "Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy" ("REMS") for OxyContin.
3	McKinsey provided Purdue with drafts of the submission. ¹⁰⁴ Indeed, McKinsey was crucial in
4	devising Purdue's response to the FDA's request for a REMS proposal from Purdue. Gordian
5	informed Rosiello and Elling on October 23, 2008 that John Stewart, Purdue's CEO, "is aware of
6	the critical role we are playing in pulling REMs together and is very appreciative." In the same
7	email, she noted that "the family" was focused "on the response to the non-approval letter" from
8	the FDA. ¹⁰⁵
9	170. In 2009, the FDA expanded its scope to a class-wide extended release/long-acting
10	REMS program.
11	171. Seeking to avoid a requirement that prescribers undergo mandatory training on
12	OxyContin's risks or management or obtain certification before prescribing OxyContin, which
13	would limit the numbers of available prescribers, Purdue turned to McKinsey. McKinsey found
14	the cost to Purdue of a system to verify completion of prescriber education before prescriptions
15	could be filled would be \$50 million—an estimate Purdue used to oppose efforts for more
16	rigorous risk management strategies. ¹⁰⁶
17	
18	
19	
20	172. Armed with McKinsey's analysis, Purdue's strategy on REMS was effective. The
21	REMS program avoided verification and enrollment provisions that would harm Purdue's profits.
22	173. Meanwhile, based on McKinsey's work on extended release opioid REMS,
23	McKinsey was aware of warnings and adverse events included within the OxyContin medication
24	
25	
26	 ¹⁰⁴ PDD8901578031 ¹⁰⁵ The Ad Hoc Group of Non-Consenting States' Statement in Support of the Official Committee of Unsecured
27	Creditors' Motions to Compel Production of Purportedly Privileged Documents for <i>In Camera</i> Review, Doc. No. 2012, <i>In re Purdue Pharma, Inc.</i> , filed November 18, 2020, Case No. 19-23649 (S.D.N.Y.), Ex C, Pg. 22.
28	¹⁰⁶ PDD8901530124 ¹⁰⁷ PPLPC019000622253

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1	guide and communications plans, including risks of overdose and adverse events including
2	dizziness and lethargy.
3	174. In June 2009, McKinsey helped Purdue prepare for an FDA advisory committee
4	meeting.
5	
6	175. McKinsey prepared for Purdue an "FDA Advisory Committee on Reformulated
7	OxyContin: Question & Answer Book" in September 2009, with questions including "Why
8	should we trust you?" In response, McKinsey recommended Purdue say "We acknowledge
9	mistakes made in the past[;]" "We have x, y and z measures in place that did not exist before[;]"
10	and "[a]t all levels, Purdue's focus is on maintaining the highest ethical standards and meeting the
11	needs of patients[.]" ¹⁰⁹
12	176. Sometimes, McKinsey's work was as obfuscating as it was self-revealing. To the
13	question of "Who at Purdue takes personal responsibility for all these deaths?[,]" McKinsey
14	offered the following response: ¹¹⁰
15	Who at Purdue takes personal responsibility for all these deaths?
16	who at Furdue takes personal responsibility for all these deaths?
17	We all feel responsible
18	
19	1
20	12 MCK-MAAG-0152135
21	
22	b. The Granularity of Growth
23	177. To this end, McKinsey prides itself on certain managerial techniques it professes
24	to have detailed knowledge of and expertise in deploying. These techniques are generally
25	
26	¹⁰⁸ PDD8901645845
27	 ¹⁰⁹ MCK-MAAG-0152135 ¹¹⁰ The Ad Hoc Group of Non-Consenting States' Statement in Support of the Official Committee of Unsecured
28	Creditors' Motions to Compel Production of Purportedly Privileged Documents for <i>In Camera</i> Review, Doc. No. 2012, <i>In re Purdue Pharma, Inc.</i> , filed November 18, 2020, Case No. 19-23649 (S.D.N.Y.), Ex F, Pg. 39.

1	applicable to problems encountered by many businesses; they are conceptual frameworks that
2	McKinsey deploys when tasked with solving a problem for a client.
3	178. After Purdue's first guilty plea, the Sacklers desired dramatic, short-term growth
4	of Purdue's opioid sales so as to increase the company's attractiveness as an acquisition target or
5	borrower while allowing the Sacklers to take money out of the company. One service McKinsey
6	offers to its clients is to tell them how to grow.
7	179. In order to identify growth opportunities for a client, McKinsey espouses a
8	"granular" approach to identifying which subsets of the client's existing business are the sources
9	of growth, and exploiting them for all they are worth. In August 2008, McKinsey directors
10	Patrick Viguerie and Sven Smit, together with Mehrdad Baghai, published a treatise on the
11	matter: The Granularity of Growth: How to Identify the Sources of Growth and Drive Enduring
12	Company Performance (Wiley, April 2008). "The key is to focus on granularity, to breakdown
13	big-picture strategy into its smallest relevant components."111
14	180. Previously, in an article in <i>McKinsey Quarterly</i> (coincidentally published the same
15	month that Purdue pled guilty), the authors explained:
16	Our research on revenue growth of large companies suggests that executives should
17	"de-average" their view of markets and develop a granular perspective on trends, future growth rates, and market structures. Insights into subindustries, segments,
18	categories, and micromarkets are the building blocks of portfolio choice. Companies will find this approach to growth indispensable in making the right decisions about
19	where to compete. ¹¹²
20	181. Additionally, McKinsey encouraged a granular assessment of the geography of
21	corporate growth. "The story gets more precise as we disaggregate the company's performance
22	on the three growth drivers in 12 product categories for five geographic regions." ¹¹³
23	
	182. One can imagine this strategy applied to a seller of, say, cartons of milk. If
24	182. One can imagine this strategy applied to a seller of, say, cartons of milk. If McKinsey were to perform an analysis of the milk seller's sales and marketing and discover that
24 25	
	McKinsey were to perform an analysis of the milk seller's sales and marketing and discover that the profit margin on milk cartons sold to university cafeterias in dairy-producing states is much
25	McKinsey were to perform an analysis of the milk seller's sales and marketing and discover that

1	greater than the margin on cartons sold at convenience stores in the southwest, and further that the
2	milk seller has previously devoted equal amounts of time and resources selling to both university
3	cafeterias and convenience stores, then McKinsey would likely advise the client to deploy
4	additional resources towards selling milk to university cafeterias in dairy-producing states.
5	McKinsey's "granular" approach to the milk seller's business channels has identified a way to
6	increase higher margin sales, leading to newfound growth and profitability for the client.
7	183. Rather than milk, McKinsey deployed this strategy on OxyContin, a controlled
8	substance, after its manufacturer pled guilty to misrepresenting the addictive and deadly
9	properties of the drug.
10	c. "Identifying Granular Growth Opportunities for OxyContin"
11	184. McKinsey's granular analysis of Purdue's OxyContin sales efforts led to the
12	implementation of a number of strategies to sell more pills.
13	185. By January 2010, McKinsey informed Purdue, in accordance with the lessons of
14	McKinsey's granular growth analysis, that Purdue could generate "\$200-400mm" in additional
15	annual sales of OxyContin by implementing McKinsey's strategies. ¹¹⁴
16	186. In November 2010, a McKinsey report instructed sales reps to maximize profits by
17	"emphasizing [the] broad range of doses"—which meant pushing the doses that were highest and
18	most profitable. ¹¹⁵
19	187. In 2012, John Stewart assigned McKinsey to "understand the significance of each
20	of the major factors affecting OxyContin's sales." ¹¹⁶
21	188. This McKinsey did in excruciatingly granular detail, analyzing each sales channel
22	for Purdue's opioids to identify weaknesses, opportunities, and to suggest courses of action to
23	improve performance. Many core themes of McKinsey's work would be crystallized in a series of
24	presentations and updates made to the Sackler family and to Purdue's board of directors in the
25	summer of 2013 entitled "Identifying Granular Growth Opportunities for OxyContin."
26	
27	¹¹⁴ PPLPC012000257443; PPLPC012000257446


- 28 115 PPLPC018000346294 116 PPLPC020000587064

i. **Marketing – Countering Emotional Messages** 1 From the outset of McKinsey's known work for Purdue, the work was grim. In 189. 2 June 2009, McKinsey teamed with Purdue's then-Chief Medical Officer (and current CEO) Craig 3 Landau and his staff to discuss how best to "counter emotional messages from mothers with 4 teenagers that overdosed in [sic] OxyContin." 5 190. Months later, McKinsey advised Purdue to market OxyContin based on the false 6 and misleading notion that the drug can provide "freedom" and "peace of mind" for its users, give 7 patients "the best possible chance to live a full and active life," and concomitantly reduce stress 8 and isolation.¹¹⁷ 9 191. These marketing claims were tailored to avoid any pitfalls that the Corporate 10 Integrity Agreement might hold. While false and misleading, these claims regarding "freedom" 11 and "peace of mind" of OxyContin users were narrowly tailored in order to avoid representations 12 regarding "the withdrawal, drug tolerance, drug addiction or drug abuse of Purdue's products," as 13 specified in Section III.B.2.c of the Corporate Integrity Agreement.¹¹⁸ 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ¹¹⁷ PPLPC023000239858

> MASTER COMPLAINT (SCHOOL DISTRICTS) 21-MD-02996-CRB (SK)

¹¹⁸ PDD1712900096

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Disease Control and Prevention guideline, following a "systematic review of the best available
evidence," concluded that "[w]hile benefits for pain relief, function and quality of life with longterm opioid use for chronic pain are uncertain, risks associated with long-term opioid use are
clearer and significant."¹²² According to the CDC director, "for the vast majority of patients, the
known, serious, and too-often- fatal risks far outweigh the unproven and transient benefits [of
opioids for chronic pain]."¹²³

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195. In addition to crafting carefully-tailored quality of life assurances designed to avoid the pitfalls of the Corporate Integrity Agreement, McKinsey invented other misleading marketing efforts for Purdue.

10 196. For instance, McKinsey urged Purdue to capitalize on OxyContin's extended11 release characteristics in another way: marketing OxyContin's twelve-hour dosing as though
12 users only need to take OxyContin twice a day, thus requiring fewer pills. OxyContin in fact was
13 well known to wear off after eight to ten hours in many patients, however. What McKinsey called
14 "convenient," would later be called "a [d]escription of Hell."

15 197. This misleading assurance of twelve-hour relief is especially pernicious, as end-ofdose failure renders OxyContin even more dangerous because patients begin to experience 16 17 withdrawal symptoms, followed by a euphoric rush with their next dose—a cycle that fuels a 18 craving for OxyContin. For this reason, Dr. Theodore Cicero, a neuropharmacologist at the Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis, called OxyContin's twelve-hour dosing 19 "the perfect recipe for addiction."¹²⁴ Many patients will exacerbate this cycle by taking their next 20 dose ahead of schedule or resorting to a rescue dose of another opioid, increasing the overall 21 22 amount of opioids they are taking. Promotion of twelve-hour dosing, without disclosing its

23

on a patient's work, physical and mental functioning, daily activities, or enjoyment of life.").

 122 CDC Guideline at 2, 18.

ALLERGAN_MDL_00387583; Warning Letter from Thomas Abrams, Dir., FDA Div. of Mktg., Adver., & Commc'ns, to Brian A. Markison, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer, King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (March 24, 2008) (finding the claim that "patients who are treated with [Avinza (morphine sulfate ER)] experience an improvement in their overall function, social function, and ability to perform daily activities . . . has not been demonstrated by substantial evidence or substantial clinical experience."). ALLERGAN_CA_00161496. The FDA's warning letters were available to McKinsey on the FDA website.

²⁷ ¹²³ Thomas R. Frieden and Debra Houry, New England Journal of Medicine, "Reducing the Risks of Relief – The CDC Opioid-Prescribing Guideline" at 1503 (Apr. 21, 2016).

^{28 &}lt;sup>124</sup> Harriet Ryan, "'You Want a Description of Hell?' OxyContin's 12-Hour Problem," Los Angeles Times, May 5, 2016, available at http://www.latimes.com/projects/oxycontin-part1/.

limitations, is misleading because it implies that the pain relief supplied by each dose lasts twelve
 hours.

In addition to designing misleading marketing messages, McKinsey even
suggested encouraging a new channel through which those messages could be delivered to
prescribers. McKinsey encouraged the tactic of "patient pushback," wherein McKinsey and
Purdue would foment patients to directly lobby their doctors for OxyContin even when those
physicians expressed reservations regarding the administration of Purdue's opioids.

8 199. The idea was that McKinsey and Purdue could spread their own message through
9 pain patients who would be perceived as more credible sources suggesting a need for controlled
10 or extended release opioid—even though the team devising this strategy would have known that
11 extended release opioids did not substantially control pain or thwart addiction better than lower12 dose, immediate release opioids.¹²⁵

13 200. McKinsey also coached Purdue on building "trust" (which from its vantage point,
14 McKinsey knew was misplaced) in Purdue following its criminal conviction.

15

16

ii. Targeting – Selling More OxyContin to Existing High Prescribers

201. Perhaps the key insight McKinsey provided was, using its granular approach, to
identify historically large prescribers and target ever more sales and marketing resources on them,
without any regard for, and indeed conscious disregard of, patient safety. Physician targeting
proved effective. McKinsey advised Purdue that visiting high-prescribing doctors many times per
year increased sales. This relentless drive to increase sales and create greater availability of
opioids was made with no notable concern about the parallel increase in opioid-related deaths,
abuse, and misuse.

24 202. On January 20, 2010, Purdue's board was informed of the ongoing work
25 McKinsey was performing concerning a new "physician segmentation" initiative whereby
26 McKinsey would analyze the opioid prescribing patterns of individual physicians to identify those

¹²⁵ PDD8901645845

that had historically been the highest prescribers.¹²⁶ McKinsey then worked with Purdue's sales
 and marketing staff to specifically target those prescribers with a marketing blitz to encourage
 even further prescribing.

4 203. Purdue trained its sales force in tactics to market to these high prescribers based on
5 McKinsey's insights and designed in conjunction with McKinsey.

204. Many of the historically highest prescribers of OxyContin—those same individuals
that McKinsey urged Purdue to target for ever more prescriptions—had prescribed Purdue's
OxyContin *before* the 2007 guilty plea and had already been subjected to Purdue's
misrepresentations regarding OxyContin that were the subject of that guilty plea.

205. McKinsey identified these physicians—those that had already been influenced by
Purdue's misrepresentations and were thus already high prescribers—as optimal targets for a
massive marketing push to sell more OxyContin.

206. McKinsey worked assiduously with Purdue over many years to continually refine
this approach and required ever-more granular data for its analysis. More than three years after
the initial introduction of the physician segmentation initiative, McKinsey requested, and Purdue
provided, "prescriber-level milligram dosing data" so that McKinsey could further analyze the
individual amounts of OxyContin prescribed by individual physicians.

207. At the same time it requested this "prescriber-level milligram dosing data" from
Purdue, McKinsey urged the Sacklers to strictly manage the target lists of each sales
representative to assure that the maximum amount of each sales representative's time was spent
with the most attractive customers.

208. On July 23, 2013, Purdue's board discussed concerns about "the decline in higher
strengths" of Purdue's opioids as well as an observed decline is "tablets per Rx." In order to
assure that the threat to OxyContin sales growth be addressed, McKinsey was assigned "to
actively monitor the number and size of opioid prescriptions written by individual doctors."¹²⁷

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28 126 PPLPC012000257446 127 PPLP004307354 209. In unveiling Project Turbocharge to Purdue and the Sacklers, McKinsey stated that
 the most prolific OxyContin prescribers wrote "25 times as many OxyContin scripts" as less
 prolific prescribers and urged Purdue and the Sacklers to "make a clear go-no go decision to
 'Turbocharge the Sales Engine'" by devoting substantial capital toward McKinsey's plan.¹²⁸

5 210. McKinsey also stated that increased numbers of visits by sales representatives to
6 these prolific prescribers would increase the number of opioid prescriptions that they would write.
7 This singular focus on increasing prescriptions was not coupled with colorable concern for the
8 patient population.

9 211. By November 2013, McKinsey had obtained the physician-level data they had
10 previously requested and continued to study ways to sell additional OxyContin prescriptions by
11 refining and targeting the sales pitch to them. The Purdue board was kept apprised of McKinsey's
12 progress.

13 212. Not only did McKinsey identify which doctors prescribed the most of Purdue's opioids, McKinsey also recommended segmenting prescribers into "types" and tailoring messages 14 15 and tactics to the different prescriber profiles. For prescribers dubbed "Early Adopting Experts" and "Proactive Teachers," defined by a willingness to use extended release opioids, including in 16 17 opioid naïve patients (patients who were not already using opioids), McKinsey urged 18 emphasizing that its seven tablet strengths provide flexibility to "tailor the dose" to customer needs.¹²⁹ Upon information and belief, this message aimed to encourage prescribers to initiate and 19 20 maintain patients on OxyContin long-term by reminding them they could increase the dose as 21 patients became tolerant with long-term use (rather than discontinue use when the drug lost its effectiveness). 22

23 213. In its October 26, 2009 presentation, "OxyContin – driving growth through
24 stronger brand loyalty,"¹³⁰ McKinsey proposed tactics to turnaround declining sales, "[e]nhance
25 loyalty to OxyContin among loyalist prescribers," "[c]onvert[ing] 'fence sitters' into more loyal

- 26
- 27 $\frac{128}{128}$ PPLP004409890
- 28 ¹²⁹ MCK-MDL2296-0126522
 - 130 *Id*.

OxyContin prescribers," and "[p]rotect OxyContin's market share[.]"¹³¹ In other words,

McKinsey proposed increasing sales by pushing both willing and reluctant physicians to prescribe
more OxyContin.

4 214. McKinsey also recommended a strategy to target those prescribers who did not
5 regularly prescribe OxyContin—so-called "Resigned Followers and ER Delayers" —encouraging
6 them to "increase step-up" to extended release opioids. These were physicians with "low comfort
7 with extended release opioids." McKinsey encouraged Purdue to emphasize to them the "range of
8 appropriate patients." In other words, McKinsey's strategy recommended that Purdue encourage
9 prescribers to use OxyContin earlier in a patient's treatment for a wider range of patients and for
10 longer periods of time.

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iii. Titration – Selling Higher Doses of OxyContin

12 215. McKinsey understood that the higher the dosage strength for any individual
13 OxyContin prescription, the greater the profitability for Purdue. Of course, higher dosage
14 strength, particularly for longer periods of use, also contributes to opioid dependency, addiction
15 and abuse. Nonetheless, McKinsey advised Purdue to focus on selling higher strength dosages of
16 OxyContin.

17 216. Consistent with its granular growth analysis, as early as October 26, 2009,
18 McKinsey advised the Sacklers and the Purdue board that Purdue should train its sales
19 representatives to "emphasiz[e] the broad range of doses," which would have the intended effect
20 of increasing the sales of the highest (and most profitable) doses of OxyContin.¹³²

21 217. McKinsey's work on increasing individual prescription dose strength continued
22 throughout the time period McKinsey worked with Purdue. The Sacklers were informed on July
23, 2013 that Purdue had identified weakness in prescribing rates among the higher doses of
24 OxyContin and reassured the Sacklers that "McKinsey would analyze the data down to the level
25 of individual physicians" in order to study ways to maximize the sales of the highest-dose
26 OxyContin pills.

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¹³¹ *Id.* at 2. ¹³² PPLPC018000346294

1	218. Purdue implemented McKinsey's suggestions through adopting the marketing
2	slogan to "Individualize the Dose" and by 2013 encouraged its sales representatives to "practice
3	verbalizing the titration message" when selling Purdue's opioids to prescribers. ¹³³
4	219. McKinsey would have known, however, that higher doses of opioids carry greater
5	risk. Patients receiving high doses of opioids (e.g., doses greater than 100 mg morphine
6	equivalent dose ("MED") per day) as part of long-term opioid therapy are three to nine times
7	more likely to suffer overdose from opioid-related causes than those on low doses. As compared
8	to available alternative pain remedies, scholars have suggested that tolerance to the respiratory
9	depressive effects of opioids develops at a slower rate than tolerance to opioids' analgesic effects.
10	The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention also recognize that higher doses of opioids tend
11	to increase overdose risks relative to any potential patient benefit. ¹³⁴
12	220. Claims that opioids could be taken in ever-increasing strengths to obtain pain
13	relief, without disclosing that higher doses increased the risk of addiction and overdose, are
14	deceptive and misleading. They were particularly important to promotional efforts, however,
15	because patients on opioids for more than a brief period develop tolerance, requiring increasingly
16	high doses to achieve pain relief. Marketers needed to generate a comfort level among doctors to
17	ensure the doctors maintained patients on the drugs even at the high doses that became necessary.
18	221. Purdue adopted McKinsey's proposal. ¹³⁵
19	
20	
21	136
22	222. The titration messaging worked. Nationwide, based on an analysis by the Los
23	Angeles Times, more than 52% of patients taking OxyContin longer than three months are on
24	
25	 ¹³³ PPLP003450924 ¹³⁴ Dowell D, Haegerich TM, Chou R. CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain – United States,
26	2016. MMWR Recomm Rep 2016;65(No. RR-1):1–49. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.rr6501e1 ¹³⁵ PPLPC023000251226 (
27	PPLPC012000243668 (); PPLPC012000245087 (); PPLPC012000246009 (; PPLPC021000265092 (
28) ¹³⁶ PKY183123435
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doses greater than sixty milligrams per day, which converts to the ninety MED that the CDC
 guideline urges prescribers to "avoid" or "carefully justify."¹³⁷

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iv. Covered Persons – Sales Quotas and Incentive Compensation

4 223. McKinsey urged the use of quotas and bonus payments to motivate Purdue's sales
5 force to sell as many OxyContin prescriptions as possible. As McKinsey described it, "[r]evision
6 to incentive comp could better align reps to Purdue's economics."¹³⁸

7 224. Notably, this behavior was prohibited by the 2007 Corporate Integrity Agreement,
8 which required Purdue to implement written policies regarding "compensation (including salaries
9 and bonuses) for [sales representatives] engaged in promoting and selling Purdue's products that
10 are designed to ensure that financial incentives *do not inappropriately motivate such individuals*11 *to engage in the improper promotion or sales of Purdue's products.*"¹³⁹

12 225. By 2010, Purdue had implemented a four-year plan, consistent with McKinsey's
13 strategy, to dramatically increase the quota of required annual sales visits by Purdue sales
14 representatives to prescribers. The quota was 545,000 visits in 2010, 712,000 visits in 2011,
15 752,000 in 2012, and 744,000 visits in 2013.

226. On August 15, 2013, as part of their "Identifying Granular Growth Opportunities
for OxyContin" presentation, McKinsey urged the Sacklers to "establish a revenue growth goal
(*e.g.*, \$150M incremental stretch goal by July 2014) and set monthly progress reviews with CEO
and Board."¹⁴⁰

20 227. In its "Identifying Granular Growth Opportunities for OxyContin" presentation to
21 the Purdue board in July 2013, McKinsey nonetheless urged Purdue, in addition to increasing the
22 focus of the sales force on the top prescribers, to increase the overall quotas for sales visits for
23 individual sales representatives from 1,400 to 1,700 annually.

25 26 27 ¹³⁷ CDC Guideline at 16. ¹³⁸ PPLPC012000441016 28 ¹³⁹ PDD1712900096 (emphasis added).

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	228. In 2013, McKinsey identified one way that Purdue could squeeze more
Ţ	productivity out of its sales force: by slashing one third of the time that Purdue devoted to
t	raining its sales force (from 17.5 days per year to 11.5 days):
	One possible way to attain benchmark ~1500 calls per year is to decrease
	training days by ~6 days and increase calls per day by 5%
	Current call activity Potential new allocation
	Number of "on territory" days per year Number of "on territory" days per year
	Item Days1_ Item Days1_
	Number of working days260Number of working days260Holidays-11.3Holidays-11.3
	Vacation and other time off -27.2 Vacation and other time off -27.2
	Trainings and meetings -17.5 Trainings and meetings -11.5
	Other company-related time off of field -4,3 Other company-related time off of field -4,3
	Total days 199.7 Total days 205.7
	Avg calls per day × 7 Avg calls per day × 7.35 Total calls per year 1398 Total calls per year 1512
	1 Purdue 2012 Actual data was used for this analysis SOURCE: Purdue: team analysis McKinsay & Company 59
	229. By eliminating one third of the amount of time sales representatives were requi
t	o be in training, McKinsey projected that Purdue could squeeze an additional 5% of physical
C	calls per day out of its newly less-trained sales force.
	230. Additionally, McKinsey developed and advised Purdue on a new incentive
c	compensation structure for the sales representatives, who were Covered Persons pursuant to the
(Corporate Integrity Agreement. McKinsey knew that, combined with the strictures of sales qu
8	and less training for the sales force, bonus/incentive compensation to the sales representatives
ł	based on the number of OxyContin prescriptions the representative produced could be a powe
1	driver of incremental OxyContin sales, without regard for patient safety.
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7. <u>Transformation: Purdue and McKinsey Adopt and Implement</u> <u>McKinsey's Strategies.</u>

231. As early as September 11, 2009, McKinsey determined and told Purdue that it
could generate \$200 million to \$400 million in additional annual sales of OxyContin by
implementing McKinsey's strategy based on the opportunities its granular growth analysis had
identified. McKinsey reiterated its assurances regarding the hundreds of millions of dollars of
additional OxyContin sales on January 20, 2010.

8 232. Purdue accepted and, with McKinsey's ongoing assistance, implemented
9 McKinsey's strategies for selling and marketing OxyContin.

10 233. For instance, in January 2010, Purdue was training its sales and marketing force on 11 the new sales tactics based on a "physician segmentation" initiative that McKinsey urged. The 12 strategy developed as a result of McKinsey's granular analysis of OxyContin sales channels. The 13 initiative sought to identify the most prolific OxyContin prescribers and then devote significant 14 resources towards convincing those high prescribers to continue to prescribe ever more 15 OxyContin, in higher doses, for longer times, to ever more patients.

16 234. On January 20, 2010, the Purdue board was informed of the progress in
17 implementing McKinsey's "physician segmentation" initiative.

18 235. This transformative collaboration would continue over the course of the19 relationship between Purdue and McKinsey.

20 236. During the time that McKinsey was working with Purdue, Purdue deliberately
21 minimized the importance of the Corporate Integrity Agreement. In 2008, Carol Panara joined the
22 Purdue sales force from rival Novartis. She would stay with the company until 2013, during
23 which time McKinsey was responsible for increasing OxyContin sales at Purdue, and culminating
24 with the implementation of McKinsey's "Project Turbocharge," beginning September 2013.

25 237. Ms. Panara stated that the 2007 guilty plea was deliberately minimized by the
26 company in presentations to its sales staff: "They said, 'We were sued, they accused us of mis27 marketing, but that wasn't really the case. In order to settle it and get it behind us we paid a fine.'

You had the impression they were portraying it as a bit of a witch hunt."¹⁴¹ (Purdue and its
 executives paid \$634.5 million in fines.)

3	238. Consistent with McKinsey's mandate, McKinsey devised methods for sales staff to
4	sell OxyContin to doctors while at the same time maintaining technical compliance with the
5	Corporate Integrity Agreement. Ms. Panara stated that, though she was told she could not flatly
6	claim that OxyContin was better or safer than other opioids, "she was trained to talk about
7	product in ways that implied that it was safer." She might tout OxyContin's twelve-hour
8	formulation to a prescriber. "You could say that with a shorter-acting medication that wears off
9	after six hours, there was a greater chance the patient was going to jump their dosing schedule
10	and take an extra one a little earlier. We couldn't say [it was safer], but I remember we were told
11	that doctors are smart people, they're not stupid, they'll understand, they can read between the
12	lines." ¹⁴²
13	8. <u>Project Turbocharge</u>
14	239. The Corporate Integrity Agreement expired in January 2013. With this restriction
15	lifted, McKinsey devised additional marketing and sales strategies for Purdue to further increase
16	OxyContin sales.
17	240. On May 14, 2013, McKinsey entered into a "Statement of Services to the Master
18	Consulting Agreement" (the "2013 Agreement") with Purdue to "conduct a rapid assessment of
19	the underlying drivers of current OxyContin performance, identify key opportunities to increase
20	near-term OxyContin revenue and develop plans to capture priority opportunities."
21	
22	143
23	241. The 2013 Agreement stated, "We have a long history of partnership with Purdue,
24	and we would make best efforts to leverage our understanding of your business – both in terms of
25	content and culture." It was signed by then-principal Arnab Ghatak, who would "lead the team
26	
27	¹⁴¹ David Crow, <i>How Purdue's 'one-two' punch fuelled the market for opioids</i> , Financial Times, September 9, 2018, <i>available at:</i> https://www.ft.com/content/8e64ec9c-b133-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c
28	142 Id.

¹⁴³ PPLPC030000770531


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1	with senior leadership from Rob Rosiello and Martin Elling." Elling was a leader of McKinsey's
2	PMP group. ¹⁴⁴
3	242. McKinsey was tasked with "Identifying Granular Growth Opportunities for
4	OxyContin," conducting an "assessment of the underlying drivers of current OxyContin
5	performance," identifying "key opportunities to drive near-term OxyContin performance," and
6	developing "plans to capture priority opportunities." ¹⁴⁵
7	243. For purposes of the project, McKinsey would need "[f]ull access to work done to
8	date and key data." ¹⁴⁶ And,
9	147
10	244. Staff told the Sacklers that McKinsey would study how to get doctors to prescribe
11	more OxyContin, ¹⁴⁸ how to use incentive compensation to push reps to generate more
12	prescriptions, how to use "patient pushback" to get doctors to prescribe more opioids, and how to
13	keep patients on opioids longer. ¹⁴⁹
14	245. The 2013 Agreement would lead to Project Turbocharge, McKinsey's successful
15	bid to transform Purdue's sales and marketing efforts for OxyContin now that Purdue was no
16	longer bound by the Corporate Integrity Agreement.
17	246. In the summer of 2013, McKinsey made multiple recommendations to Purdue's
18	board to increase OxyContin revenue, and urged the Sackler family to "make a clear go-no-go
19	decision to 'Turbocharge the Sales Engine."
20	247. Purdue, like McKinsey, recognized that the initiative was no small thing. An
21	internal Purdue email states that
22	150
23	248. The Sacklers were impressed. On August 15, 2013, Richard Sackler emailed
24	Mortimer D.A. Sackler, "[T]he discoveries of McKinsey are astonishing."
25	¹⁴⁴ Id.
26	¹⁴⁵ PPLPC030000770531 / MCK-MAAG-0024283 ¹⁴⁶ <i>Id.</i>
27	¹⁴⁷ PPLPC012000431809 ¹⁴⁸ PPLPC012000431262
28	¹⁴⁹ <i>Id.</i> ; PPLPC012000431266 ¹⁵⁰ PPLPC012000437344

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1	249. Eight days later, on August 23, 2013, McKinsey partners met with the Sackler
2	family-not the Purdue board of directors-to pitch Project Turbocharge. Dr. Arnab Ghatak, one
3	of the McKinsey partners leading the Purdue account, recounted the meeting to fellow McKinsey
4	partner Martin Elling in an email exchange: "[T]he room was filled only with family, including
5	the elder statesman Dr. Raymond [Sackler] We went through exhibit by exhibit for about 2
6	hrs They were extremely supportive of the findings and our recommendations and
7	wanted to strongly endorse getting going on our recommendations." ¹⁵¹
8	250. Elling, a co-leader of the Purdue account, remarked in the same email
9	correspondence that McKinsey's "findings were crystal clear to" the Sacklers, and that the
10	Sacklers "gave a ringing endorsement of 'moving forward fast." ¹⁵²
11	251. As a result of the Sackler family endorsement of McKinsey's proposals, the
12	following month Purdue implemented Project Turbocharge based on McKinsey's
13	recommendations. In adopting "Project Turbocharge," Purdue acknowledged the improper
14	connotations of the name, and re-christened the initiative the decidedly more anodyne "E2E:
15	Evolve to Excellence." ¹⁵³
16	252. Evolve to Excellence ("E2E") was the theme of Purdue's 2014 National Sales
17	Meeting.
18	253. CEO John Stewart also told sales staff that board member Paolo Costa was a
19	"champion for our moving forward with a comprehensive 'turbocharge' process," referring to
20	McKinsey's plan.
21	254. After Purdue adopted McKinsey's recommendations, McKinsey continued to work
22	with Purdue sales and marketing staff reporting to Russell Gasdia during Purdue's
23	implementation of McKinsey's recommendations.
24	
25	
26	¹⁵¹ MCK-MDL2996-0403095 ¹⁵² <i>Id.</i>
27	 ¹⁶³ Regarding the name change, CEO John Stewart wrote to McKinsey partners Rob Rosiello and Arnab Ghatak on August 15, 2013: "Paolo Costa was especially engaged in the discussion and he (among others) will be a champion
28	for our moving forward with a comprehensive 'turbocharge' process – <i>though we do need to find a better and more permanently appropriate name</i> ." PPLPC012000436626 (emphasis added).

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1	order to increase profits, Purdue must again increase the number of sales visits to "high-value"
2	prescribers, i.e., those that prescribe the most OxyContin. ¹⁵⁴
3	260. Purdue and McKinsey worked together to implement "Turbocharging the Sales
4	Engine."
5	
6	155
7	261. McKinsey and Purdue also worked together on an "implementation plan" for E2E,
8	with McKinsey taking on the role of "executive oversight" of projects including the creation of
9	target lists, internal dashboards to track progress, and changes to Purdue's incentive
10	compensation plan consistent with E2E. ¹⁵⁶
11	a. Targeting High Subscribers
12	262. Project Turbocharge called for revising the existing process for targeting high-
13	prescribing physicians, with a shift from targeting solely on the basis of prescription deciles to
14	considering additional factors. Based on its analysis, McKinsey told Purdue that "[t]here is
15	significant opportunity to slow the decline of OxyContin by calling on more high-value
16	physicians" and that "[t]he revenue upside from sales re-targeting and adherence could be up to
17	\$250 million."
18	
19	
20	¹⁵⁴ In fact, recent deposition testimony suggests McKinsey may have been responsible for the fact that Timney was
21	given the CEO job at Purdue in the first place. On October 30, 2020, Timney provided the following testimony (emphasis added):
22	Q: Are you familiar with McKinsey & Company? A: I decline to answer on the ground that I may not be compelled to be a witness against
23	myself in any proceeding. Q: Did individuals at McKinsey <i>assist you in getting hired as the CEO</i> of Purdue?
24	A: I decline to answer on the ground that I may not be compelled to be a witness against myself in any proceeding.
25	In fact, McKinsey appears to have played a substantial role in the succession of several Purdue CEO's. Martin Elling, in his 2018 annual self-assessment, provided the following example of "how I deliver
26	impact:" "Actively managing CEO/CXO transitions: from Michael Friedman to John Stewart (2007) to Mark Timney (2014) to Craig Landau (2017) at Purdue." MCK-MDL2996-0357931. "I drove our
27	introduction of Purdue in 2004 and then, with Rob Rosiello, built it into a substantial and sustaining client We have served across four CEOs and are now helping the new leadership team adapt to a world of
28	headwinds for their core product OxyContin," he added. MCK-MDL2996-0357931. ¹⁵⁵ PPLPC021000615265
	¹⁵⁶ MCK-MDL2996-0180338, at 0180340

263. The core objective of McKinsey's initiative was to ensure that Purdue was
 "making calls on the highest potential customers with the right frequency to maximize prescribing
 potential."

4 264. McKinsey determined and advised Purdue that the top half of prescribing
5 physicians "write on average 25 times more scripts per prescriber" than the lower half. McKinsey
6 advised that Purdue would see a greater return on its sales investment by focusing on these
7 targets, including on prescribers with alarming prescribing patterns that raised red flags they were
8 writing "prescriptions" for non-medical use. McKinsey's plan aimed at boosting sales of
9 OxyContin by targeting the highest volume opioid prescribers, without addressing whether the
10 expanded sales would be for an illicit market.

McKinsey found that Purdue did not "focus on the highest potential docs," 11 265. measured both by the number of prescriptions and reimbursement considerations.¹⁵⁷ One 12 13 McKinsey analyst urged McKinsey to recommend Purdue target "[1]iterally, at least all" prescribers in the top 20% of prescribers, "minus another few percent who are no sees[.]"¹⁵⁸ 14 15 McKinsey team lead Arnab Ghatak replied that "they probably have 20% no see[], but i'd also assume there are not many high writers that are no see."¹⁵⁹ ("No see" prescribers are prescribers 16 17 who do not accept visits from pharmaceutical sales representatives. Thus, McKinsey recognized 18 that most of the highest volume prescribers, or "high writers" of prescriptions, were willing to 19 entertain sales visits from sales representatives.)

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266. "To put this in perspective," McKinsey stated,

the average prescriber in decile 5-10 [the top half of prescribers by volume] writes 25 times as many OxyContin scripts as a prescriber in decile 0-4. In Q1 2013 the majority (52%) of OxyContin primary calls were made to decile 0-4 prescribers. Including the secondary calls, 57% of the primary detail equivalents (PDEs) were made to decile 0-4 prescribers. Best practice in the industry is over 80% of effort on higher value prescribers."

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- 26

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¹⁵⁷ MCK-MDL2996-0364024

28 ¹⁵⁸ MCK-MDL2996-0364267

¹⁵⁹ Id.

1 McKinsey concluded: "Given that there are 14,000 uncalled physicians in deciles 5-10, there is

2 significant opportunity to shift calls to higher potential prescribers."¹⁶⁰

267. McKinsey pointed to a "true physician example" in Wareham, Massachusetts, who wrote 167 more OxyContin prescriptions after Purdue sales reps visited him.¹⁶¹

	Specialty : Ane Location : War Market Decile : 8	sthesiology eham, Massachuse
1-11	12 months ending March 2012	12 months endi March 2013
Calls made on physician	0 P1 1 P2	18 P1 1 P2
physician		

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Graphic from McKinsey presentation recommending targeting high prescribers

15 268. To slow or reverse the decline in OxyContin sales, McKinsey recommended a shift 16 to "value deciles," which purported to weigh prescribers according to factors including overall 17 opioid prescriptions, including the number of branded versus generic prescriptions; prescriber 18 rules in place limiting sales calls; managed care access; and the number of the prescribers new to 19 brand prescriptions, including new opioid patients and switches from other opioid products.¹⁶² 20 The cumulative effect of the value rankings was to shift detailer emphasis onto the highest-21 volume prescribers. Further, McKinsey's analysis found that the highest-volume prescribers were 22 themselves most influenced by detail visits.

23

24

269. Purdue moved quickly to do as McKinsey advised. All sales representatives received a memo on December 23, 2013, identifying how to select "SuperCore" prescribers, or the top ten targets,¹⁶³ in their territory according to the E2E high prescribing principles and

25 26

27 ¹⁶⁰ MCK-MDL2996-0187168 / PPLP004409892

28 | ¹⁶¹ PPLPC012000437356 ¹⁶² PPLPC022000646874 ¹⁶³ MCK-MDL2996-0316833

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1	required that each SuperCore prescriber be visited at least twice a month. ¹⁶⁴
2	
3	
4	¹⁶⁵ As part of these changes, McKinsey's plan involved <i>more</i> minimum sales calls
5	overall. ¹⁶⁶
6	270.
7	
8	who later plead guilty to criminal charges related to an opioid drug ring. The
9	prescriber also surrendered his license to practice after an Ohio Medical Board investigation
10	revealed that he prescribed excessive and dangerous combinations of opioids and muscle relaxers
11	and that he prescribed opioids to a patients who complained of headaches and others who showed
12	signs of addiction. ¹⁶⁷ The same prescriber received at least sixty visits from Purdue from mid-
13	2013 through 2016. ¹⁶⁸
14	271.
15	
16	The doctor, who worked at a family practice, was
17	charged with involuntary manslaughter, Medicaid fraud, drug trafficking, grand theft, and other
18	offenses.
19	272.
20	
21	¹⁶⁹ In 2018, the Drug Enforcement Administration issued an Order to Show Cause and
22	Immediate Suspension Order to Dr. Khan-Jaffrey over concerns that her DEA registration
23	"constituted an imminent danger to the public health and safety," finding she prescribed opioids
24	without a legitimate medical purpose and disregarded urine screens indicating abuse and
25	¹⁶⁴ PURCHI-000005915
26	¹⁶⁵ PPLPC022000686986 ¹⁶⁶ MCK-MDL2996-0187168
27	¹⁶⁷ https://www.cnhinews.com/article_91ffac58-1b32-11e8-b264-6b34793bf5c3.html ¹⁶⁸ Public information about visits at which a payment was made is available for this time period through "Open
28	Public information about visits at which a payment was made is available for this time period through "Open Payments." ¹⁶⁹ PPLPC014000257127
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1	diversion. ¹⁷⁰ Dr. Khan-Jaffrey's DEA registration was fully revoked on July 28, 2020. ¹⁷¹ Dr.
2	Louis Spagnoletti, of Marlton, New Jersey,
3	¹⁷² lost his state license to prescribe controlled substances in 2018. ¹⁷³
4	Similarly, Dr. Vivienne Matalon, a Decile 10 prescriber from Cherry Hill, New Jersey,
5	¹⁷⁴ went on to lose her license in 2018 as well, for
6	allegedly receiving kickbacks to prescribe the fentanyl drug Subsys to three patients, including
7	one that died. ¹⁷⁵
8	273. Another prescriber, Dr. Damon Cary of Wilmington, Delaware,
9	, ¹⁷⁶ received an
10	emergency suspension order in 2019 after prescribing controlled substances, including opioids, to
11	undercover officers without performing any medical examinations. ¹⁷⁷ Dr. Eva Dickinsson, of
12	Harrington, Delaware,
13	¹⁷⁸ was arrested on marijuana charges in 2016 and had her license suspended in
14	2017 for sharing drugs, including opioids, with her patients. ¹⁷⁹
15	274. Dr. Michael Cozzi of Fort Wayne, Indiana,
16	, had his medical license
17	suspended in 2016, where he had prescribed more controlled substances than any other Indiana
18	prescriber, with over two million doses of oxycodone, seeing ninety to100 patients a day. ¹⁸⁰ Dr.
19	Jamie Gurrero,
20	¹⁸¹ was sentenced to 100 months in prison in
21	¹⁷⁰ https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/07/29/2020-16387/kaniz-f-khan-jaffery-md-decision-and-order
22	¹⁷¹ <i>Id.</i> ¹⁷² PPLPC014000257127
23	 ¹⁷² PPLPC014000257127 ¹⁷³ https://patch.com/new-jersey/moorestown/state-suspends-doctor-accused-illegally-prescribing-opioids ¹⁷⁴ PPLPC014000257127
24	¹⁷⁵ https://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases18/pr20180504d.html ¹⁷⁶ PPLPC014000257130
25	 ¹⁷⁷ https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/health/2019/08/05/doctor-prescribed-opioids-undercover-cops-failed-follow-protocol/1920386001/
26	¹⁷⁸ PPLPC014000257130
27	¹⁷⁹ https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/health/2017/01/19/doctors-license-suspended-delaware- maryland/96779080/
28	 ¹⁸⁰ https://www.wane.com/news/fort-wayne-pain-doctors-medical-license-suspended/ (He later died in a tractor accident, https://www.journalgazette.net/news/local/police-fire/20180816/tractor-accident-kills-pain-doctor) ¹⁸¹ PPLPC014000257130
	relevented for the second seco

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2016 after pleading guilty to unlawful distribution or dispensing of controlled substances, health
 care fraud, conspiracy, and money laundering.¹⁸²
 275.

4 Misrepresentations to these prescribers were especially
5 insidious because they were aimed at general practitioners who lack the time and expertise to
6 closely manage higher-risk patients on opioids.

7 276. McKinsey also urged, consistent with continually refining its granular approach,
8 that sales representatives devote two-thirds of their time to selling OxyContin and one-third of
9 their time selling Butrans, another Purdue opioid product. Previously, the split had been fifty10 fifty.

11

b. Circumventing Safeguards Against Abuse and Diversion

277. Project Turbocharge also involved a granular analysis of Purdue's individual sales 12 13 channels. In its August 8, 2013 report to the Purdue board, McKinsey also attributed the decline in OxyContin sales to safeguards to limit suspicious opioid sales. McKinsey informed Purdue that 14 "[t]he retail channel, both pharmacies and distributors, is under intense scrutiny and direct risk." 15 "There are reports of wholesalers stopping shipments entirely to an increasing number of 16 17 pharmacies," "[m]any wholesalers are also imposing hard quantity limits on orders based on prior purchase levels," and "[p]harmacy chains are implementing guidelines for which patients can fill 18 opioid prescriptions[.]"¹⁸³ 19

20 278. For instance, McKinsey recommended that Purdue circumvent pharmacies entirely
21 with a mail order program because enforcement by federal regulators was decreasing OxyContin
22 dispensing through Walgreens. McKinsey informed the Sacklers that "[d]eep examination of
23 Purdue's available pharmacy purchasing data shows that Walgreens has reduced its units by
24 18%." Further, "the Walgreens data also shows significant impact on higher OxyContin
25 dosages."¹⁸⁴

- 26
- ¹⁸² https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdky/pr/kentuckiana-anesthesiologist-sentenced-100-months-unlawful-distribution-controlled
 ¹⁸³ MCK-MAAG-0024297
 - 184 Id.

1	279. In order to counter these perceived problems, McKinsey suggested that Purdue's
2	owners lobby Walgreens specifically to increase sales and circumvent the safeguarding sales
3	limits. It also suggested the establishment of a direct-mail specialty pharmacy so that Purdue
4	could circumvent Walgreens and sell directly to Walgreens' customers. Finally, McKinsey
5	suggested the use of opioid savings cards distributed in neighborhoods with Walgreens locations
6	to encourage the use of Purdue's opioids despite Walgreens actions.
7	280. McKinsey's initiative also included ways to circumvent these safeguards.
8	McKinsey recommended that the sales force distribute vouchers and "starter kits" for patients
9	who faced co-pays for OxyContin prescriptions. ¹⁸⁵ In particular, McKinsey recommended
10	dispensing vouchers to outlets of a specific large national pharmacy chain where prescriptions
11	and OxyContin inventories were down. ¹⁸⁶ This chain, as part of its own settlement with the Drug
12	Enforcement Administration, had removed pharmacist bonuses for dispensing opioids. ¹⁸⁷
13	c. Incentivizing Opioid Sales
14	281. McKinsey's "turbocharging" plan also had other elements.
15	
16	
17	
18	189
19	9. <u>McKinsey's Efforts Triple OxyContin Sales</u>
20	282. In 2013, despite significant headwinds, with marketing activities turbocharged,
21	OxyContin sales peaked. The restrictions on Purdue's sales and marketing methods contained in
22	the Corporate Integrity Agreement should have resulted in fewer overall OxyContin sales; the
23	guilty plea identified a specific segment of existing OxyContin sales that were illegitimate and
24	should thus cease. All else being equal, OxyContin sales should have decreased to account for the
25	
26	¹⁸⁵ MCK-MDL2996-0290827.
27	¹⁸⁶ MCK-MDL2996-0041646. ¹⁸⁷ MCK-MDL2996-0104431; MCK-MDL2996-0041646.
28	¹⁸⁸ PPLPC012000437346. ¹⁸⁹ <i>Id.</i>

successful elimination of improper sales. In fact, OxyContin sales did decrease in the immediate
 aftermath of the 2007 guilty plea.

283. And within five years, however, OxyContin sales would triple. McKinsey is
responsible for the strategy that accomplished this. It presented specific plans to Purdue, which
Purdue adopted and spent hundreds of millions of dollars implementing. The result: a final spasm
of OxyContin sales before the inevitable decline of the drug.¹⁹⁰

7 284. The Purdue McKinsey collaboration was a spectacular success. Between the 2008
8 and 2016, Purdue distributed in excess of \$4 billion to the Sackler family, with \$877 million
9 distributed in 2010 alone.

10 285. These distributions would not have been possible without the McKinsey's work
11 dramatically increasing OxyContin sales.

286. The Sacklers were aware of the value McKinsey provided: on December 2, 2013,
CEO John Stewart informed Kathe Sackler and Vice President of Sales and Marketing Russell
Gasdia Project Turbocharge "was already increasing prescriptions and revenue." Crucially, these
results were already being realized *before* the strategy was fully deployed as the theme of the
2014 National Sales Meeting. Stewart elaborated to Sackler that "trends are more positive than
was the case a few months back, and when the E2E Project (the changes arising out of the
McKinsey analysis) is fully implemented there will certainly be additional increases."¹⁹¹

19

20

21 288. McKinsey's contributions to Purdue's growth after 2007 are remarkable.
22 OxyContin sales should have naturally declined; the Department of Justice identified OxyContin
23 sales that were illegitimate because of Purdue's conduct, and the Inspector General of the
24 Department of Health and Human Services entered into a Corporate Integrity Agreement whereby
25 Purdue was monitored to assure that those sales did not continue.

192

26

287.

Later that month,

 ¹⁹⁰ On February 10, 2018, Purdue announced that it is no longer marketing opioids, and disbanded its OxyContin sales force.
 ¹⁹¹ PPLPC012000454422

¹⁹² PPLPC012000457292

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1	289. In 2007, the year of Purdue's guilty plea, net sales of OxyContin totaled
2	approximately \$1 billion. ¹⁹³
3	290. The guilty plea "did little to stem Purdue's blistering growth rate." In fact, by
4	2010, after McKinsey was advising Purdue on how to maximize sales, OxyContin sales exceeded
5	\$3 billion: a <i>tripling</i> of revenue from OxyContin sales. ¹⁹⁴
6	291. Under McKinsey's guidance, OxyContin sales would reach their all-time peak in
7	2013, the year McKinsey proposed, and Purdue adopted, Project Turbocharge. ¹⁹⁵ That OxyContin
8	sales peaked in 2013 is especially notable, given that overall opioid prescriptions had already
9	peaked three years earlier, in 2010. ¹⁹⁶ McKinsey's efforts added a final boost to OxyContin sales
10	before the eventual unraveling, and Purdue's decision, in the end, to cease marketing the drug.
11	292. Project Turbocharge was a continuing success.
12	¹⁹⁷ and Chief Financial Officer Edward
13	Mahoney reported to the Purdue board that the effort "has resulted in significant improvement."
14	
15	198
16	293. McKinsey was paid handsomely: it received more than for its work for
17	Purdue from 2008 to2013 alone. ¹⁹⁹ In pursuit of these profits, McKinsey continued to help Purdue
18	grow opioid sales even after Purdue reached a 2015 Assurance of Discontinuance with New York
19	arising out of an investigation concerning its Abuse and Diversion Detection program and media
20	coverage highlighted its lack of attention to diversion control. McKinsey's own work elsewhere
21	identified "reducing prescribing" as among the efforts to combat the opioid epidemic and also
22	
23	¹⁹³ See David Crow, How Purdue's 'one-two' punch fueled the market for opioids, Financial Times, September 9, 2018, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/8e64ec9c-b133-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c
24	 ¹⁹⁴ Id. ¹⁹⁵ Phil McCausland and Tracy Connor, OxyContin maker Purdue to stop promoting opioids in light of epidemic,
25	NBC News, February 10, 2018, available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/americas-heroin-epidemic/
26	oxycontin-maker-purdue-stop-promoting-opioids-light-epidemic-n846726 ¹⁹⁶ Gery P. Guy Jr, <i>at al.</i> , <i>Vital Signs: Changes in Opioid Prescribing Patterns in the United States</i> , 2006-2015, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, July 7, 29017, <i>available at:</i> https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/
27	wr/mm6626a4.htm ¹⁹⁷ PPLPC037000159028
28	¹⁹⁸ PPLPC037000159028 ¹⁹⁸ PPLPC014000263961

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1	showed that opioid prescribers were frequently writing prescription for patients with known r	isks
2	of abuse. Still, McKinsey continued to work to help opioid manufacturers increase opioid sale	es,
3	including through Purdue's deceptive marketing campaign.	
4	294. By 2014, according to Purdue, there were 5.4 million OxyContin prescriptions	•
5	written, 80% for twelve-hour dosing. Of those prescriptions, more than half were for doses	
6	greater than sixty milligrams per day.	
7	295. The Sackler family has withdrawn over \$10 billion from Purdue since 2008,	
8	including \$1.7 billion in 2009 alone. These distributions were made possible by McKinsey's	
9	services and came at the expense of a deepening national opioid crisis.	
10	E. <u>McKinsey's Opioid-Related Work with Other Clients.</u>	
11	296. Part of the unique value McKinsey provides is its deep knowledge of its client	s'
12	competitors, often because it counts those same competitors as its clients. McKinsey generall	У
13	does not disclose to its clients its work for their competitors.	
14	297. The opioid industry was no different. Indeed, McKinsey specifically worked to)
15		
16		
17		
18	1. <u>Endo</u>	
19	298. While McKinsey was working for Purdue, McKinsey was also working for Er	do
20	Pharmaceuticals. Arnab Ghatak was a principal McKinsey partner on both accounts at the same	ne
21	time. ²⁰¹ There was additional overlap between the McKinsey teams staffed to Purdue and End	lo,
22	including McKinsey partners Nicholas Mills and Laura Moran. After all, these particular	
23	consultants had granular expertise in the specific subject-matter relevant to these opioid	
24		
25	 ²⁰⁰ MCK-MDL2996-0041741. ²⁰¹ Ghatak's familiarity with both Endo and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one reason why, on April 3, 2014, Ghatak was placed and Purdue is perhaps one r	aced
26	in charge of analyzing a proposed <i>partnership</i> between Purdue and Endo to sell opioids. Lauran Moran describe "partnership workstream" that McKinsey was then performing for Purdue to identify ways for Purdue to obtain	d the
27	term growth. She stated that Purdue and McKinsey "agreed the partnerships workstream should include the top potential partners (Valeant, Endo and Pfizer for now). And for each what assets each partner would bring and w	3
28	growth (most importantly) would the deal bring. Arnie [Ghatak] and Phil to work out Endo and Valeant, John G Raul to do Pfizer tomo." MCK-MDL2996-0421790.	

1 manufacturers. That subject-matter expertise is a compelling reason why McKinsey is hired in the 2 first place. McKinsey advised both Endo and Purdue how to maximize the sales or their branded 3 opioid products-Belbuca (Buprenorphine), Butrans (Buprenorphine), Opana (Oxymorphone), 4 and OxyContin (Oxycodone) —all at once. 5 **New Blues** a. 299. Like Purdue, Endo was historically a pharmaceutical manufacturer focused on the 6 7 pain market. Like Purdue, Endo relied on opioid sales for a significant portion of its business. As 8 a matter of fact, Endo's history with opioids predates the Sacklers' ownership of Purdue. In 1950, 9 Endo's predecessor, Intravenous Products of America, Inc., launched Percodan, an Oxycodone/Aspirin tablet. In 1971, Endo, then owned by E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company 10 ("DuPont"), launched Percocet, another oxycodone-based tablet.²⁰² 11 300. In 1997, Endo separated from DuPont to become a standalone private company 12 retaining Percodan and Percocet.²⁰³ In 2000, as the result of an acquisition, the company became 13 public.²⁰⁴ 14 In 2006, Endo launched its own branded oxymorphone products, Opana and 15 301. Opana ER.²⁰⁵ With the legacy assets of Percodan and Percocet, Endo's business had always been 16 17 focused on opioid sales. Oxymorphone is not a new opioid, and Opana was not Endo's first 18 oxymorphone product. It was first synthesized more than a century ago in Germany. Endo began selling it in the United States in 1959 under the name Numorphan. 19 20 302. Numorphan was referred to as "blues," after the color of the 10mg pills. It delivered a more euphoric high than heroin, according to some. In 1974, the National Institute on 21 Drug Abuse noted in its "Drugs and Addict Lifestyle" report that Numorphan was popular as an 22 abused drug for its quick and sustained effect.²⁰⁶ By 1979, Endo withdrew Numorphan from the 23 24 25 26 ²⁰² https://www.endo.com/about-us/history#fragment-25 ²⁰³ https://www.endo.com/about-us/history#fragment-24 27 ²⁰⁴ https://www.endo.com/about-us/history#fragment-21 ²⁰⁵ https://www.endo.com/about-us/history#fragment-15


^{28 &}lt;sup>206</sup> John Fauber & Kristina Fiore, *Abandoned Painkiller Makes a Comeback*, MedPage Today (May 10, 2015), *available at:* https://www.medpagetoday.com/psychiatry/addictions/51448

market. Upon information and belief,

2	207
3	303. The memory of the 1970s Numorphan addiction crises did not fade quickly. In
4	1989, the film Drugstore Cowboy featured Matt Dillon as an addict in the 1970s who robs drug
5	stores to obtain drugs to sell in order to finance his opioid dependency. ²⁰⁸ In one scene, an addict
6	asks Dillon's character if he has any "blues." Dillon's character explains that "blues" are
7	increasingly hard to find, and offers to sell morphine sulfate to an addict instead. The addict
8	explained that he much preferred the Numorphan, but settled for the morphine. ²⁰⁹
9	304. With the launch of Opana, Endo decided it was time for history to repeat itself.
10	After Opana's approval in 2006, Endo solidified its position as a pain specialist among
11	manufacturers. By 2012, opioid sales accounted for approximately \$403 million of Endo's \$3
12	billion in revenue, more than 10%. From 2010 to 2013, total Opana ER revenue alone exceeded
13	\$1.1 billion.
14	305. Opana and Numorphan were both oxymorphone. The brand name was the only
15	thing that changed. What Endo removed from the market in 1979 due to abuse concerns, it re-
16	introduced 27 years later. After 2006, Opana was on occasion referred to as "blue heaven," or,
17	more to the point, "new blues." ²¹⁰
18	306. In 2017, Endo would once again remove its branded oxymorphone product from
19	the market, and for the same reason. Endo's abuse-deterrent formulation of Opana was removed
20	at the request of the FDA due to acute concerns about its abuse potential.
21	307. In addition to its branded products, Endo, through subsidiaries Qualitest
22	Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and, after its acquisition in 2015, Par Pharmaceuticals, also manufactured
23	generic versions of oxycodone, oxymorphone, hydromorphone, and hydrocodone. Over the
24	
25	²⁰⁷ EPI000443330 (
26	"); ENDO-OPIOID-MDL-06246554 (
27). ²⁰⁸ See https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0097240/; https://www.bionity.com/en/encyclopedia/Oxymorphone.html
28	²⁰⁹ Scene from Drugstore Cowboy, <i>available at</i> : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TksvZdrx9_A ²¹⁰ https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drug_chem_info/oxymorphone.pdf

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1	course of McKinsey's relationship with Endo, McKinsey would repeatedly advise Endo how to
2	maximize its generics business in addition to sales of Endo's branded opioids.
3	b. <u>Old Friends</u>
4	308. McKinsey's relationship with Endo began as early as in 2006, the same year as the
5	Opana launch.
6	309. McKinsey's earliest known work with Endo concerned the launch of Opana in
7	Europe, but its relationship with Endo would expand to encompass all aspects of Endo's business,
8	including corporate organization and resource allocation, the launch of a new branded
9	Buprenorphine product, and sales force optimization efforts for Endo's branded and generic
10	opioid products.
11	310. In 2007, McKinsey was shaping overall corporate strategy at Endo. In a
12	presentation to Endo's board of directors in May of that year
13	
14	
15	
16	."211
17	311. McKinsey's partnership with Endo would last more than a decade, and, like its
18	relationship with Purdue, is an exemplary example of the transformational relationship in action.
19	312. In some ways, the McKinsey's relationship with Endo was even more tightknit and
20	companionable than with Purdue. For instance, no one at Purdue previously worked for
21	McKinsey. In early 2013, Rajiv de Silva, previously a leader of McKinsey's PMP group, was
22	appointed CEO of Endo. At Endo, McKinsey was now advising an old friend, one of its previous
23	senior partners. ²¹²
24	313. As de Silva himself explained, "
25	
26	²¹¹ ENDO-OPIOID_MDL-02899510.
27	 ²¹² See "Rajiv De Silva Named President and CEO of Endo Health Solutions," Press Release dated February 25, 2013, available at: https://investor.endo.com/news-releases/news-release-details/rajiv-de-silva-named-president-and-
28	ceo-endo-health-solutions ("Earlier in his career, he was a Principal at McKinsey & Company, where he served as a member of the partnership group that led the global Pharmaceuticals and Medical Products practice.")

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1	
2	»·213
3	314. Under de Silva, Endo relied more heavily on McKinsey than ever before.
4	McKinsey consultants interacted directly and often exclusively with de Silva. McKinsey was so
5	close to the Endo CEO that it could intervene in direct reporting from one of de Silva's
6	deputies. ²¹⁴ It is as if McKinsey had insinuated itself as a shadow layer of bureaucracy within
7	Endo.
8	315. McKinsey maintained weekly performance review meetings with de Silva and
9	senior Endo management. In these meetings, granular weekly sales data was reviewed for each of
10	Endo's branded products, including Opana. ²¹⁵
11	316. McKinsey advised both Purdue and Endo contemporaneously for more than a
12	decade. With each client, the goal was the same: to maximize opioid sales. The work McKinsey
13	performed for each client was so similar that there was routinely confusion internally about
14	whether a specific project or task to perform was for Endo or Purdue. ²¹⁶
15	317. Despite McKinsey's emphasis on confidentiality, the fact that McKinsey repeats
16	its work from one client to the next is well-known to the client. Indeed, it is part of the
17	justification in hiring McKinsey in the first place. McKinsey can tell you what everyone else is
18	doing.
19	
20	
21	
22	,,217
23	²¹³ ENDO-OPIOID-DEPMAT-000047877 at pg. 320:22 – 321:3.
24	²¹⁴ See MCK-MDL2996-0405502 (Email from Ghatak to de Silva, stating that it "would be great for you to push Blaine and Bob [both Endo employees] on why there are no slides showing the metrics on field call attainment
25	there was an explicit agreement to track them. Setting the expectation that you want them included would really help").
26	 ²¹⁵ MCK-MDL2996-0062712. ²¹⁶ In response to an internal email from Craig MacKenzie to other McKinsey consultants seeking "expert input on
27 28	labels for abuse deterrent formulations" in conjunction with McKinsey's work on the Belbuca launch (discussed <i>infra.</i>), McKinsey consultant Jeff Smith replied, "Craig – is this for Purdue or Endo? If for Endo, I am conflicted." MCK-MDL2996-0383805. ²¹⁷ ENDO-OPIOID-MDL-07619243.




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1	322. McKinsey
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3	
4	
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6	***************************************
7	323. Within a few years of its introduction in the United States, abuse of the drug
8	became widespread. Endo then sought to introduce a reformulated version of Opana that it could
9	market as abuse-deterrent by introducing a tamper-resistant coating to the pill.
10	324. In December 2011, Endo obtained FDA approval for a new formulation of Opana
11	ER with the coating that Endo claimed was crush-resistant. The following month, however, the
12	FDA told Endo that it could not market Opana ER, even after the reformulation, as abuse-
13	deterrent.
14	325. Endo "did not submit any new clinical safety or efficacy data" as part of its
15	application, but rather relied entirely on the "bioequivalence" of the new and old formulations of
16	Opana. Obtaining approval of reformulated Opana ER on this basis allowed Endo to rely on the
17	safety and efficacy of the original version of the drug as the basis for approval of the reformulated
18	version. ²²⁴ The FDA found that such promotional claims "may provide a false sense of security
19	since the product may be chewed and ground for subsequent abuse." In other words, Opana ER
20	was still crushable. In December 2011, Endo admitted that "[i]t has not been established that this
21	new formulation of Opana ER is less subject to misuse, abuse, diversion, overdose, or
22	addiction." ²²⁵
23	
24	
25	²²³ Id.
26	²²⁴ Intervenor Impax Laboratories, Inc.'s (1) Cross-Motion to Dismiss; or, in the Alternative, (2) Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, <i>Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, et</i>
27	<i>al.</i> ("Impax Br."), No. 1:12-cv-01936 Doc. 18 at 7 (D.D.C. Dec.9, 2012); <i>see also</i> FDA Summary Review for Regulatory Action, NDA 201655 (Dec. 9, 2011) (stating that "[n]o new safety data were included in this submission"
•	and "[n]o efficacy studies were submitted in this application.").

^{28 &}lt;sup>225</sup> Endo Dec. 12, 2011 News Release; Ex. A to Rurka Decl., *Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, et al.*, No. 1:12-cv-01936 Doc. 18-2 (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2012).

1	326. In 2013, an Endo training module directed key opinion leaders to instruct
2	prescribers that OPANA ER with INTAC is the only oxymorphone designed to be "crush-
3	resistant," and advised the key opinion leaders to state during their speeches that "[t]he only way
4	for your patients to receive oxymorphone ER in a formulation designed to be crush-resistant is to
5	prescribe OPANA ER with INTAC."226 The speakers were advised to stress that generic versions
6	of Oxymorphone "are not designed to be crush-resistant."
7	327. These abuse-deterrent attributes of the reformulation—the very characteristics
8	McKinsey and Endo touted as a reason to prescribe Opana—were a sham. The reformulation was
9	designed to prevent the pill from being crushed and snorted through the nose. It did not prevent
10	intravenous use, however. The result was that many users already dependent of Opana began
11	using needles to inject the drug for the first time. As an internal Endo email put it,
12	,,227
13	328. Jeff, a veteran of the war in Iraq, explained the process. Jeff first became
14	dependent on Percocet and Opana after returning from Iraq, where his back was injured when his
15	Humvee rolled over in 2008. After being prescribed opioids for his back pain, Jeff became
16	dependent, and began using Opana by snorting it. Endo then introduced the reformulated abuse-
17	deterrent version of Opana in 2012. "[A]nd then they reformulated them," he said, referring to the
18	Opana pills. "And the only way you could really do them is inject them because if you actually
19	swallow them, it – you – they really don't do nothing." ²²⁸
20	329. Jeff and his companion Joy showed the journalist how the drug was used. "You
21	want to see how to cook it?" Jeff asked. He and Joy then proceeded to place a portion of an
22	Opana pill on piece of aluminum and heat it with a lighter. "Right away, I can start to see this
23	hard, white coating just kind of floating off the piece of the pill. It looks like plastic," described
24	the journalist witnessing the process. ²²⁹
25	
26	²²⁶ EPI000421543.
27	 ²²⁷ EP1000421345. ²²⁷ END00010732. ²²⁸ Kelly McEvers, "Opioid Epidemic Sparks HIV Outbreak in Tiny Indiana Town," NPR, March 31, 2016, <i>available</i>
28	<i>at</i> : https://www.npr.org/2016/03/31/472577254/opioid-epidemic-sparks-hiv-outbreak-in-tiny-indiana-town

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1	330. Joy explained how the abuse-deterrent coating, once melted, was discarded by			
2	using the filter of a cigarette: "Now you see the coating of – all that mess laying there still?			
3	That's what the filter's for." ²³⁰ The journalist described what then took place:			
4	And Joy puts that cigarette filter into the liquid, and they Joy, Jeff and another guy			
5	each take turns with their needles, sticking it into the filter and pulling the liquid through. Joy and Jeff turn their back to me while they inject. And then it just gets			
6	really, really quiet.			
7	331. Joy couldn't conceive of the position she was in. A nurse, she hurt her back at			
8	work and began taking prescription pain medication. She began taking the pills by mouth, and			
9	later began to snort them. Dependency began. But she told herself, "I'd never ever would use a			
10	needle, never. I'm never going to do that." ²³¹			
11	332. After Opana's reformulation, Joy began using it intravenously. "I started using the			
12	needle about – it was around the 6^{th} of February," she said. "I'm so ashamed I pack so much			
13	shame, and I'm going to cry I pack so much shame from it. I do." ²³²			
14	333. Endo's 2012 reformulation of Opana caused outbreaks of HIV in populations of			
15	intravenous Opana users. In Austin, Indiana, where Jeff and Joy resided, Opana was linked to an			
16	outbreak of at least 200 HIV cases in a town with a population of 4,500. ²³³			
17	334. Intravenous use of reformulated Opana has also been associated with outbreaks of			
18	Hepatitis C and Thrombotic Thrombocytopenic Purpura ("TTP"). ²³⁴ The concerns even reached			
19	Wall Street, where an analyst asked Endo about a TPP outbreak in Tennessee associated with			
20	Opana ER. Endo assured the analyst that the outbreak was, like the outbreak in Indiana, in "a			
21	very, very distinct area of the country."			
22	335. Endo was well aware of these problems.			
23				
24				
25				
26	²³⁰ Id. ²³¹ Id.			
27	²³² Id. ²³³ Id.			
28	 ²³⁴ "Thrombotic Thrombocytopenic Purpura (TTP)–Like Illness Associated with Intravenous Opana ER Abuse — Tennessee, 2012," <i>Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report</i> (Jan. 11, 2013). 			



(SCHOOL DISTRICTS)

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1	340. As the preceding paragraphs make clear, Endo and McKinsey were laser-focused
2	on maximizing overall sales of Endo products, and decidedly not on concerns over their actual
3	abuse potential or the appropriate <i>size</i> of the market for these products, given evident,
4	longstanding, and ever-present concerns about their abuse. To the point, McKinsey regarded
5	concerns about opioid abuse only as a means by which its clients could introduce differentiated
6	products (i.e., those with purported abuse-deterrent or tamper-resistant features) to continually
7	perpetuate overall opioids sales for their clients. In all instances, the parties desired for the size of
8	that overall opioids market to grow in line with the introduction of "differentiated" products like a
9	reformulated Opana.
10	341. Endo's purported concern about deterring abuse of its drugs was laid bare as farce
11	by a particularly striking decision: to continue to sell the old formulation of Opana despite touting
12	the notion that the old formulation was purportedly dangerous in ways that the new formulation
13	was not. Endo
14	. 241
15	342. Endo not only continued to distribute original Opana for nine months after the
15 16	342. Endo not only continued to distribute original Opana for nine months after the reformulated version became available, it declined to recall original Opana ER despite its
16	reformulated version became available, it declined to recall original Opana ER despite its
16 17	reformulated version became available, it declined to recall original Opana ER despite its dangers. ²⁴² In fact, Endo also claimed in September 2012 to be "proud" that "almost all remaining
16 17 18	reformulated version became available, it declined to recall original Opana ER despite its dangers. ²⁴² In fact, Endo also claimed in September 2012 to be "proud" that "almost all remaining inventory" of the original Opana ER had "been utilized." ²⁴³
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d. **Belbuca: Endo's Answer to Butrans**

344. Buprenorphine is another differentiated product. Opioid manufacturers began to introduce Buprenorphine products to the market after the introduction of OxyContin, Opana, and 4 other branded opioids long-known to have abuse and dependency problems. Buprenorphine products were marketed as purportedly less dangerous than products such as OxyContin or 5 Opana. 6

345. Of course, Endo and Purdue continued to assiduously market and sell OxyContin 7 and Opana alongside their Buprenorphine products, and McKinsey worked with each at every 8 step of the way, despite the implicit contradiction in marketing two products at the same time 9 whose point of differentiation is one being *less addictive and dangerous* than the other. 10

For example, on August 13, 2015, McKinsey's Craig MacKenzie circulated a 346. 11 discussion document to Endo and McKinsey staff entitled "Belbuca value proposition," which 12 laid out McKinsey's thoughts on how to differentiate Endo's buprenorphine product from other 13 opioids in the marketplace.²⁴⁵ One point of differentiation McKinsey noted was that OxyContin 14 was commonly abused, while Endo's Belbuca hopefully would not be: ²⁴⁶ 15

- 16
- 17

Comparative value propositions against Purdue products

18			BELBUCA		* Hysingla ER
19		Abuse	Perceived due to inherent properties in formulation and	Commonly abused; reformulated as "abuse deterrent" in 2010	Formulated with abuse deterrent properties
20	Safety	deterrence	molecule		
21	Safety	Side effects/ tolerability	Good tolerability after titration, low constipation	Average, can be associated with nausea, vomiting, & constipation	Lack of NSAID or tylenol decrease risk of adverse reaction
22					

23 347. The cognitive dissonance was palpable. At the same time that MacKenzie sent his 24 email differentiating Belbuca, and as described *supra*, McKinsey was *also* maximizing 25 OxyContin sales for Purdue—the opioid it was describing to Endo as commonly abused. 26

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²⁴⁵ MCK-MDL2996-0410742.

Product strengths

²⁴⁶ MCK-MDL2996-0006669, at 0006675.

348.

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Butrans was Purdue's buprenorphine product.

349. 4 Once Butrans was launched at Purdue, McKinsey worked with Endo to create 5 another branded Buprenorphine product to compete with Butrans. These product planning and 6 launch processes are long-term affairs. McKinsey worked with Endo on this project for four years 7 before Endo's Belbuca obtained FDA approval.

8 350. McKinsey remained in place at Endo to implement the launch of Endo's 9 Buprenorphine product. The strategic goal of Belbuca—the key to its commercial success—was to convert short acting opioid ("SAO") users to Belbuca. As McKinsey explained to CEO Rajiv 10 de Silva, "The fundamental question is whether Belbuca will take share from the short-acting 11 opioids."²⁴⁷ 12

13 351. Ultimately, Belbuca was not a large commercial success for Endo because it failed to transition a sufficient number of short acting opioid users to the long-acting Belbuca. As the 14 15 drug underperformed, Endo felt ever more pressure to stimulate sales. John Harlow described one meeting with de Silva on April 8, 2016: "We just got out of the review with Rajiv and clearly our 16 17 TRx trends are not good and are behind other recently launched pain products . . . the request from Rajiv was to do anything possible that could be implemented ASAP to stimulate RXs."²⁴⁸ 18 By July 6, 2016, McKinsey and Endo were increasingly focused on converting 19 352. 20

short-acting opioid users.

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
."²⁴⁹ Notably, the goal was to increase *overall* buprenorphine 22 23 prescriptions, not only those of Belbuca. The discussion document identified an objective to create "a new treatment paradigm for [Buprenorphine] and Belbuca at the transition between 24 25

27 ²⁴⁷ MCK-MDL2996-0210158.

28 ²⁴⁸ MCK-MDL2996-0358973, at 0358975.


²⁴⁹ ENDO-OPIOID MDL-07264539





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Endo instead conceived of Belbuca as an "*Initial* ATC Opioid Therapy." It was to be positioned
 as "the *first* LAO for poorly controlled or dissatisfied chronic pain patients transitioning from
 short-acting to long-acting opioids." Patients could eventually transition from Belbuca to other
 long-acting opioids, like Opana:²⁵⁴



Belbuca could find its market niche as a stepping stone as individuals proceed through the patient

funnel from short acting opioid users to longer-term long-acting opioid users. The farther an

24 individual proceeds through this funnel, the more the individual is worth.

356. McKinsey also knew that this same pathway that begins with opioid therapy after a
serious injury also leads to opioid dependency and addiction. In 2011, McKinsey was working on
"Project X." which was the project to develop a buprenorphine product to compete with Butrans.

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²⁵⁴ MCK-MDL2996-0404374, at 0404375.

Case 3:21-md-02996-CRB Document 297 Filed 12/06/21 Page 87 of 179 1 (Belbuca, in other words, was the result of Project X.) McKinsey described the "opioid dependence treatment pathway" as follows:²⁵⁵ 2 3 breakthrough thinking, collaboration, customer foc 4 OPIOID DEPENDENCE TREATMENT PATHWAY 5 6 Patient begins opioid therapy following serious injury/surgery 7 Patient pain not controlled, dosages increase, patient seeks 8 additional medication options Patient referred to pain specialist 9 Patient shows up in ER, Clinic or seeks out addictionologist 10 Addictionologist – Pain Specialist or Psychiatrist with 11 additional license to prescribe Methadone, 12 Subutex/Suboxone for opioid dependence 13 Options 14 Methdone Subutex initiation, followed by Suboxone treatment 15 16 13 Confidential Internal Document. Draft - Not Approved by Management. 17 18 357. In the same presentation, McKinsey identified the key to a successful launch of a 19 branded Buprenorphine product: "The challenge faced by Endo will not be to gain formulary 20 approval, it will be to gain tier 2 status and *minimize restrictions on prescribing*."²⁵⁶ 21 e. **Turbocharging the Sales Force with a Blitz** 22 358. In 2015, a McKinsey team led by Arnab Ghatak proposed to Endo a sales 23 transformation to invigorate Endo's product sales, including its opioids. At the suggestion of 24 Ghatak, McKinsey used the Purdue Pharma Project Turbocharge model from the previous year as a template for the Endo proposal.²⁵⁷ Even the PowerPoint presentations used to create the 25 26 proposal to Endo were drafted off the Project Turbocharge slides. On June 28, 2015, Sherin Ijaz 27


²⁵⁵ MCK-MDL2996-0131500, at 0131512.

^{28 &}lt;sup>256</sup> MCK-MDL2996-0131500, 0131525 (emphasis added). ²⁵⁷ MCK-MDL2996-0075895.

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1	of McKinsey emailed Ghatak, Nicholas Mills, and Laura Moran to circulate a draft proposal for
2	an "Endo sales force transformation" PowerPoint presentation. Ijaz explained, "Laura, I heavily
3	leveraged what you send (sic) from Purdue as it was all applicable." ²⁵⁸ All three of the recipients
4	of Ijaz's email regarding the Endo proposal had been working on the Purdue account for years.
5	359. Endo
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8	,,259
9	360. Endo's Vice President & General Manager of its Pain Business Unit, John Harlow,
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12	260
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14	261
15	361. The Endo and Purdue proposals were essentially identical sales transformations.
16	The goals were the same: to maximize sales of opioids. Merely the names were changed. While
17	McKinsey offered to "turbocharge" Purdue's sales force, McKinsey proposed a "sales force blitz"
18	for Endo. ²⁶²
19	362. In fact, the names weren't <i>entirely</i> changed.
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21	263
22	363.
23	
24	
25	
26	²⁵⁸ MCK-MDL2996-0070237. ²⁵⁹ ENDO_AAC_00363406.
27	²⁶⁰ <i>Id.</i> ²⁶¹ <i>Id.</i>
28	 ²⁶² E.g., MCK-MDL2996-0130803; MCK-MDL2996-0132851. ²⁶³ MCK-MDL2996-0069747, at 0069749.
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disrupting/sacrificing [Sumavel] or [Voltaren] TRx volume and it appears that we [can]
 accomplish this with your recommendation of addition another 500 targets."²⁶⁵

3 366. With the Sales Force Blitz underway, Endo received good news in New York.
4 Years prior, Endo had initiated patent litigation against generic manufacturers of Opana ER,
5 arguing that the generic versions of the drug infringed on Endo's patents. In part because of the
6 perceived impending loss of exclusivity, Endo had in recent years allocated its sales force
7 capacity away from Opana and to other Endo products.

8 367. On August 14, 2015, Endo received a favorable initial ruling declaring that the
9 generic versions of Opana violated Endo's patents, and enjoined their further sale. The ruling
10 provided additional patent exclusivity for Opana, and Endo was keen to exploit its advantage.

11 368. That afternoon, 12 13 14 266 15 The following week, Harlow wrote to the McKinsey team working for Endo to 16 369. 17 focus their attention on Opana ER. "Now with our litigation victory from last week, plus our 18 UHC opportunity, there is an increased need to increase FF support to drive Sep-Dec business.... With this win, I am now willing to go broader with OER targeting."²⁶⁷ 19 20 370. McKinsey and Endo proceeded to design and implement retargeting strategies to boost Opana sales in late 2015. 21 22 2. Johnson & Johnson 23 371. McKinsey also working with Johnson & Johnson, whose role overseeing and 24 contributing to the opioid crisis has been exhaustively detailed in other complaints. See, e.g., City 25 and County of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P., N.D. Cal. No. 18-2591, Doc. 128 (Mar. 13, 26 2020). Johnson & Johnson occupied multiple roles within the opioids industry. Through its 27 ²⁶⁵ MCK-MDL2996-0409436, at 0409437 (sic).

28 ²⁶⁶ ENDO-OPIOID_MDL-02279530.

²⁶⁷ MCK-MDL2996-0358871, at 0358872; ENDO-OPIOID_MDL-02201117 .

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subsidiary, Janssen Pharmaceuticals ("Janssen"), it marketed and sold branded opioid products,
including Duragesic (a transdermal fentanyl patch) and Nucynta (tramadol tablets and oral
solution). Through its Noramco and Tasmanian Alkaloids subsidiaries, Johnson & Johnson
farmed the poppy plant in New Zealand and created the precursor chemical and raw materials
necessary to manufacture *all* opioids. Noramco and Tasmanian Alkaloids sold these raw materials
to the other opioid manufacturers: Purdue, Endo, Mallinckrodt, and others. Johnson & Johnson
was the origin point in the entire opioids supply chain.

8

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372. Just like McKinsey's relationships with Purdue, Endo, and the others, McKinsey's opioid-related work for Johnson & Johnson spanned decades.

Just as Endo was led by former partner McKinsey partner Rajiv de Silva, Johnson 10 373. 11 & Johnson similarly relied on McKinsey as a pipeline for its own management timber. As described above, McKinsey alumni tend to move on to positions with McKinsey clients. 12 13 Janssen's current Director of Customer Marketing & Value Based Care was hired from McKinsey's PMP group. The relationship flows both ways: Janssen's former Vice President of 14 15 Sales and Marketing for Janssen Pharmaceuticals is currently a McKinsey partner. Moreover, Ian Davis has been an independent director since 2010 and currently sits on the Audit and Regulatory 16 17 Compliance committees of Johnson & Johnson's board. Previously, he was a Senior Partner at 18 McKinsey, "having served as Chairman and Worldwide Managing Director from 2003 until $2009.^{268}$ 19

374. Kevin Sneader, until recently McKinsey's global managing partner, and one of
Davis' successors, described Davis as a "mentor" who was the managing partner of McKinsey's
London office when Sneader was working there and "worked on one of his teams."²⁶⁹ Given
Frazier's presence on the board, Johnson & Johnson was obviously an important account for
McKinsey. At present, it is not known which McKinsey partner(s) was the Director(s) of Client
Services for the Johnson & Johnson account.

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²⁶⁸ https://www.jnj.com/leadership/ian-e-l-davis

^{28 &}lt;sup>269</sup> See Interview with Kevin Sneader, Harvard Project for Asian & International Relations, January 31, 2021, *available at* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qed53EGG8kU

1	375. What is known, however, is that McKinsey
2	
3	
4	" ²⁷⁰ On July 6,
5	2011, Ghatak attended an internal McKinsey call with the consultants working on the Johnson &
6	Johnson account to discuss the "J&J Nucynta sales force disruption." ²⁷¹ The same day, Laura
7	Moran, who like Ghatak worked both the Purdue and Endo accounts, also provided internal
8	advice regarding Nucynta to her McKinsey partner Gerti Pellumbi, who was leading Nucynta
9	sales efforts for the Johnson & Johnson account, and engagement manager Bryan Reinholt, who
10	was with Pellumbi on the Johnson & Johnson account. ²⁷² Martin Elling, one of the lead
11	McKinsey partners on the Purdue account alongside Ghatak, attended internal McKinsey calls on
12	March 25, 2010, ²⁷³ and again on May 27, 2011 to discuss McKinsey's work for Johnson &
13	Johnson's Nucynta. ²⁷⁴ Then, on December 13, 2011, Elling attended a meeting with Johnson &
14	Johnson personnel regarding "acceleration opportunities." ²⁷⁵ Aamir Malik attended the meeting
15	with Elling, and, naturally, also worked on the Endo account. ²⁷⁶ Malik and Ghatak had an internal
16	McKinsey meeting amongst themselves regarding the "Nucynta Kickoff" at Johnson & Johnson
17	six months prior, on June 3, 2011. ²⁷⁷
18	a. Noramco
19	376. Janssen was not the only Johnson & Johnson unit
20	, and Janssen was not Johnson & Johnson's only division involved in the
21	narcotics trade.
22	
23	
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25	²⁷⁰ JAN-NH-00167575. ²⁷¹ MCK-MDL2996-0222833.
26	²⁷² MCK-MDL2996-0419348. ²⁷³ MCK-MDL-2996-0256186.
27	²⁷⁴ MCK-MDL-2996-0255907. ²⁷⁵ MCK-MDL-2996-0255926.
28	 ²⁷⁶ <i>Id.</i>; <i>see also</i> MCK-MDL-2996-0348536 (Example of Malik's work on Endo account). ²⁷⁷ MCK-MDL-2996-0261694.

1	377. Opioids—all of them—are derivatives of opium, which is derived from the poppy
2	plant. In order to sell opioids, someone needs to farm the opium poppy and process the harvest
3	into the raw materials necessary for opioid manufacturers—all of them—to make their products.
4	378. Johnson & Johnson was that farmer. It owned Noramco and Tasmanian Alkaloids,
5	which grew poppies in New Zealand and sold the raw ingredients for opioids to practically all
6	manufacturers.
7	379. On August 19, 2009, McKinsey's
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9	.278
10	380.
11	
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14	279
15	381. Seven years later, in 2016, Johnson & Johnson exited the business by selling
16	Noramco and Tasmanian Alkaloids to SK Capital, a private equity firm focused on the
17	pharmaceuticals business, for approximately \$800 million. ²⁸⁰
18	
19	Not only was McKinsey's advice
20	invaluable to Johnson & Johnson, the perspective McKinsey gained of the overall opioid market
21	from advising the principal upstream supplier to the entire industry would be invaluable in to its
22	own work with its other opioid manufacturer clients.
23	b. Duragesic
24	382. Fentanyl was first synthesized by Paul Janssen and his pharmaceutical company
25	Janssen Pharmaceuticals in 1959. In the 1990s, the company (by then owned by Johnson &
26	²⁷⁸ NORAMCO_TX_01136410.
27	 ²⁷⁹ NORAMCO_TX_01136411, slide 4. ²⁸⁰ Gareth Macdonald, "US Investor buys J&J's opiate API business and announces restructuring," <i>Outsourcing</i>
28	<i>Pharma</i> , July 20, 2016, <i>available at</i> : https://www.outsourcing-pharma.com/Article/2016/07/21/US-investor-buys-J-J-s-opiate-API-business-and-announces-restructuring

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Johnson) developed Duragesic, which is a transdermal patch that administers fentanyl to the
 patient wearing it.

3 383. "Duragesic proved to be one of the most successful analgesic pharmaceutical
4 products ever developed, with sales in 2004 (its last year of patent life) exceeding \$2.4 billion.
5 The success of the fentanyl patch caused many generic companies to produce equivalents once it
6 went off patent."²⁸¹

384. McKinsey was an integral part of fentanyl's success. As early as 2002, McKinsey
was advising Johnson & Johnson regarding methods to boost sales of its opioids. For example, on
March 14, 2002, McKinsey prepared a confidential report for Johnson & Johnson's subsidiary
Janssen regarding how to market their opioid Duragesic. Incredibly, one of the recommendations
McKinsey provided to Johnson & Johnson was that they concentrate their sales and marketing
efforts on doctors that were *already* prescribing large amounts of Purdue's OxyContin.²⁸²

13 385. In other words, as early as 2002, McKinsey had such intricate knowledge of the
14 sales and marketing practices of opioid manufacturers, generally, and Purdue's efforts with
15 OxyContin, specifically, that it was able to recommend to *a competitor of Purdue* that it boost its
16 own opioid sales by *following in the footsteps of Purdue*.

17 386. McKinsey also advised Johnson & Johnson to target Duragesic on "high abuse18 risk patients (e.g., males under 40)." This targeting would take advantage of the marketing claim
19 that Duragesic "was harder to abuse than other opioids on the market."²⁸³


20 387. McKinsey helped Janssen target its opioid marketing by identifying "priority 21 growth opportunities" and growth strategies for Duragesic.²⁸⁴ In 2002, McKinsey considered 22 "[w]hat are settings of care for opioid high-prescribers and treaters of back pain," listing the

^{24 &}lt;sup>281</sup> Theodore Stanley, "The Fentanyl Story," The Journal of Pain, Vol. 15, No. 12 (December), 2014, pg. 1220, *available at:* https://www.jpain.org/article/S1526-5900(14)00905-5/pdf

 ²⁸² Chris McGreal, *Johnson & Johnson faces multibillion opioids lawsuit that could upend big pharma*, The Guardian, June 23, 2019, *available at:* https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jun/22/johnson-and-johnson-opioids-crisis-lawsuit-latest-trial

 ²⁸³ Julia Lurie, "Inside Johnson and Johnson's Quiet Domination of the Opioid Market," June 11, 2019, Mother
 Jones, available at https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/06/johnson-and-johnson-opioid-poppies-tasmania-oklahoma-lawsuit/

^{28 284} *Oklahoma v. Johnson & Johnson*, Oklahoma Proposed Findings & Conclusions, citing 5/30/19pm Tr. & S-1253; *see also* JAN-MS-00481545 (Deem-Eshleman Ex 73).




1	390. McKinsey is a repeat opioid sales turbocharger. McKinsey's efforts to turbocharge
2	Nucynta sales resembled those it later deployed in more robust form at Purdue a few years later.
2	For example, "physician prescribing habits," and "switching behavior," were external factors
4	McKinsey identified as key issues "impacting future Nucynta growth." Understanding these
5	issues at a granular level would be crucial, including "What is physician/market awareness of
	Nucynta ER? By physician segment?" ²⁸⁸ These same factors drove McKinsey's later work
6 7	
7	turbocharging OxyContin.
8	391. Along the way, McKinsey
9	
10	289
11	
12	392. Despite this ambivalence about tamper-resistance, in a status update on June 23,
13	2011, McKinsey informed Janssen that its "initial physician interview findings" indicate Nucynta
14	ER has "lower addictive/abuse potential and side-effect profile as key differentiators vs.
15	Oxycontin ER." ²⁹⁰
16	393. As part of the turbocharge process,
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21	**291
22	394. By 2014, Janssen was began exploring the sale of Nucynta, and McKinsey was
23	involved in the process. Incredibly,
24	²⁹² Purdue ultimately did not purchase Nucynta. Instead, in 2015, Johnson & Johnson's
25	288 MCK MDL 2006 0125626
26	²⁸⁸ MCK-MDL-2996-0135636. ²⁸⁹ JAN-MS-00322271. ²⁹⁰ MCK MDL 2006 0000526 at 0000520
27	²⁹⁰ MCK-MDL-2996-0009526, at 0009529. ²⁹¹ JAN-MS-02272779. ²⁹² DPL PC022000661012
28	²⁹² PPLPC023000661013

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1	Jansson with sold its Nussents rights to another manufactures. Denomed Inc., for just even and
1	Janssen unit sold its Nucynta rights to another manufacturer, Depomed Inc., for just over one
2	billion dollars. ²⁹³
3	395. The year prior, Nucynta accounted for \$172 million in annual sales for Janssen.
4	Janssen described the Nucynta sale to Depomed as "a strategic decision designed to focus efforts
5	on growth efforts." ²⁹⁴ Depomed, for its part, saw the Nucynta acquisition as a transformational
6	opportunity to position itself as "a pain and neurology-focused specialty pharmaceutical
7	company." ²⁹⁵
8	396. When Depomed bought Nucynta,
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15	3. <u>Other Manufacturers</u>
16	397. McKinsey worked with numerous other manufacturers to promote the sale of
17	opioids. To date, Plaintiffs have identified as McKinsey clients
18	.298
10	398. Coordination among these industry participants was a natural outgrowth of the fact
20	that McKinsey had existing client relationships with each participant. For instance, on May 7,
20 21	2009, Richard Sackler's personal counselor, McKinsey partner Maria Gordian,
22	
23	
24). ²⁹³ See https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/depomed-announces-closing-of-acquisition-of-us-rights-to-
25	nucynta-tapentadol-nucynta-er-tapentadol-extended-release-tablets-and-nucynta-tapentadol-oral-solution-from- janssen-pharmaceuticals-inc-for-105-billion-300060453.html
26	²⁹⁴ Josh Beckerman, "DepoMed to Buy U.S. Rights to Nucynta From J&J Unit," <i>Wall Street Journal</i> , January 16, 2015, <i>available at</i> : https://www.wsj.com/articles/depomed-to-buy-u-s-rights-to-nucynta-from-j-j-unit-1421357503
27	 ²⁹⁵ Id. ²⁹⁶ DEPO-CDI-00071072 (emphasis added).
28	²⁹⁷ MNK-MDL_001756041; MNK-T1_0000968026; MN-T1_0004715842; MNK-T1_0005985720. ²⁹⁸ TEVA_CHI_00187019.

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different hew when considered in light of one of McKinsey's other clients: the Food and Drug 2 Administration itself.

3 404. Indeed, the FDA has proved a massive client for McKinsey, who since 2000 has endeavored to expand its public sector practice under the direction and leadership of Nancy 4 Killefer, a now-retired senior partner and director of the firm.³⁰⁴ Since 2008, the FDA has paid 5 McKinsey more than \$140 million.³⁰⁵ A significant portion of that work for the FDA related to 6 7 the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research ("CDER"). The CDER is the principal 8 division tasked with approving, among other classes of drugs, opioids. Since 2008, McKinsey has been awarded at least 17 contracts worth at least \$48 million for CDER work.³⁰⁶ 9 405. The REMS protocols, discussed above, that McKinsey assisted Purdue and others 10 in surmounting beginning in 2008 and culminating in 2012, were overseen by CDER.³⁰⁷ 11 406. Meanwhile, in 2010, McKinsey advised the FDA on building a monitoring system 12 13 called "track and trace" to assist in the identification of potentially improper distribution of harmful prescription drugs, such as opioids. "The 'track and trace' system deeply impacted 14 15 McKinsey clients, including the nation's three largest drug distributors—McKesson, AmerisourceBergen, and Cardinal Health [where Killefer has been a director since 2015]."³⁰⁸ 16 17 407. Under one contract, McKinsey developed a roadmap and implemented plans to 18 modernize CDER's new drug regulatory program. Under another, McKinsey developed a framework to increase information technology project delivery across CDER.³⁰⁹ 19 20 408. In 2007, Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act ("FDAAA"), which placed new restrictions on the use of certain high risk prescription drugs, 21 22 including opioids. The new law mandated that FDA require manufacturers of certain drugs to 23 create REMS. 24

³⁰⁷ Id. 27

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³⁰⁸ See http://cg.cardinalhealth.com/board-of-directors/default.aspx; Hassan Letter.

28 ³⁰⁹ Letter to Senator Chuck Grassley from Andrew Tantillo, Oct. 22, 2021, available at: https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fda to grassley - mckinsey conflicts of interest.pdf

³⁰⁴ Duff McDonald, *The Firm*. Killefer is also a director of Cardinal Health, one of the distributor defendants in the 25 ongoing nationwide opioid litigation, and a company subject to FDA regulations. ³⁰⁵ Letter to Dr. Janet Woodcock from Senator Margaret Hassan et al, August 23, 2021, available at:

²⁶ https://www.hassan.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fda-mckinsey_letter-final-210823.pdf ("Hassan Letter") 306 Id.

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1	409. The FDAAA also required the Secretary of Health and Human Services "to
2	develop standards and identify and validate effective technologies for the purpose of securing the
3	drug supply chain against counterfeit, diverted, subpotent, substandard, adulterated, misbranded,
4	or expired drugs." 21 U.S.C. § 355e(a).
5	410. In 2010 and 2011, under the FDAAA, the FDA awarded McKinsey contracts to
6	design a "track and trace" system to monitor prescription drugs, including opioids, throughout the
7	supply chain and to streamline the drug approval process. The track and trace system had the
8	greatest effect on drug distributors, including McKinsey clients McKesson, AmerisourceBergen,
9	and Cardinal Health. ³¹⁰
10	411. Under these contracts, McKinsey was required to consult with "supply chain
11	stakeholders," which likely included these three McKinsey clients as well as pharmaceutical
12	manufacturers. ³¹¹
13	412. In 2011, McKinsey also won a \$1.8 million contract with CDER's Office of
14	Surveillance and Epidemiology ("OSE"), which monitors and evaluates the safety profiles of
15	drugs available to American consumers. ³¹² OSE "evaluates more than 2 million adverse event
16	reports submitted every year to FDA's MedWatch program" and provides "risk management
17	expertise on development and implementation of programs and initiatives to support [CDER's]
18	policies related to [REMS] authorities. ³¹³
19	413. The OSE contract tasked McKinsey with a widespread mission of understanding
20	how OSE functions within the context of a broader system of drug safety in CDER and ultimately
21	developing and implementing a new operating model. In other words, McKinsey helped to
22	restructure a key body that has oversight over the opioid supply chain.
23	414. The 2012 Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act required the
24	FDA to modernize Sentinel, a system meant to monitor the safety of drugs once they are on the
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26	³¹⁰ Hassan Letter.
27	³¹¹ <i>Id.</i> ³¹² https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21071060-mckinsey-ose-contract
28	³¹³ https://www.documencroud.org/documents/210/1000-mckmsey-ose-contract epidemiology

1	market. ³¹⁴ According to the FDA, "Sentinel generates <i>real-world evidence</i> to support regulatory
2	actions aimed at protecting the public's health," which in turn "inform[s] healthcare provider
3	decision-making for patients." ³¹⁵
4	415. A 2014 contract with the FDA charged McKinsey with assessing the "strengths,
5	limitations and appropriate use" of Sentinel. Like the track and trace contract, the Sentinel project
6	required McKinsey to interview "external stakeholders," including "industry organizations" and
7	"drug and device industry leaders." ³¹⁶ McKinsey also evaluated how the FDA employees used
8	Sentinel to inform regulatory decision making. ³¹⁷
9	416. McKinsey performed similar work for the FDA as recently as 2019, ³¹⁸ when it
10	signed a contract extension with the agency for work relating to the FDA's efforts to modernize
11	the process by which it regulates new drugs. ³¹⁹
12	417. The FDA's drug tracking programs have been panned as failures. ³²⁰
13	418. A theme was emerging: as new legislation and regulatory systems were enacted
14	that could have hampered the opioid supply chain, McKinsey stepped in as a key consultant for
15	the FDA. Each time, the new system failed to reign in the out-of-control opioid market. While the
16	FDA was not solely responsible for regulating the opioid industry and McKinsey was not wholly
17	responsible for the FDA's inaction, tools like Sentinel and track and trace could have been
18	implemented in a way to provide new information to combat the country's growing opioid crisis.
19	
20	³¹⁴ https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21071047-r_sentinel_assessment_award_contract_sow-redacted-pr ³¹⁵ https://www.fda.gov/files/about%20fda/published/Sentinel-System-Overview—-Presentation.pdf;
21	https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20150604.936915/full/ ³¹⁶ Ian MacDougall, "McKinsey Never Told the FDA It Was Working for Opioid Makers While Also Working for
22	the Agency," <i>ProPublica</i> (Oct. 4, 2021), <i>available at</i> https://www.propublica.org/article/mckinsey-never-told-the- fda-it-was-working-for-opioid-makers-while-also-working-for-the-agency
23	³¹⁷ Letter to Bob Sternfels from Representative Carolyn B. Maloney, Nov. 5, 2021, <i>available at:</i> https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2021-11-05.CBM%20to%20Sternfels-
24	McKinsey%20re%20Document%20and%20Information%20Request%20%28001%29.pdf ³¹⁸ Ian MacDougall, "McKinsey Never Told the FDA It Was Working for Opioid Makers While Also Working for
25	the Agency," <i>ProPublica</i> (Oct. 4, 2021), <i>available at</i> https://www.propublica.org/article/mckinsey-never-told-the- fda-it-was-working-for-opioid-makers-while-also-working-for-the-agency
26	³¹⁹ Letter to Bob Sternfels from Representative Carolyn B. Maloney, Nov. 5, 2021, <i>available at:</i> https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2021-11-05.CBM%20to%20Sternfels-
27	McKinsey%20re%20Document%20and%20Information%20Request%20%28001%29.pdf ³²⁰ Sabrina Tavernise, "F.D.A. Faulted for Problems With Drug Tracking" <i>The New York Times</i> , Jan. 14, 2016,
28	available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/15/health/fda-faulted-for-problems-with-drug-tracking.html; https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-16-192.pdf

419. At the same time it was consulting for the FDA, McKinsey was working with its
 opioid industry clients on how skirt the FDA's regulatory systems.

420. For example, McKinsey advised Purdue on how to soften the FDA's proposed
REMS and on coordinating with other opioid manufacturers to advocate against strict
oversight.³²¹ The finalized REMS for opioid products was largely devoid of the restrictions that
FDA had initially proposed.³²²

421. McKinsey's work with the FDA was a key factor in why pharmaceutical industry
clients tapped McKinsey for FDA-related work. For example, in endorsing McKinsey's proposed
strategy of banding together with other opioid manufacturers, Purdue CEO John Stewart
suggested that the consultant itself facilitate the pharmaceutical group's approach to FDA. He
wrote: "Perhaps a consultant such as McKinsey who did similar work in the industry and FDA on
some aspects of clinical trials or a healthcare-related group that would be interested in playing an
active role in the program's development and delivery would be a good choice."³²³

14 422. McKinsey performed work for the FDA without disclosing its potential conflicts15 of interest to the FDA in violation of the contracts between the company and the agency.

423. The FDA typically includes conflict of interest clauses in its contracts and relies on
contractors to assess and report any conflicts. McKinsey's contracts with the FDA related to
CDER processes contained such provisions. One contract required McKinsey to "make an
immediate and full disclosure, in writing, . . . of any potential or actual organizational conflict of
interest or the existence of any facts that may cause a reasonably prudent person to question the
contractor's impartiality because of the appearance or existence of bias."³²⁴

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³²¹ Hassan Letter.
³²² Hassan Letter; Maloney Letter.

27 ³²³ Purdue Bankruptcy, Doc. 2166-5, at 58-59.

³²⁴ Ian MacDougall, McKinsey Never Told the FDA It Was Working for Opioid Makers While Also Working for the
 Agency, *ProPublica* (Oct. 4, 2021), available at https://www.propublica.org/article/mckinsey-never-told-the-fda-it-was-working-for-opioid-makers-while-also-working-for-the-agency

1	424. But McKinsey never disclosed its work on behalf of opioid supply clients to the
2	FDA despite having a hand in developing some of the FDA's most important regulatory
3	processes. ³²⁵
4	425. Disclosing its conflicts might have turned off the lucrative tap to not only FDA
5	contracts but also to pharmaceutical industry clients, given the clear value such clients placed on
6	McKinsey's work for the FDA.
7	426. McKinsey's manipulation of regulatory requirements—whether to skirt its own
8	contractual requirements or to bend processes that regulate its clients—is nothing new. McKinsey
9	has come under fire from the Office of Inspector General for the General Services Administration
10	for contract procurement violations ³²⁶ and from the Justice Department related to violation of
11	Chapter 11 bankruptcy rules. ³²⁷ Most recently, six senators have begun to investigate the
12	relationship between McKinsey and the FDA ³²⁸ the House Committee on Oversight and Reform
13	is exploring its abusive conduct in connection with the opioid industry. ³²⁹
14	427. As one commentator noted, McKinsey's conduct suggests that it "behaves as if it
15	believes the rules should bend to its way of doing things, not the other way around." ³³⁰
16	F. <u>McKinsey's Efforts to Increase the Overall Size of the Opioid Market: the</u> Larger the Pie, the Larger the Slice
17	428. McKinsey advised multiple opioid manufacturers regarding how to grow opioid
18	sales. In order to benefit all its clients, McKinsey engaged in efforts to grow the entire opioid
19	market, and not only each individual client's share of it. The theory, basically, is that a rising tide
20	lifts all boats.
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23	³²⁵ <i>Id.</i> ; Letter to Senator Chuck Grassley from Andrew Tantillo, Oct. 22, 2021, <i>available at</i> :
24	https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fda_to_grassleymckinsey_conflicts_of_interest.pdf ³²⁶ Ian MacDougall, How McKinsey Makes Its Own Rules, <i>ProPublica</i> (Dec. 14, 2019), available at
25	https://www.propublica.org/article/how-mckinsey-makes-its-own-rules ³²⁷ Mary Williams Walsh and Emily Flitter, McKinsey Faces Criminal Inquiry Over Bankruptcy Case Conduct, <i>New</i>
26	<i>York Times</i> , Nov. 8, 2019, <i>available at</i> https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/08/business/mckinsey-criminal-investigation-bankruptcy.html
27	 ³²⁸ Hassan Letter. ³²⁹ Maloney Letter.
28	³³⁰ Ian MacDougall, How McKinsey Makes Its Own Rules, <i>ProPublica</i> (Dec. 14, 2019), available at

1	429. For example, Purdue incentivized its sales staff "to increase not just sales of
2	OxyContin but also generic versions of extended release oxycodone." Typically, one would not
3	wish to encourage the sales of generic competitors that offer a similar product to one's own. If,
4	however, the goal is to position a company so as to look like an attractive acquisition target, the
5	growth of the overall opioid market is just as important as one's own market share: "Whereas
6	pharma salespeople are usually compensated based on their ability to grow sales of a particular
7	medicine, part of the bonus for Purdue's staff was calculated in relation to the size of the overall
8	market." ³³¹ McKinsey designed that plan. ³³²
9	430. This notion that the size of a company's market share is not as important as the
10	size of the overall market in which it competes is a core insight of McKinsey's granular approach
11	to identifying corporate growth opportunities. Describing their authors' conclusions in The
12	Granularity of Growth, McKinsey stated, "One of their most surprising conclusions is that
13	increased market-share is seldom a driver of growth. They contend, instead, that growth is driven
14	by where a company chooses to compete: which market segments it participates in the key is
15	to focus on granularity, to breakdown big-picture strategy into its smallest relevant
16	components."333
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18 19	
	³³¹ See David Crow, How Purdue's 'one-two' punch fuelled the market for opioids, Financial Times, September 9, 2018, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/8e64ec9c.b133-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c
19	2018, <i>available at</i> : https://www.ft.com/content/8e64ec9c-b133-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c ³³² Worth noting is that this strategy of increasing overall opioid sales directly benefitted the Sacklers through their
19 20	2018, <i>available at</i> : https://www.ft.com/content/8e64ec9c-b133-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c ³³² Worth noting is that this strategy of increasing overall opioid sales directly benefitted the Sacklers through their ownership of Rhodes Pharma, a generic opioid manufacturer. Naturally, McKinsey worked with the Sacklers in connection with Rhodes as well, including proposing ideas for synergizing Purdue and Rhodes. <i>See, e.g.</i> , MCK-
19 20 21	2018, <i>available at</i> : https://www.ft.com/content/8e64ec9c-b133-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c ³³² Worth noting is that this strategy of increasing overall opioid sales directly benefitted the Sacklers through their ownership of Rhodes Pharma, a generic opioid manufacturer. Naturally, McKinsey worked with the Sacklers in connection with Rhodes as well, including proposing ideas for synergizing Purdue and Rhodes. <i>See, e.g.</i> , MCK- MDL2996-0324955; MCK-MDL2996-0285201. Especially worth noting is that this strategy also benefitted McKinsey's other opioid clients as well. As one observer wrote: "They have a huge amount of inside information,
19 20 21 22	2018, <i>available at</i> : https://www.ft.com/content/8e64ec9c-b133-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c ³³² Worth noting is that this strategy of increasing overall opioid sales directly benefitted the Sacklers through their ownership of Rhodes Pharma, a generic opioid manufacturer. Naturally, McKinsey worked with the Sacklers in connection with Rhodes as well, including proposing ideas for synergizing Purdue and Rhodes. <i>See, e.g.</i> , MCK- MDL2996-0324955; MCK-MDL2996-0285201. Especially worth noting is that this strategy also benefitted McKinsey's other opioid clients as well. As one observer wrote: "They have a huge amount of inside information, which raises serious conflict issues at multiple levels," stated a former consultant, referring to McKinsey's influential role as advisor to multiple participants in a given industry, such as opioid manufacturing. It "puts them in a kind of
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 19 20 21 22 23 24 	2018, <i>available at</i> : https://www.ft.com/content/8e64ec9c-b133-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c ³³² Worth noting is that this strategy of increasing overall opioid sales directly benefitted the Sacklers through their ownership of Rhodes Pharma, a generic opioid manufacturer. Naturally, McKinsey worked with the Sacklers in connection with Rhodes as well, including proposing ideas for synergizing Purdue and Rhodes. <i>See, e.g.</i> , MCK- MDL2996-0324955; MCK-MDL2996-0285201. Especially worth noting is that this strategy also benefitted McKinsey's other opioid clients as well. As one observer wrote: "They have a huge amount of inside information, which raises serious conflict issues at multiple levels," stated a former consultant, referring to McKinsey's influential role as advisor to multiple participants in a given industry, such as opioid manufacturing. It "puts them in a kind of oligarchic position." Michelle Celarier, <i>The Story McKinsey Didn't Want Written</i> , Institutional Investor, July 8, 2019, <i>available at:</i> https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1g5zjdcr97k2y/The-Story-McKinsey-Didn-t-Want- Written. For example, in an August 15, 2013 presentation to Purdue management entitled "Identifying OxyContin
 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	2018, <i>available at</i> : https://www.ft.com/content/8e64ec9c-b133-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c ³³² Worth noting is that this strategy of increasing overall opioid sales directly benefitted the Sacklers through their ownership of Rhodes Pharma, a generic opioid manufacturer. Naturally, McKinsey worked with the Sacklers in connection with Rhodes as well, including proposing ideas for synergizing Purdue and Rhodes. <i>See, e.g.</i> , MCK- MDL2996-0324955; MCK-MDL2996-0285201. Especially worth noting is that this strategy also benefitted McKinsey's other opioid clients as well. As one observer wrote: "They have a huge amount of inside information, which raises serious conflict issues at multiple levels," stated a former consultant, referring to McKinsey's influential role as advisor to multiple participants in a given industry, such as opioid manufacturing. It "puts them in a kind of oligarchic position." Michelle Celarier, <i>The Story McKinsey Didn't Want Written</i> , Institutional Investor, July 8, 2019, <i>available at:</i> https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1g5zjdcr97k2y/The-Story-McKinsey-Didn-t-Want- Written. For example, in an August 15, 2013 presentation to Purdue management entitled "Identifying OxyContin Growth Opportunities," McKinsey noted that "McKinsey's <i>knowledge of the ways other pharma companies operate</i> suggests Purdue should reassess the roles of MSL and HECON Groups – and further drive the salesforce to be more
 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 	2018, <i>available at</i> : https://www.ft.com/content/8e64ec9c-b133-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c ³³² Worth noting is that this strategy of increasing overall opioid sales directly benefitted the Sacklers through their ownership of Rhodes Pharma, a generic opioid manufacturer. Naturally, McKinsey worked with the Sacklers in connection with Rhodes as well, including proposing ideas for synergizing Purdue and Rhodes. <i>See, e.g.</i> , MCK- MDL2996-0324955; MCK-MDL2996-0285201. Especially worth noting is that this strategy also benefitted McKinsey's other opioid clients as well. As one observer wrote: "They have a huge amount of inside information, which raises serious conflict issues at multiple levels," stated a former consultant, referring to McKinsey's influential role as advisor to multiple participants in a given industry, such as opioid manufacturing. It "puts them in a kind of oligarchic position." Michelle Celarier, <i>The Story McKinsey Didn't Want Written</i> , Institutional Investor, July 8, 2019, <i>available at:</i> https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1g5zjdcr97k2y/The-Story-McKinsey-Didn-t-Want- Written. For example, in an August 15, 2013 presentation to Purdue management entitled "Identifying OxyContin Growth Opportunities," McKinsey noted that "McKinsey's <i>knowledge of the ways other pharma companies operate</i>

431. In other words, "Purdue's marketing force was indirectly supporting sales of
 millions of pills marketed by rival companies."³³⁴ "It's the equivalent of asking a McDonald's
 store manager to grow sales of Burger King and KFC," stated a government official with the
 Department of Health and Human Services.³³⁵

5

G. McKinsey's Work Kills People.

432. The deceptive marketing strategies McKinsey developed and helped to implement 6 7 were successful. Its granular growth tactics, myopically focused on increased revenues for its 8 clients, substantially contributed to an explosion in the use of opioids across the country. 9 Approximately 20% of the population between the ages of 30 and 44, and nearly 30% of the population over 45, have used opioids. Opioids are the most common treatment for chronic pain, 10 and as of 2016, 20% of office visits for non-cancer pain included the prescription of an opioid.³³⁶ 11 433. In 2009, Dr. Van Zee identified the *precise tactics* that McKinsey deployed for all 12 13 of its opioid clients, including Purdue, as a source of OxyContin misuse and abuse, and suggested that regulation may be appropriate to curtail the use of the McKinsey's tactics: "The use of 14 15 prescriber profiling data to target high-opioid prescribers—coupled with very lucrative incentives for sales representatives—would seem to fuel increased prescribing by some physicians—perhaps 16

17 the most liberal prescribers of opioids and, in some cases, the least discriminate."³³⁷

434. In time, additional evidence mounted supporting the conclusion that McKinsey's
tactics were demonstrably exacerbating the nationwide opioid crisis. One way of demonstrating
the link between aggressive sales and marketing of opioids and worsened mortality outcomes
arose out of a quirk of Purdue's own marketing tactics.

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435. In 1996, when OxyContin was introduced, five states maintained "triplicate"

programs that required prescribers of Schedule II controlled substances to fill out prescriptions in

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 ³³⁴ See David Crow, How Purdue's 'one-two' punch fueled the market for opioids, Financial Times, September 9, 2018, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/8e64ec9c-b133-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c
 ³³⁵ Id.

³³⁶ Deborah Dowell, Tamara M. Haegerich, and Roger Choi, *CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain – United States, 2016*, CDC (March 18, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/rr/rr6501e1.htm

^{28 3&}lt;sup>37</sup> Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 221, 224 (Feb. 2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2622774/pdf/221.pdf.

triplicate.³³⁸ One of the triplicate copies would then be filed with the state agency in charge of
maintaining a prescription database intended to monitor diversion and other potential issues
relating to the over-dissemination of Schedule II narcotics. Because Purdue viewed these
triplicate requirements as an overly burdensome hindrance on prescribing, the company chose to
focus its marketing efforts in other states that did not impose these constraints.

436. This resource-allocation decision by Purdue to focus more marketing efforts in
states with fewer regulations regarding the prescribing of controlled substances provided a way to
test whether *marketing* of OxyContin, by itself, was a cause of not only increased overdose rates
for OxyContin, but of *all* opioid-related overdoses, *including* those involving illicit opioids such
as heroin and fentanyl.

437. The results were stark. In 2019, economists from the University of Pennsylvania,
Notre Dame, and the RAND Corporation analyzed the disparate outcomes in overall opioid
overdose mortality experienced in the triplicate states where Purdue did not primarily focus its
marketing efforts and non-triplicate states where Purdue did primarily focus those efforts.³³⁹

438. The economists found that "OxyContin distribution was about 50% lower in
'triplicate states' in the years after the launch. While triplicate states had higher rates of overdose
deaths prior to 1996, this relationship flipped shortly after the launch [of OxyContin] and
triplicate states saw substantially slower growth in overdose deaths, continuing even twenty years
after OxyContin's introduction. *Our results show that the introduction and marketing of OxyContin explain a substantial share of overdose deaths over the last two decades.*"³⁴⁰

21 22

439. A 2017 *Journal of American Medical Association* study found that physicians ordered fewer promoted brand-name medications and prescribed more cost-effective generic versions if they worked in hospitals that instituted rules about when and how pharmaceutical sales representatives were allowed to detail prescribers.³⁴¹ The changes in prescribing behavior

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³⁴⁰ *Id*. (emphasis added).

³³⁸ Patrick Radden Keefe, *Empire of Pain*, Pg. 407.

 ³³⁹ Abby E. Alpert, William N. Evans, Ethan M.J. Lieber, and David Powell, *Origins of the Opioid Crisis and its Enduring Impacts*, NBER Working Paper No. 26500, November 2019, *available at*: https://www.nber.org/papers/w26500

^{28 &}lt;sup>341</sup> Ian Larkin et al., Association Between Academic Medical Center Pharmaceutical Detailing Policies and Physician Prescribing, 317 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 1785 (2017).

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appeared strongest at hospitals that implemented the strictest detailing policies and included
enforcement measures. Another study involved the research of four different practices which
included visits by sales representatives, medical journal advertisements, direct-to-consumer
advertising, and pricing, and found that sales representatives have the strongest effect on driving
drug utilization. An additional study found that doctor meetings with sales representatives are
related to changes in doctor prescribing practices and requests by physicians to add the drugs to
hospitals' formularies.

440. A more recent *Journal of American Medical Association* study analyzed the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' Open Payments database regarding pharmaceutical
company marketing efforts towards doctors, as well as CDC data on prescription opioid overdose
deaths and prescribing rates, in order to assess whether pharmaceutical marketing of opioids to
physicians affected the rate of prescription opioid overdose deaths. Notably, the study analyzed
these marketing practices beginning August 1, 2013 and ending December 31, 2015.³⁴²

14 441. Those dates are significant, as the study captures the same timeframe that
15 McKinsey's Project Turbocharge, re-christened E2E, was implemented.

442. The study noted "physician prescribers are the most frequent source of prescription
opioids for individuals who use opioids nonmedically."³⁴³

443. The study found that "increased county-level opioid marketing was associated

19 with elevated overdose mortality 1 year later, an association mediated by opioid prescribing rates;

20 per capita, the number of marketing interactions with physicians demonstrated a stronger

21 *association with mortality* than the dollar value of marketing."³⁴⁴

444. Referring to the sales and marketing tactics McKinsey specialized in

23 implementing, the authors concluded, "amid a worsening opioid crisis, our results suggest that

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³⁴² Scott E. Hadland *et. al.*, *Association of Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing of Opioid Products with Mortality from Opioid-Related* Overdoses, JAMA Network, January 18, 2019, *available at:* https://jamanetwork.com/journals/
 jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2720914.

 $28 \quad {}^{343}$ Id.

³⁴⁴ *Id.* (emphasis added)

industry marketing to physicians may run counter to current efforts to curb excessive opioid
 prescribing."³⁴⁵

445. The authors' proposed solution was plain and simple, and echoed Dr. Van Zee's
congressional testimony from 2002: "Pharmaceutical companies might also consider, as one
manufacturer recently did, *voluntarily ceasing marketing opioid products directly to physicians*."³⁴⁶

7 446. The dangers of opioids were known to McKinsey at the time it engaged in the
8 misconduct described in this Complaint. The addictive potential of opioids and the need for
9 control and restraint in their use was internally understood, as was the likelihood of large-scale
10 opioid addiction, abuse, overdoses, illness, and early death resulting from sharply increased use.

447. McKinsey also performed its own research in evaluating the anticipated effects of
Project Turbocharge. An April 2014 implementation update observed an increase in sales calls, as
well as that "OxyContin [health care providers] with increased calls consistently outperform
HCPs with decreasing or no change in call frequency."

15 448. The evidence of a direct link between increased opioids marketing and sales and increased opioid abuse was everywhere. A 2007 study found "a very strong correlation between 16 therapeutic exposure to opioid analgesics, as measured by prescriptions filled, and their abuse."347 17 18 McKinsey evidently understands this. In a September 2016 online article, McKinsey asserts that 19 "[t]here is no doubt that more consistent use of best practices – across geographic areas, 20 institutions, and clinicians – would provide tremendous help in combating the crisis" and describes certain examples of such practices as "successful in reducing prescribing."³⁴⁸ 21 449. 22 There is a "parallel relationship between the availability of prescription opioid

analgesics through legitimate pharmacy channels and the diversion and abuse of these drugs and

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³⁴⁵ Id.

²⁶ 346 *Id.* (emphasis added).

 ³⁴⁷ Theodore J Cicero *et al.*, *Relationship Between Therapeutic Use and Abuse* of *Opioid Analgesics in Rural*,
 Suburban, and Urban Locations in the United States, 16.8 Pharmacoepidemiology and Drug Safety, 827-40 (2007), available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pds.1452.

^{28 &}lt;sup>348</sup> https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-systems-and-services/our-insights/why-we-need-bolder-action-to-combat-the-opioid-epidemic

associated adverse outcomes."³⁴⁹ The opioid epidemic is "directly related to the increasingly widespread misuse of powerful opioid pain medications."³⁵⁰ 2

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450. In a 2016 report, the CDC explained that "[o]pioid pain reliever prescribing has quadrupled since 1999 and has increased in parallel with [opioid] overdoses." Patients receiving opioid prescriptions for chronic pain account for the majority of overdoses. For these reasons, the CDC concluded that efforts to rein in the prescribing of opioids for chronic pain are critical "to reverse the epidemic of opioid drug overdose deaths and prevent opioid-related morbidity."³⁵¹

8 451. Compounding the harm from deceptive marketing, McKinsey worked with Purdue 9 to continue and grow the opioid sales of prescribers that raised red flags of diversion, despite Purdue's legal obligations to report and halt supply. In doing so, it enabled an oversupply of 10 11 opioids, which allows non-patients to become exposed to opioids, and facilitates access to opioids for both patients who could no longer access or afford prescription opioids and addicts struggling 12 13 with relapse.

- Most of the illicit use originates from prescribed opioids. It has been estimated that 14 452. 60% of the opioids that are abused come, directly or indirectly, through physicians' prescriptions. 15
- 453. As McKinsey itself has recognized in citing a study reaching this conclusion, 16 roughly 80% of heroin users previously used prescription opioids.³⁵² As many as one in four 17 18 patients who receive prescription opioids long-term for chronic pain in primary care settings 19 struggles with addiction. And, the link between prescription narcotic painkiller abuse and 20 subsequent and/or simultaneous heroin abuse continues to grow.

21 454. In fact, people who are addicted to prescription opioid painkillers are 40 times 22 more likely to be addicted to heroin. The CDC identified addiction to prescription pain 23 medication as the strongest risk factor for heroin addiction. A more recent, and even more deadly problem stemming from the prescription opioid epidemic involves fentanyl, a powerful opioid 24

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- ³⁵⁰ Califf, MD, et al., A Proactive Response to Prescription Opioid Abuse, New Engl. J. Med. (Apr. 14, 2016). 27 ³⁵¹ CDC, January 1, 2016 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report; Rudd, Rose A., et al. "Increases in drug and opioid overdose deaths - United States, 2000-2014." American Journal of Transplantation 16.4 (2016): 1323-1327.
- 28 ³⁵² https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-systems-and-services/our-insights/why-we-need-bolder-actionto-combat-the-opioid-epidemic

³⁴⁹ Dart, MD, et al., Trends in Opioid Analgesic Abuse and Mortality in the United States, New Engl. J. Med., 26 372:241-248 (Jan. 15, 2015).

prescribed for cancer pain or in hospital settings that, in synthetic form, has made its way into
 Plaintiffs' communities.

455. Carfentanil, a powerful derivative of fentanyl, has increasingly been found in
heroin and fentanyl sold illicitly. Carfentanil is so strong that it is typically used in veterinary
medicine to sedate large wild animals such as elephants, and has been researched as a chemical
weapon. A dose the size of a grain of salt can rapidly lead to deadly overdose in humans.

456. No demographic is untouched by this epidemic. Nationally, one in five deaths
among younger adults in 2016 involved opioids, according to one study. And, deaths involving
both prescription and illicit opioids have risen sharply, nearly doubling since 2009.

457. Opioids were involved in 42% of all fatal drug overdoses in 2015, and another
25% involved heroin. According to the CDC, between 1999 and 2015, more than 183,000 people
died in the United States from prescription-related overdoses.

458. Rising opioid use and abuse have negative social and economic consequences far
beyond overdoses in other respects as well. According to a recent analysis by a Princeton
University economist, approximately one out of every three working age men who are not in the
labor force take daily prescription pain medication. The same research finds that opioid
prescribing alone accounts for 20% of the overall decline in the labor force participation for this
group from 2014 to 2016, and 25% of the smaller decline in labor force participation among
women. Many of those taking painkillers still said they experienced pain daily.

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H. <u>McKinsey Knew that OxyContin Was Highly Abusable, Addictive, and</u> Dangerous, and that Its Marketing Strategies Increased Those Harms.

459. McKinsey continued working with Purdue long after the severity of the opioid
crisis was well known. McKinsey knew that high dose OyxContin prescriptions carried a serious
risk of overdose. In 2017, over half of Purdue's opioids prescriptions exceeded the ninety mg
morphine equivalence threshold a day—the recommended maximal dose per the 2016 CDC
Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain.

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1	460. Purdue's 2007 guilty plea put McKinsey on notice of Purdue's misconduct. By
2	that time, McKinsey had access to public information indicating that OxyContin and other
3	opioids pose significant risk of addiction and misuse.
4	461. McKinsey was well aware of the risks of OxyContin based on its extensive
5	experience in the pharmaceutical industry, close collaboration with Purdue, and participation in
6	the regulatory submissions for reformulated OxyContin.353
7	462. The first bullet point of Purdue's 2007 "Observations and Activities Requiring an
8	[Abuse, Diversion, and Detection] Report" was "[a]n apparent pattern of an excessive number of
9	patients for the practice type[.]" ³⁵⁴ Thus, McKinsey knew or should have known that there was a
10	higher risk of abuse and diversion among high-volume prescribers.
11	463. What is more, on September 13, 2013 McKinsey briefed Purdue on the ongoing
12	concerns regarding OxyContin addiction and diversion among prescribers:
13	Findings on messaging and positioning
14	Opioids overall are still viewed as effective and necessary class of painkillers,
15	Key themes from prescriber interviews on abuse deterrents include:
16	Prescriber awareness of abuse deterrence and label change is mixed Opinions on impact/efficacy of abuse deterrence vary Most prescribers are concerned about abuse, but attempt to establish measures to
17	protect themselves Concerns remain that technology does not address oral abuse Less Informed prescribers ask for additional information and education around
18	ebuse deterrent formulations Existing market research suggests that most physicians do not feel that
19	reformulation positively impacts their prescribing behavior, and that diversion, abuse and regulatory concerns continue to weigh on prescribers
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22	McKinsay & Company 27
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24	464. In a PowerPoint slide entitled "Findings on messaging and positioning," part of a
25	presentation to Purdue entitled "OxyContin growth opportunities: Phase 1 Final Report:
26	
27	³⁵³ McKinsey PPLPC0390000347612 (
28); McK-MAAG-0118819 (email chain). ³⁵⁴ PPLPC010000033944.

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 by by sicians do not feel that [OxyContin] reformulation positively impacts their prescribing behavior, and that diversion, abuse and regulatory concerns continue to weigh on prescribers." 465. In an August 2017 presentation, McKinsey recognized that the opioid epidemic was "triggered, in large part, by a massive increase in prescribed opioids in the early 2000's."
465. In an August 2017 presentation, McKinsey recognized that the opioid epidemic
vas "triggered, in large part, by a massive increase in prescribed opioids in the early 2000's."
466. McKinsey's presentations to Purdue included extensive discussion of doctors'
concerns about opioid misuse and side effects, demonstrating McKinsey's awareness of the
langers of opioids. Rather than working to limit these disastrous effects, McKinsey treated
loctors' misgivings as obstacles to confront with new messaging.
467. Indeed, one reason that <i>Purdue</i> had knowledge that their own products were
addictive and dangerous is because McKinsey told them.
468. If McKinsey was not aware of the adverse consequences of OxyContin, the drug it
vas paid to sell, such ignorance could not survive the granular reality of its relationship with
Purdue. For example, in June 2009, McKinsey worked to "counter the emotional messages from
nothers with teenagers that overdosed on OxyContin."355
469. Within a few years of countering these emotional messages, McKinsey even
leveloped a method to identify geographic hot spots of OxyContin abuse and diversion. Once
leveloped, however, McKinsey simply never used it to decrease these harms.
470. Paul Coplan
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471. In deposition testimony in prior opioid-related litigation, Coplan was asked,
While you were at Purdue, did Purdue make an effort to identify hot spots for opioid abuse and
addiction or not?" ³⁵⁷
472. "
⁵⁵ PDD8901645845.
⁵⁶ Paul M. Coplan 1/18/19 Dep. Tr. At 16:18 -17:17. ⁵⁷ Id. at 355:10.

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8	474. Instead, McKinsey focused on increasing opioid sales for its clients, despite
9	knowing the harmful consequences of doing so. In yet another indication that OxyContin sales
10	should not be turbocharged: during McKinsey's work for Purdue, Purdue was unable to purchase
11	product liability insurance to cover its practice of selling OxyContin.
12	475. The basic premise of McKinsey's work put it on notice of the harmful
13	consequences that would ensure. It was tasked with advising a monoline manufacturer of opioids
14	about sales and marketing practices for its addictive products while that manufacturer was bound
15	by a five-year Corporate Integrity Agreement covering the very same opioid sales and marketing
16	practices. In 2012, OxyContin accounted for 94% of Purdue's revenue. ³⁶¹ As late as 2018, it
17	remained 84% of Purdue's revenue. ³⁶² According to the U.S. Department of Justice, "[f]rom 2010
18	to 2018, Purdue's profits were almost entirely driven by its success in selling OxyContin." ³⁶³ In
19	2015 alone, it obtained \$3 billion in annual opioid sales—a four-fold increase from its 2006 sales
20	of \$800 million.
21	476. McKinsey's mandate was to increase Purdue's opioid sales during a time when
22	Purdue was obligated to restrict its previous marketing strategies because those strategies had
23	caused the overprescribing of opioids and the inevitable consequences thereof. McKinsey's job
24	was to counter the intended results of the Corporate Integrity Agreement; to devise strategies to
25	
26	³⁵⁸ <i>Id.</i> at 355:14–356:11. ³⁵⁹ <i>Id.</i> at 357:8-16.
27	³⁶⁰ <i>Id.</i> at 357:22–358:6. ³⁶¹ Gerald Posner, <i>Pharma</i> , pg. 524 (Simon & Schuster 2020).
28	 ³⁶² Id. ³⁶³ https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1329571/download

sell as many pills as conceivably possible. Under McKinsey's tutelage, Purdue's growth
 continued its upward trajectory unabated, the Corporate Integrity Agreement notwithstanding.


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I. <u>McKinsey Portrays Itself as Part of a Solution to a Problem It was Integral in</u> <u>Creating.</u>

5 477. McKinsey's work on the other side of the aisle—helping clients address opioid 6 abuse and addiction—further proves that it was well aware of the risks of OxyContin, and thus 7 the risks of pushing OxyContin sales and high dose sales, and targeting the highest-volume 8 prescribers. McKinsey advised Purdue on "Project Tango," a 2014 plan to enter the addiction drug market.³⁶⁴ McKinsey noted the 9 ,,365 10 478. More than assisting specific clients with addressing the crisis itself, McKinsey saw 11 the ongoing opioid crisis as an opportunity to posture itself as contributing more broadly to 12 13 society. McKinsey likes to think of itself as a change agent capable of solving problems that truly 14 matter, and the opioid crisis is one McKinsey realizes matters. Dr. Sarun Charumilind, a 15 McKinsey partner in Philadelphia, "has led the firm's support to clients and *society* to combat the opioid crisis.366 16 17 479. In Detroit, partner Razili Lewis also helps "clients and *society* combat the opioids crisis." She does so by providing "insights, expertise, analytics, and technology."³⁶⁷ 18 480. Over in Cleveland, senior partner Tom Latkovic also "helps clients and *society*" 19 combat the opioids crisis."368 20 481. Kana Enomoto, a senior expert in Washington, D.C., is a "national leader in 21 mental health and substance-use policy," who acted as a "content director" on a study to "raise 22 23 awareness about opioid-use disorders." She also provided strategic guidance to the United States 24 25 ³⁶⁴ See David Armstrong, OxyContin Maker Explored Expansion Into "Attractive" Anti-Addiction Market, 26 ProPublica (Jan. 30, 2019), available at https://www.propublica.org/article/oxycontin-purdue-pharma-massachusettslawsuit-anti-addiction-market. 27 ³⁶⁵ PPLPC023000714734. ³⁶⁶ See https://www.mckinsey.com/our-people/sarun-charumilind 28

³⁶⁷ See https://www.mckinsey.com/our-people/razili-lewis ³⁶⁸ See https://www.mckinsey.com/our-people/tom-latkovic

Case 3:21-md-02996-CRB Document 297 Filed 12/06/21 Page 115 of 179 1 Surgeon General regarding efforts to "combat the opioid epidemic" when she was his Chief of Staff.³⁶⁹ 2 3 482. McKinsey consistently states that it takes its obligations to society seriously. Indeed, the firm has established a center:³⁷⁰ 4 5 The Center for Societal Benefit through Healthcare was established to build on the long-standing mission of McKinsey's Public & Social Sector and Healthcare 6 Systems & Services Practices to improve healthcare. The Center's work is funded solely by McKinsey; it is not commissioned by any business, government, or other 7 institution. The Center brings a range of capabilities to bear, including McKinsey's 8 healthcare expertise, advanced analytics, functional knowledge, technology assets, network, and investment capacity. 9 The Center aspires to collaborate with other organizations to drive positive 10 innovation to improve overall health and well-being and reduce healthcare disparities. 11 483. The Center has focused on addressing the impacts of the opioid crisis on society. 12 13 One of the metrics that McKinsey uses to track the opioid crisis as a matter of public health is the "opioid prescribing rate" per 100 people in every county in the United States.³⁷¹ 14 15 484. As McKinsey's data visualization makes clear, there is an association between areas with higher opioid prescribing rates and higher instances of opioid use disorder. 16 17 485. The Center's data visualization is also reminiscent of similar work McKinsey did 18 for Purdue in 2013, although the analysis McKinsey did for Purdue was more granular, analyzing opioid prescribing patterns on the *zip-code* level in all 50 states, as opposed to the county level:³⁷² 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ³⁶⁹ See https://www.mckinsey.com/our-people/kana-enomoto ³⁷⁰ See https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-systems-and-services/how-we-help-clients/center-for-27 societal-benefit-through-healthcare/overview ³⁷¹ See https://csbh-dashboard.mckinsey.com/#/data-28 insights?chart=SC&geo=County&lob=All&metric1=opioid_rxrate&metric2=oud&tab=Map



1	487. Meanwhile, McKinsey has partnered with Shatterproof, a national non-profit
2	organization dedicated to reversing the addiction crisis in the United States, to prepare a report on
3	overcoming stigma associated with opioid use disorder. ³⁷³ McKinsey touts the Shatterproof
4	partnership on its webpage as an example of "our societal impact." ³⁷⁴
5	488. In August 2017, McKinsey prepared a presentation entitled "Perspectives on
6	Combatting the Opioid Crisis," which referenced its work on combatting opioid addiction for
7	various other entities:
8	
9	RECENT CLIENT EXPERIENCE Designed and helped launch a health home program to expand
10	resources and accountability for substance abuse treatment
11	Conducted a state wide assessment of opioid prescriber performance in terms of prescribing rate, dosage, and duration
12	>>> Defined clinically relevant opioid quality measures for a portfolio of episodes-of-care
13	>>> Defined clinically relevant opioid quality measures for a Patient Centered Medical Home and Accountable Care Organizations
14	Used predictive analytics to develop multi-faceted approach to assess patient risk for opioid addiction
15 16	Used geo-spatial and social network analytics to assess intensity of opioid abuse and treatment needs
17	Integrated claims and PDMP data to generate transparency on provider prescribing practices
18	Developed a substance abuse episode of care focused on
19	priority patient journeys
20	489. In June 2018, Dr. Charumilind and Mr. Latkovic, along with fellow McKinsey
21	partner Elena Mendez-Escobar, published a public report, "Ten insights on the Opioid crisis from
22	claims data analysis," stating information about the risks of opioids that McKinsey knew while
23	advising Purdue to sell more opioids and higher dose opioids, and target the highest volume
24	prescribers:
25	a. "Providers frequently prescribe opioids to patients with known or potential
26	risk factors for abuse[;]"
27	
28	³⁷³ See https://www.shatterproof.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/A-Movement-to-End-Addiction-Stigma.pdf

³⁷⁴ See https://www.mckinsey.com/us/our-societal-impact

- b. "Approximately 35% of the patients given opioid prescriptions in our
 analysis had features that put them at increased risk for opioid abuse[;]"
 c. "Most opioids are prescribed by providers other than the natural
 'quarterback' of a patient's underlying complaint or condition... This finding makes clear that
 high-dose prescribers and multi-prescriber patterns are separate issues—and both are important to
- 6 address[;]" and
- 7

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d. "A small portion of opioid use originates in emergency departments."³⁷⁵
 490. Two months later, the same authors, joined by Ms. Lewis, published "Why we need bolder action to combat the opioid epidemic."³⁷⁶ "Our research suggests that much broader – and bolder – action is required," they announced.³⁷⁷

11

J. <u>Coda</u>

491. Marvin Bower, the McKinsey legend who admonished, "Deliver bad news if you 12 13 must, but deliver it properly," died in 2003, one year before the firm began working with Purdue. 492. 14 McKinsey's work with Purdue would have been unrecognizable to Bower, one of the founders of modern management consulting. Instead of acknowledging the elephant in the 15 room—that Purdue's business was knowingly maximizing the amount of addictive and deadly 16 17 opioids sold in the United States-and delivering that bad news promptly properly to the client, 18 McKinsey instead committed to partner with Purdue to maximize opioid sales without regard to 19 the consequences.

493. On October 23, 2017, the president of the United States declared the ongoing
nationwide opioid epidemic a "public health emergency." Even at this late hour in the crisis,
McKinsey continued to propose solutions to the Sacklers and Purdue to further boost opioid sales.
These solutions were fashioned, in perfect McKinsey parlance, as "high impact interventions to
rapidly address market access challenges."

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 ³⁷⁵ https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-systems-and-services/our-insights/ten-insights-on-the-us-opioid crisis-from-claims-data-analysis

 ³⁷⁶ See https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-systems-and-services/our-insights/why-we-need-bolder action-to-combat-the-opioid-epidemic

1	4	94.	Less than two	months after the put	olic health emergence	y declaration, McKinsey
2	proposed	l these	high impact ir	nterventions to Purdu	ue and its board. An	nong them was perhaps
3	McKinse	ey's mo	ost audacious g	gambit of the entire	Purdue relationship:	paying money—
4	"rebates"	'—to ł	nealth insurers	whenever someone	overdosed on Purdu	e's drug.
5	4	95.	These paymen	ts for future OxyCo	ntin overdoses were	christened "Event-Based
6	contracts	."378				
7	4	96.	Helpfully, Mc	Kinsey provided esti	mates for the future	costs of these "events." ³⁷⁹
8	McKinse	ey note	d that, if Purdu	ue were to start mak	ing overdose payme	nts, it would "need to
9	determin	e whic	ch payment am	ount is optimal."		
10	4	97.	A "meaningful	l" amount, according	g to McKinsey, wou	ld be somewhere between
11	six and f	ifteen	thousand dolla	rs for each person w	ho overdoses or dev	velops opioid-use disorder as
12	a result o	of Purd	lue's drugs:			
13	Г		Meaningful reh	ate amounts per OD/		DRAFT
14		4	from ~\$6k to ~			
15						
16			ased rebate \$0	\$6,360	\$14,810	
17		Low rebate	Status guo	Drug costs	Medical costs	e
18			No additional event-based	Cost for 1 year of OxyContin ¹	Excess medical costs for 1 year	
19			rebate Literature	agrees on ~\$10-20k excess cost	related to abuse ²	1
20			[10] 10] 10] 10] 10] 10] 10] 10] 10] 10]	r surrounding inciting event (e.g		
21		F	urther consider is need	led of the rebate level that best rebate and financial protection		
22	1	Monthly estimate	s of \$530 per Purdue			
23	14 mi	Kirson et al, "Ecor Based on Truven SOURCE: Literature	nomic Burden of Opioid Abuse: Updated data. Lower figures ~\$10k are from 2011	Findings." JMCP vol 23, No 4, April 2017 analyses; \$14K is from Kirson et al from 2012-2016 data	CONFIDENCE CONFIDENCE	TAL 40
24	40				MCK-	MAAG-0201388
25						
26						he face of a national disaster, led
27	Forsythe,	McKinse	ey Proposed Payi	ng Pharmacy Companie	s Rebates for OxyConti	on." Walt Bogdanich and Michael <i>n Overdoses</i> , New York Times,
28	opioids.htt	nl				nckinsey-purdue-oxycontin-
-	WICKIN:	sey defi	neu an event as	"first occurrence for ov	erclose or opioid use dis	order.

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1	498. The money would be paid to health insurers for the increased costs of additional
2	medical services that resulted from the fact that Purdue's medications caused opioid-use disorder
3	and overdoses in people whose health care costs were the payors' obligation. The money
4	McKinsey proposed Purdue pay out in these circumstances would not go to the individuals
5	afflicted, nor the estates of the dead.
6	499. McKinsey's analysis also suggested that it could predict the number of people who
7	would become addicted to opioids or overdose on pills sold through Purdue's downstream
8	customers. McKinsey "projected that in 2019, for example, 2,484 CVS customers would either
9	have an overdose or develop an opioid use disorder."380
10	500. It is little surprise, then, that McKinsey was concerned with its legal liability for
11	this work. Within months of recommending "event-based contracts" to Purdue, Martin Elling
12	raised this concern with Arnab Ghatak and suggested corrective action: destroying evidence.
13	
14	Message
15	From: Martin Elling [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP
16	(FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=6B33C3264F744B04AF05FA59341271BE-MARTIN ELLI] Sent: 7/4/2018 12:10:13 PM To: A G [drarnabghatak@gmail.com]
17	Subject: Re: [EXT]Re: Howdy
18	Have a great fourth. M
19	> On Jul 4, 2018, at 2:01 PM, A G <drarnabghatak@gmail.com> wrote:</drarnabghatak@gmail.com>
	> Thanks for the heads up. Will do.
20	> >> On Jul 4, 2018, at 7:57 AM, Martin Elling <martin_elling@mckinsey.com> wrote: >></martin_elling@mckinsey.com>
21	>> Just saw in the FT that Judy Lewent is being sued by states attorneys general for her role on the Purdue Board. It probably makes sense to have a quick conversation with the risk committee to see if we should be doing anything other that eliminating all our documents and emails. Suspect not but as things get tougher there someone might turn to us. M
22	>> +===================================
23	>> This email is confidential and may be privileged. If you have received it >> in error, please notify us immediately and then delete it. Please do not >> copy it, disclose its contents or use it for any purpose.
24	>> +===================================
25	501. Elling's prediction that things would "get tougher" for Purdue would prove
26	prescient.
27	
28	³⁸⁰ Walt Bogdanich and Michael Forsythe, <i>McKinsey Proposed Paying Pharmacy Companies Rebates for OxyContin Overdoses</i> , N.Y. Times (Nov. 27, 2020, updated Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/27/business/mckinsey-purdue-oxycontin-opioids.html

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1 2

Guilty Again - 2020

1.

502. On October 20, 2020, Purdue—McKinsey's co-conspirator—agreed with the
United States Department of Justice to plead guilty to improper marketing of OxyContin and
other opioids again (the "2020 Settlement Agreement"). This time the plea agreement concerned
conduct from 2010 to 2018. The agreement includes \$8.3 billion in penalties from Purdue and
\$225 million from the Sackler family.

503. Purdue pleaded guilty to a dual-object conspiracy to defraud the United States and
to violate the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 353, violating anti-kickback laws,
and "using aggressive marketing tactics to convince doctors to unnecessarily prescribe opioids—
frivolous prescriptions that experts say helped fuel a drug addiction crisis that has ravaged
America for decades."

12 504. The new plea agreement does not identify Purdue's co-conspirators, and
13 McKinsey is not identified by name in the agreement. Instead, McKinsey is referred to as the
14 "consulting company."

15 505. Purdue's new guilty plea concerns Covered Conduct (as defined in the plea
agreement) that directly implicates McKinsey in the conspiracy. It is the same conduct described
in this Complaint.

18 506. Indeed, the plea agreement signed by McKinsey's co-conspirator states bluntly:
19 "Purdue, *in collaboration with [McKinsey]*, implemented many of [McKinsey's]
20 recommendations." (emphasis added).

507. Further, Purdue admitted that E2E "*was overseen by [McKinsey]* and some of
Purdue's top executives through the creation of the E2E Executive Oversight Team ('EOT') and
Project Management Office ('PMO')" (emphasis added).

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2. <u>A Mea Culpa</u>

508. On December 5, 2020, six weeks after Purdue's second guilty plea, McKinsey
issued a rare public statement regarding its work with a specific client on its website. The client
was Purdue, and the statement was issued is response to Purdue's second guilty plea and recent
media reports regarding McKinsey's work selling OxyContin after 2007:

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McKinsey statement on its past work with Purdue Pharma

December 5, 2020—As we look back at our client service during the opioid crisis, we recognize that we did not adequately acknowledge the epidemic unfolding in our communities or the terrible impact of opioid misuse and addiction on millions of families across the country. That is why last year we stopped doing any work on opioid-specific business, anywhere in the world.

Our work with Purdue was designed to support the legal prescription and use of opioids for patients with legitimate medical needs, and any suggestion that our work sought to increase overdoses or misuse and worsen a public health crisis is wrong. That said, we recognize that we have a responsibility to take into account the broader context and implications of the work that we do. Our work for Purdue fell short of that standard.

We have been undertaking a full review of the work in question, including into the 2018 email exchange which referenced potential deletion of documents. We continue to cooperate fully with the authorities investigating these matters.

13 509. As the statement indicates, McKinsey stopped doing work "anywhere in the
14 world." Given that Purdue's operations addressed only the United States, the global reach of
15 McKinsey's regret is noteworthy.

16 510. In August 2013, when the Sacklers adopted McKinsey's "Project Turbocharge" for
17 Purdue, Tim Reiner, a long-time McKinsey consultant, joined Mundipharma. Mundipharma is a
18 separate company—also owned by the Sacklers—that sells opioids internationally.

19 511. As late as 2019, Mundipharma has been asserting many of the same misleading
20 claims about opioids that previously led to criminal liability in the United States.³⁸¹ McKinsey has
21 long assisted the Sacklers in growing Mundipharma's opioids market.³⁸² By 2015, McKinsey's
22 workload with Mundipharma was large enough to merit formal coordination and incorporation
23 with the overall McKinsey team servicing the Purdue account. Around this time, McKinsey's
24 Elling agreed to assume "a real operational DCS" role with respect to the work that McKinsey
25 was performing for the various Sackler interests, including "integrat[ing] the Mundipharma

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^{27 &}lt;sup>381</sup> See Kinetz, Erika, *Fake doctors, pilfered medical records drive OxyChina sales*, Associated Press, November 19, 2019, *available at:* https://apnews.com/article/4122af46fdba42119ae3db30aa13537c

^{28 382} See, e.g., MCK-MDL2996-0256120; MCK-MDL2996-0327127; MCK-MDL2996-0183279; MCK-MDL2996-0286490.

stuff." ³⁸³ Even if the various components of the Sackler "family conglomerate" were nominally
 independent, McKinsey consolidated its own treatment of its work for all of these companies as
 serving just a single client.

4

3. A Hedge Fund

5 512. On February 4, 2021, forty-nine state attorneys general announced a multistate
6 settlement with McKinsey related to its work for opioid manufacturers. McKinsey agreed to pay
7 almost \$600 million dollars. At the time of the announcement, most of the participating states
8 each filed a complaint and consent decree finalizing the settlement.

513. Three days after the settlement, it came to light that McKinsey appears to have
benefitted from its work promoting opioids not only through the fees paid to McKinsey by its
clients, but also through investments in opioid-related business made by McKinsey's own hedge
fund, the McKinsey Investment Office ("MIO"). MIO is the hedge fund referenced above, with
respect to McKinsey's investment in Teva Pharmaceutical.

14 514. Consultants don't typically have in-house hedge funds overseeing retirement
15 accounts and partners' personal investments. In fact, McKinsey is the only one. "Most large
16 companies, including all the major consulting firms, hire third-party firms . . . to oversee their
17 employees' retirement accounts."³⁸⁴ MIO manages approximately \$31 billion on behalf of
18 McKinsey partners, employees, and former partners.³⁸⁵


19 515. Through MIO, McKinsey was heavily invested in the opioid industry, and stood to
20 gain financially from the continuation of the opioid crisis. It even invested in opioid addiction
21 treatment businesses—a growing industry, as McKinsey knew.

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³⁸³ MCK-MDL2996-0210149

 ³⁸⁴ Gretchen Morgenson, "Consulting giant McKinsey allegedly fed the opioid crisis. Now an affiliate may profit from treating addicts.," *NBC News*, February 8, 2021, *available at* https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/
 consulting-giant-mckinsey-allegedly-fed-opioid-crisis-now-affiliate-may-n1256969

 ³⁸⁵ SEC Order dated November 19, 20201 at Para. 5, available at: https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2021/ia 5912.pdf. That \$31 billion under management would make MIO Partners the thirteenth largest hedge fund on Earth. *See* https://www.pionline.com/interactive/largest-hedge-fund-managers-2021.



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"separately managed accounts," comprising approximately 40% of MIO's holdings, are portfolios of securities managed by a third-party money manager, but where MIO "knows what securities 2 3 are held through each account," and; (3) direct investments, where MIO invests its own money 4 directly, which comprises approximately 10% of MIO's investments.

5 521. In other words, for at least 40% of MIOs holdings, McKinsey partners are able to know the specific investments held by the various MIO funds. "MIO has a ledger for every 6 security in their managed accounts."³⁸⁷ That comprises a pool of capital worth more than \$6 7 8 billion.

9 522. MIO is run for the benefit of McKinsey's partners and, to a separate extent, 10 McKinsey's employees. Those individuals (and, crucially, former McKinsey partners) invest their 11 own money in MIO, and their access to those investment opportunities constitutes a meaningful and important component of those individuals' compensation. MIO has, "at a minimum, the 12 13 ability to view the individual securities that account for approximately 40 to 50 percent." This is 14 approximately \$6 billion dollars of invested capital. What is more, MIO directly invests 15 approximately 10% of its assets. That is \$1.5 billion MIO directly invests in securities without the use of any outside money manager. These numbers exclude leverage. 16

17 From a conflicts perspective, the fact that *former* partners may participate in MIO 523. 18 investments merits consideration. With respect to McKinsey's opioid investments, it is notable to consider just who some of those "former partners" are. As noted above, Rajiv de Silva, Chief 19 20 Executive Officer of opioid defendant Endo Pharmaceuticals, is a former McKinsey partner. Kare 21 Shultz, Chief Executive Officer of opioid defendant Teva Pharmaceutical, is a former McKinsey 22 partner. Frank Scholz, President of opioid defendant SpecGX, a subsidiary of Mallinckrodt, is a 23 former McKinsey partner. Marc Owen, President of opioid defendant McKesson, is a former McKinsey partner. This list is merely illustrative; it is not exhaustive. 24

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524. The result is the prospect of individual executives at various opioid manufacturing and distribution companies obtaining financial gain from the ongoing propagation of the opioid

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³⁸⁷ Michelle Celarier, McKinsey's Managed Accounts Come Under Scrutiny in Trial, Institutional Investor, February 28 5, 2020, available at: https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1k6wnn251s472/McKinsey-s-Managed-Accounts-Come-Under-Scrutiny-in-Trial

1 crisis *not* via compensation from their employers, but via participating in investments alongside 2 their *former* employer (and, in many cases, current consultant).

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525. Three days after McKinsey and the state attorneys general announced their settlement, NBC News reported that MIO, McKinsey's hedge fund, owned opioid-related investments during the time that it advised its opioid clients.

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526. One is Deerfield Management Co., "a \$10 billion dollar health care investment firm based in New York."³⁸⁸ As ever, "two top Deerfield executives previously worked at 8 McKinsey." A retirement fund managed by MIO held a \$108 million stake in funds managed by 9 Deerfield and invested in opioid industry participants. "In 2017, for example, Deerfield was a 6 percent shareholder in Mallinckrodt, a major opioid maker."³⁸⁹ From 2011 through 2016, 10 Deerfield held a stake of up to \$90 million in Teva. Deerfield also took stakes in the distributors 11 described above, including McKesson and Cardinal Health.³⁹⁰ 12

13 527. McKinsey is also invested in treatment, an inevitable growth industry sprouting 14 from the over-selling of opioids. Separate from its investments with Deerfield, MIO is also invested in Adamis Pharmaceuticals, "a company that develops products to treat opioid 15 overdoses," and therefore "may also benefit from opioid settlement funds" paid by McKinsey as a 16 17 result of its settlement with the states. As of 2020, MIO owned 26% of the Adamis' preferred shares through another outside investment manager (not Deerfield).³⁹¹ Separately, Deerfield 18 invested \$331 million in Recovery Centers of America, an addiction treatment company that 19 operates facilities in states that McKinsey recently settled with.³⁹² 20

528. These relationships and investments give a glimpse into the myriad means 21 McKinsey deploys to make money. Consulting is more than giving advice. Indeed, On November 22 23 19, 2021, MIO Partners agreed to pay an \$18 million fine to the SEC due to MIO's possession of material nonpublic information related to its holdings, information obtained through consulting. 24

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³⁸⁸ Gretchen Morgenson, "Consulting giant McKinsey allegedly fed the opioid crisis. Now an affiliate may profit 26 from treating addicts.," NBC News, February 8, 2021, available at https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/consulting-giant-mckinsey-allegedly-fed-opioid-crisis-now-affiliate-may-n1256969

- ³⁸⁹ Id. 27
- ³⁹⁰ Id.
- ³⁹¹ Id. 28

³⁹² Id.

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VI. <u>TOLLING OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS</u>

529. McKinsey is equitably estopped from relying upon a statute of limitations defense.
Alongside its clients, McKinsey undertook active efforts to deceive the Plaintiffs and to
purposefully conceal its unlawful conduct and fraudulently assure the public, including Plaintiffs,
that opioids were non-addictive, effective, and safe for the treatment of long-term chronic pain
and non-acute, non-cancer pain with the goal of increased sales, greater availability and access to
opioids, and maximizing profits.

8 530. McKinsey and its clients were deliberate in taking steps to conceal their
9 conspiratorial behavior and active role in the deceptive marketing of opioids. This deceptive
10 marketing—which included the above falsehoods that opioids were safer, less subject to abuse,
11 and less addictive than other pain medications—was a substantial factor in the oversupply of
12 opioids through overprescribing and suspicious sales, all of which fueled the opioid epidemic.

531. McKinsey deliberately advised its clients on marketing strategies and tactics to
bolster their opioid products as non-addictive, safe, and efficacious without reliable scientific
evidence to support same. McKinsey's consulting services were given confidentially, and both
McKinsey and its clients concealed the content of those services from the public. In doing so,
McKinsey concealed its role in shaping, editing, and providing the content of the false and
misleading materials addressing pain management and opioids that were widely disseminated to
regulators, prescribers, and the public at large, including Plaintiffs.

McKinsey also concealed from Plaintiffs the existence of the Plaintiffs' claims by 532. 20 hiding it and its client's lack of cooperation with law enforcement. For example, in May 2007, 21 Purdue and three of its executives pled guilty to federal charges of misbranding OxyContin in 22 what the company acknowledged was an attempt to mislead doctors about the risk of addiction 23 and entered into a Corporate Integrity Agreement explained above. Purdue was ordered to pay 24 \$600 million in fines and fees. In its plea, Purdue admitted that its promotion of OxyContin was 25 misleading and inaccurate, misrepresented the risk of addiction, and was unsupported by science. 26 Additionally, Michael Friedman, the company's president, pled guilty to a misbranding charge 27 and agreed to pay \$19 million in fines; Howard R. Udell, Purdue's top lawyer, also pled guilty 28

and agreed to pay \$8 million in fines; and Paul D. Goldenheim, its former medical director, pled
 guilty as well and agreed to pay \$7.5 million in fines.

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3 533. Nevertheless, even after the guilty pleas, Purdue continued to pay doctors on 4 speakers' bureaus to promote the liberal prescribing of OxyContin for chronic pain and fund 5 seemingly neutral organizations to disseminate the message that opioids were non-addictive as 6 well as other misrepresentations. Purdue also assembled an army of lobbyists to fight any 7 legislative actions that might encroach on its business. Between 2006 and 2015, Purdue and other 8 painkiller producers, along with their associated nonprofits, spent nearly \$900 million dollars on 9 lobbying and political contributions—eight times what the gun lobby spent during that period. 10 McKinsey participated extensively in these actions and provided Purdue with strategies and 11 assistance to maximize sales as described in this Complaint. McKinsey knew that the actions it took with Purdue were unlawful, and yet deliberately proceeded in order to increase Purdue's 12 13 sales and profits, and in turn to serve McKinsey's financial interests.

14 534. McKinsey affirmatively sought to convince the public that its clients' legal duties 15 to report suspicious sales of opioids had been satisfied through public assurances that they were 16 working to curb the opioid epidemic. For example, after the 2007 Purdue guilty plea described 17 above, McKinsey provided services to protect the company's public image and sales, aiding in 18 the concealment of the addictive nature and dangers associated with opioid use and denying 19 blame for the epidemic, attributing it instead solely to abuse and inappropriate prescribing. At the 20 guidance and advice of McKinsey, Purdue and other McKinsey clients publicly portrayed 21 themselves as committed to working diligently with law enforcement and others to prevent 22 diversion of these dangerous drugs and curb the opioid epidemic, and they made broad promises 23 to change their ways, insisting they were good corporate citizens. Instead, McKinsey assisted Purdue, for example, with marketing campaigns and messaging that continued business as usual, 24 25 indiscriminately targeting high prescribers and promoting opioids as safe but avoiding the pitfalls of the Corporate Integrity Agreement. These repeated misrepresentations misled regulators, 26 27 prescribers, and the public, including the Plaintiffs, and deprived Plaintiffs of actual or implied 28 knowledge of facts sufficient to put the Plaintiffs on notice of potential claims.

535. Plaintiffs did not discover the nature, scope, and magnitude of McKinsey's
 misconduct, and its full impact on Plaintiffs, and could not have acquired such knowledge earlier
 through the exercise of reasonable diligence.

4 536. Prior to the applicable limitations period, Plaintiffs did not suspect, and had no
5 reason to suspect, that McKinsey's conduct caused their injuries, including the consumption of
6 Plaintiffs' resources as the opioid epidemic remains unabated.

537. McKinsey intended that its actions and omissions made with its clients would be
relied upon, including by the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs did not know and did not have the means to
know the truth due to McKinsey and its clients' actions and omissions.

10 538. The Plaintiffs reasonably relied on the affirmative statements developed by
11 McKinsey and made by its clients regarding their purported compliance with their obligations
12 under the law and consent orders, which were false and only intended to save the clients' public
13 image.

14 539. McKinsey's fraudulent concealment has tolled the running of any statute of
15 limitations. Through it and its clients' affirmative misrepresentations and omissions, McKinsey
16 actively concealed from Plaintiffs the risks associated with opioids that led to the opioids crisis.
17 The wrongdoing, misrepresentations, and omissions by McKinsey has not ceased because the
18 public nuisance remains unabated.

19

VII. HARM TO SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND STATE CLASSES

20 540. McKinsey's intentional and/or unlawful conduct, as described herein, resulted in 21 direct and foreseeable, past and continuing, economic damages, which Plaintiffs and the State 22 Classes have incurred and continue to incur, including: (1) costs associated with special education 23 means, including, but not limited to, special programs for children with opioid-related learning disabilities, or for children in need of psychological counseling or other supports due to opioid-24 25 related family crisis; (2) costs associated with providing care and support for children whose family members suffer from opioid-related disability or incapacitation and/or opioid use disorder; 26 27 (3) costs associated with increased school security in all facilities of the school board district; (4) 28 costs for providing medical care, additional therapeutic and prescription drug purchases, and

1 other treatments for patients suffering from opioid-related addiction or disease, including 2 overdoses and deaths; (5) costs associated with increased healthcare and healthcare insurance; (6) 3 costs regarding disability payments; (7) loss of tax revenue; and (8) treble damages, and for 4 which Plaintiff seeks relief as to all claims and counts, as alleged herein. Plaintiff also seeks the 5 means to abate the epidemic (created by McKinsey's wrongful and/or unlawful conduct), 6 including but not limited to, economic damages from McKinsey as reimbursement for the costs 7 associated with past, present, and future efforts to address, pay for and/or eliminate the 8 aforementioned hazards to public health and safety.

9 541. Plaintiffs, and similarly situated school districts in their states, have had to increase resources or divert resources away from other essential functions because of McKinsey's schemes 10 11 to increase opioid sales. The costs to schools have included increased disability evaluations, increased numbers of students qualifying for educational disability, increased classroom therapies 12 13 and services, increased administrative expenses, and resources increasingly diverted from 14 classroom instruction to address behavioral disruptions caused by students whose ability to self-15 regulate has been compromised by prenatal opioid exposure or their families' addiction to opioids. 16

542. A significantly higher proportion of children with a history of NOWS are
diagnosed with educational disabilities, including developmental delay or speech or language
impairment. They are more likely to have severe intellectual disabilities, autism spectrum
disorders, or Attention Deficit Disorder. They are also more likely to fail to meet grade level
norms. These differences, individually and in combination make children with a history of
NOWS significantly and disproportionately more likely to qualify for and receive mandated
special education services.³⁹³

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³⁹³ Mary-Margaret A. Fill et al., *Educational Disabilities Among Children Born With Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome*, 142 Pediatrics e20180562 (2018); *see also* Oei JL, Melhuish E, Uebel H, et al. *Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome and High School Performance*, 139 Pediatrics 2 (2017); Sirnes, Eivind, et al. "Brain morphology in school-aged children with prenatal opioid exposure: a structural MRI study." *Early human development* 106 (2017): 33-39. In addition, eighty percent of children with ADHD receive school-based services, at some point, via federally mandated

Individual Education Plans (IEPs) or services pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Danielson, Melissa
 L., et al. "A national description of treatment among United States children and adolescents with attentiondeficit/hyperactivity disorder." *The Journal of pediatrics* 192 (2018): 240-246.

543. In every one of the states where Plaintiffs are located, McKinsey conspired with
 and aided and abetted Purdue and other opioid manufacturers to flood those states with
 prescription opioids, causing an increase in babies born with NOWS in those states and an
 increase in enrollment by students with NOWS histories in Plaintiffs' school districts.

5 544. The states in which the school districts bringing this Complaint are located have
6 been especially hard hit.

7 West Virginia has the highest rate of opioid-related overdose deaths in the a. 8 country. In 2017, there were 833 drug overdose deaths involving opioids in the state, a rate of 9 49.6 deaths per 100,000 persons. West Virginia was specifically targeted with aggressive opioid marketing to doctors and pharmacists with over 780 million doses of prescription painkillers 10 transported into the state over the course of six years.³⁹⁴ McKinsey identified particular counties 11 and towns in West Virginia, and even particular prescribers and pharmacies, to target for 12 13 excessive opioid sales. Kermit, West Virginia, a town with a population of 392, received nearly 9 million hydrocodone pills over the course of two years.³⁹⁵ One pharmacy in Oceana, West 14 Virginia received nearly 600 times as many oxycodone pills as a nearby Rite Aid.³⁹⁶ Between 15 2007 and 2013, the incidence of Neonatal Opioid Withdrawal Syndrome increased from 7.74 per 16 1000 live births per year to 31.56 per 1000 live births per year in West Voirginia.³⁹⁷ Researchers 17 18 examined a 15-month period from October 1, 2016 to December 31, 2017, and found Neonatal Opioid Withdrawal Syndrome in 52.6 per 1000 live births among West Virginia residents.³⁹⁸ 19 20 b. In Kentucky, McKinsey identified particular counties and towns, and even particular pharmacies, in Kentucky to flood with opioids. From August 1, 2014 until July 31, 21 22 2015, there were 1,234 NOWS births reported to the Kentucky Department of Public Health— 23

- ³⁹⁴ Eric Eyre, *Drug firms poured 780M painkillers into WV amid rise of overdoses*, Charleston Gazette-Mail (Dec. 17, 2016), <u>https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/health/drug-firms-poured-m-painkillers-into-wv-amid-rise-of/article 78963590-b050-11e7-8186-f7e8c8a1b804.html</u>
 ³⁹⁵ Id.
- 27 ³⁹⁶ *Id.*

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 ³⁹⁷ Umer, Amna, et al. "Capturing the statewide incidence of neonatal abstinence syndrome in real time: the West Virginia experience" *Pediatric research* 85.5 (2019): 607-611.

translating to about 100 newborns per month. In 2018, providers wrote 79.5 opioid prescriptions
 for every 100 persons in the state.³⁹⁹

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VIII. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiffs bring this case on behalf of themselves and as statewide class actions 4 545. 5 under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) and, alternatively, 23(c)(4) on behalf of all 6 independent public school districts in their respective states ("the State Classes"). All class 7 members bear the steadily rising costs of providing special education and related supports and 8 services and diversion of resources to their states to provide for (1) children exposed to opioids in 9 *utero*, which makes those children about twice as likely to exhibit learning and developmental disabilities than children who were not exposed,⁴⁰⁰ and (2) children presenting emotional and 10 behavioral challenges in schools because of their family members' use of opioids. 11

12 546. Plaintiffs and the State Classes will continue to incur significant costs in the years
13 to come as the current and future cohorts of adversely impacted children come of school age and
14 move from lower school to high school with special needs all along the way.

547. Plaintiffs' State Classes are defined as follows:

16 a. <u>West Virginia Class</u>: All independent public school districts in the State
17 of West Virginia.

18 b. <u>Kentucky Class</u>: All independent public school districts in the State of
19 Kentucky.

20 548. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend or modify the class definitions with greater

21 specificity or further division into subclasses or limitation to particular issues.

549. Numerosity. The potential members of the State Classes as defined are so

- 23 numerous that joinder of all members is unfeasible and not practicable. There are 55 public
- 24 school districts in West Virginia⁴⁰¹ and 171 in Kentucky.⁴⁰²
- 25

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²⁶ ³⁹⁹ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. U.S. Opioid Prescribing Rate Maps. (2019, October 3). Retrieved from https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/maps/rxrate-maps.html.

⁴⁰⁰ Paul Morgan and Yangyang Wang, *The Opioid Epidemic, Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome, and Estimated Costs for Special Education Services*, 25 American Journal of Managed Care 13 (2019).

^{28 &}lt;sup>401</sup> https://www.greatschools.org/schools/districts/West_Virginia/WV/

⁴⁰² Kentucky Department of Education, https://education.ky.gov/comm/schdist/Pages/default.aspx

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1	550. Commonality and Predominance. There are questions of law and fact common	on to	
2	the State Classes, which predominate over any questions affecting only individual State Class		
3	members. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation:		
4	a. McKinsey's conduct in creating, urging, and implementing marketing	g,	
5	promotion, distribution, and sales strategies for opioids after Purdue's first guilty plea in 20	07;	
6	b. Whether McKinsey disregarded the risks associated with its strategie	s for	
7	"turbocharging" opioid sales in 2013 and later;		
8	c. Whether McKinsey's developing, urging, and implementing its opioi	d	
9	strategies with Purdue and other opioid manufacturers it worked with caused or contributed	to an	
10	increase in opioid addiction and abuse and the effects alleged;		
11	d. Whether McKinsey's conduct with respect to developing, urging, and	t	
12	implementing nationwide opioid sales, including in each State Class's state, was negligent,		
13	grossly negligent, reckless, or intentional;		
14	e. Whether McKinsey's conduct with respect to developing, urging, and	t	
15	implementing nationwide opioid sales, including in each State Class's state, caused or contr	ributed	
16	to causing a public nuisance;		
17	f. Whether McKinsey's conduct with respect to developing, urging, and	t	
18	implementing nationwide opioid strategies resulted in false misrepresentations to prescriber	ſS,	
19	including those in each State Class's state, regarding opioids;		
20	g. Whether McKinsey aided and abetted and/or conspired with Purdue,		
21	Rhodes, the Sacklers, and other opioid manufacturers it worked with in developing, urging,	and	
22	implementing its opioid strategies;		
23	h. Whether McKinsey's actions, as set out in this Complaint, caused an		
24	increase in the number of children born with in utero opioid exposure;		
25	i. Whether children affected by opioid usage <i>in utero</i> require special		
26	education services and other supports in public schools; and		
27	j. Whether opioid addiction or use disorder in the family home increase	es the	
28	risk that a student will present emotional and behavioral difficulties in school in school.		

I

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-	551. Typicality. The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of each of			
2	their State Classes. Plaintiffs and the State Classes sustained damages as aforesaid arising out of			
3	and caused by McKinsey's unlawful conduct as alleged in this Complaint.			
4	552. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and			
5	protect the interests of the members of their State Class. Counsel representing Plaintiffs are			
6	competent and experienced in litigating class actions.			
7	553. Superiority of Class Action. A class action is superior to other available methods			
8	for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all the members of the			
9	State Classes is impracticable. Furthermore, the adjudication of this controversy through a class			
10	action will avoid the possibility of inconsistent and potentially conflicting adjudication of the			
11	claims asserted herein. A class action would provide a superior vehicle for resolving the issues for			
12	all similarly affected and situated. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as			
13	a class action.			
14	IX. <u>CLAIMS FOR RELIEF</u>			
15	554. All cases of action are brought on behalf of both Plaintiffs and State Classes.			
16	A. Violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq.			
16 17	 A. <u>Violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq.</u> 555. Plaintiffs realleage all of the foregoing allegations and incorporate them by 			
17	555. Plaintiffs realleage all of the foregoing allegations and incorporate them by			
17 18	555. Plaintiffs realleage all of the foregoing allegations and incorporate them by reference.			
17 18 19	555. Plaintiffs realleage all of the foregoing allegations and incorporate them by reference.556. This claim is brought by Plaintiffs against McKinsey for actual damages, treble			
17 18 19 20	 555. Plaintiffs realleage all of the foregoing allegations and incorporate them by reference. 556. This claim is brought by Plaintiffs against McKinsey for actual damages, treble damages, and available injunctive and/or equitable relief under 18. U.S.C. § 1964, for violations 			
17 18 19 20 21	 555. Plaintiffs realleage all of the foregoing allegations and incorporate them by reference. 556. This claim is brought by Plaintiffs against McKinsey for actual damages, treble damages, and available injunctive and/or equitable relief under 18. U.S.C. § 1964, for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1961, <i>et seq.</i>, specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d). 			
17 18 19 20 21 22	 555. Plaintiffs realleage all of the foregoing allegations and incorporate them by reference. 556. This claim is brought by Plaintiffs against McKinsey for actual damages, treble damages, and available injunctive and/or equitable relief under 18. U.S.C. § 1964, for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1961, <i>et seq.</i>, specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d). 557. Section 1962(c) makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with 			
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	 555. Plaintiffs realleage all of the foregoing allegations and incorporate them by reference. 556. This claim is brought by Plaintiffs against McKinsey for actual damages, treble damages, and available injunctive and/or equitable relief under 18. U.S.C. § 1964, for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1961, <i>et seq.</i>, specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d). 557. Section 1962(c) makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to 			
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	 555. Plaintiffs realleage all of the foregoing allegations and incorporate them by reference. 556. This claim is brought by Plaintiffs against McKinsey for actual damages, treble damages, and available injunctive and/or equitable relief under 18. U.S.C. § 1964, for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1961, <i>et seq.</i>, specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d). 557. Section 1962(c) makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a 			
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	 555. Plaintiffs realleage all of the foregoing allegations and incorporate them by reference. 556. This claim is brought by Plaintiffs against McKinsey for actual damages, treble damages, and available injunctive and/or equitable relief under 18. U.S.C. § 1964, for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1961, <i>et seq.</i>, specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d). 557. Section 1962(c) makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity" 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 			

1	559. Plaintiffs are each a "person," as the term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3), and
2	have standing to sue under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) as they were and are injured in their business
3	and/or property "by reason of" the RICO Act violations described herein.
4	560. Section 1962(d) makes it unlawful for "any person to conspire to violate" Section
5	1962(c), among other provisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
6	561. McKinsey conducted the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
7	activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and § 1962(d).
8	Description of the Enterprise
9	562. Section 1961(4) defines an enterprise as "any individual, partnership, corporation,
10	association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
11	not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
12	563. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4), a RICO "enterprise" may be an association-in-fact
13	that, although it has no formal legal structure, has (i) a common purpose, (ii) relationships among
14	those associated with the enterprise, and (iii) longevity sufficient to pursue the enterprise's
15	purpose. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009).
16	564. Opioid manufacturers, including Purdue, Johnson & Johnson, Janssen, Cephalon,
17	Endo, and Mallinckrodt (collectively the "Opioid Manufacturers"), together with McKinsey,
18	which participated in the marketing and sale of opioids as described in this Complaint,
19	(collectively, the "Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members" or the "Enterprise Members") engaged
20	in a scheme to unlawfully increase sales of opioids-and grow their share of the prescription
21	painkiller market and the market as a whole-through repeated and systematic
22	misrepresentations, concealments, and omissions of material fact about the safety and efficacy of
23	opioids for treating long-term chronic pain, together with other deceptive and fraudulent acts and
24	practices, as described in the Factual Allegations section of this Complaint.
25	565. In order to unlawfully increase the demand for opioids and thereby increase their
26	own profits despite their knowledge of the harmful effects that would follow, the Opioid
27	Marketing Enterprise Members formed an association-in-fact enterprise (the "Opioid Marketing
28	Enterprise" or the "Enterprise"). The Opioids Manufacturers worked together to accomplish their

I

aims, with McKinsey serving as a go-between that held all of the companies together and helped 1 2 coordinate the deceptive marketing and sales strategies. Through McKinsey and their own 3 personal relationships, the members of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise had the opportunity to 4 form and take actions in furtherance of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise's common purpose: lying 5 to prescribers and Plaintiffs in order to increase sales of addictive and dangerous drugs and line 6 the enterprise members' pockets. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members' substantial 7 financial contributions to the Opioid Marketing Enterprise and the advancement of opioids-8 friendly messaging fueled the U.S. opioid epidemic.

566. In the alternative, the association-in-fact Opioid Marketing Enterprise existed just
between McKinsey and Purdue, who worked together to unlawfully increase sales of opioids—
and grow Purdue's share of the prescription painkiller market—through repeated and systematic
misrepresentations about the safety and efficacy of opioids for treating long-term chronic pain.
McKinsey knew Purdue was marketing its opioids illegally and fueling an opioid epidemic, but
using the knowledge it gained from its work with other opioid manufacturers, McKinsey joined
forces with Purdue to turbocharge the opioids market in order to profit from this crisis.

16 567. The Controlled Substances Act (the "CSA") and its implementing regulations
17 require that "[e]very person who manufactures, distributes, dispenses, imports, or exports any
18 controlled substance," including opioids, become a "registrant." *See* 21 U.S.C. § 823(a)-(b); 21
19 C.F.R. § 1301.11(a). These registrants, including opioid manufacturer and distributors, must
20 maintain a system to identify and report suspicious orders, including orders of unusual size or
21 frequency, or orders deviating from a normal pattern, and maintain effective controls against
22 diversion of controlled substances. *See* 21 U.S.C. § 823; 21 C.F.R. § 1301.74(b).

568. Despite these duties, McKinsey and the other Enterprise Members engaged in a
scheme with the overarching purpose of materially expanding prescription opioid use by altering
the medical community's opioid prescribing practices through repeated fraudulent statements and
misrepresentations. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise's scheme was sophisticated, welldeveloped, and fraudulent and was designed to increase the prescription rate for opioid
medications the Enterprise Members knew where dangerous and highly addictive. At all relevant

times, McKinsey was aware of the conduct of the Enterprise, was a knowing and willing
 participant in that conduct, and reaped profits from that conduct in the form of payments from
 other Enterprise Members as a reward for work done to increase sales and distribution of
 prescription opioids.

5

The Common Purpose and Scheme of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise.

569. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members, through the Opioid Marketing 6 7 Enterprise, concealed the true risks and dangers of opioids from the medical community and 8 Plaintiffs and made misleading statements and misrepresentations about opioids that downplayed 9 the risk of addiction and exaggerated the benefits of opioid use. These misleading statements 10 included: (1) that addiction is rare among patients taking opioids for pain; (2) that addiction risk 11 can be effectively managed; (3) that symptoms of addiction exhibited by opioid patients are actually symptoms of an invented condition, which the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members 12 named "pseudoaddiction"; (4) that withdrawal is easily managed; (5) that increased dosing 13 14 presents no significant risks; (6) that long-term use of opioids improves function; (7) that the risks 15 of alternative forms of pain treatment are greater than the adverse effects of opioids; (8) that use 16 of time-released dosing prevents addiction; and (9) that abuse-deterrent formulations provide a 17 solution to opioid abuse.

570. The scheme devised, implemented, and conducted by the Opioid Marketing
Enterprise Members was a common course of conduct designed to ensure that the Opioid
Marketing Enterprise Members unlawfully increased their sales and profits through concealment
and misrepresentations about the addictive nature and effective use of the Opioid Manufacturers'
drugs. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members acted together for a common purpose and
perpetuated the Opioid Marketing Enterprise's scheme.

571. There was regular communication between the Opioid Marketing Enterprise
Members in which information was shared, misrepresentations were coordinated, and payments
were exchanged. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members functioned as a continuing unit for
the purpose of implementing the Opioid Marketing Enterprise's scheme and common purpose,
and each agreed and took actions to hide the scheme and continue its existence.

1 572. As public scrutiny and media coverage focused on how opioids ravaged 2 communities throughout the United States, McKinsey did not challenge Purdue or other 3 manufacturers' misrepresentations, seek to correct their previous misrepresentations, terminate 4 their role in the Opioid Marketing Enterprise, nor disclose publicly that the risks of using opioids 5 for chronic pain outweighed their benefits and were not supported by medically acceptable 6 evidence. Instead, despite its knowledge of the ongoing fraud and the danger it posed, McKinsey 7 continued to participate in the Opioid Marketing Enterprise for financial gain. 8 573. The impact of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise's scheme is still in place—i.e., the 9 opioids continue to be prescribed and used for chronic pain throughout the United States, and the 10 epidemic continues to injure Plaintiffs and consume the resources of Plaintiffs. 11 574. The evidence shows that the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members, including McKinsey, were each willing participants in the Opioid Marketing Enterprise, had a common 12 13 purpose and interest in the object of the scheme, and functioned within a structure designed to effectuate the Enterprise's purpose. 14 15 The Conduct of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Violated Civil RICO. 575. From at least 2004 to the present, each of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise 16 17 Members played some part in directing the affairs of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise and 18 participated in the operation or management of the affairs of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise, 19 directly or indirectly, in the following ways: 20 Creating and providing a body of deceptive, misleading, and unsupported a. 21 medical and popular literature about opioids that (i) understated the risks and overstated the 22 benefits of long-term use; (ii) appeared to be the result of independent, objective research; and 23 (iii) was thus more likely to be relied upon by physicians, patients, and payors; b. Creating and providing a body of deceptive, misleading, and unsupported 24 25 electronic and print advertisements about opioids that (i) understated the risks and overstated the 26 benefits of long-term use; (ii) appeared to be the result of independent, objective research; and 27 (iii) was thus more likely to be relied upon by physicians, patients, and payors; 28

c. Creating and providing a body of deceptive, misleading, and unsupported 1 sales and promotional training materials about opioids that (i) understated the risks and overstated 2 3 the benefits of long-term use; (ii) appeared to be the result of independent, objective research; and 4 (iii) was thus more likely to be relied upon by physicians, patients, and payors; 5 d. Devising and implementing marketing schemes that included targeting and 6 misleading physicians, unlawfully incentivizing sales representatives to maximize prescriptions 7 and dosages, and evading regulatory constraints; and 8 Disseminating many of their false, misleading, imbalanced, and e. 9 unsupported statements through unbranded materials that appeared to be independent 10 publications. 11 576. The scheme devised and implemented by the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members amounted to a common course of conduct intended to enrich themselves by increasing 12 13 sales of prescription opioids by convincing doctors to prescribe and patients to use opioids, 14 including for long-term chronic pain, despite the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members' 15 knowledge of the addictions and deaths that would occur as a result. The scheme was a continuing course of conduct, and many aspects of it continue through to the present. 16 17 The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members Conducted or Participated, Directly or 18 Indirectly, in the Conduct of the Enterprise's Affairs. 19 577. "[T]o conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct" of an enterprise, 20 "one must participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself." Reves v. Ernst & 21 Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993). 22 578. As described herein, the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members participated in the 23 conduct of the Enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, and McKinsey was the mastermind of marketing schemes deployed by the Enterprise members to defraud prescribers 24 25 and Plaintiffs by using the mail and wires in furtherance of plans that were designed with specific intent to defraud. 26 27 579. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members conducted an association-in-fact 28 enterprise and/or participated in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of illegal activities

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MASTER COMPLAINT

SCHOOL DISTRICTS)

21-MD-02996-CRB (SK)

1 (the predicate racketeering acts of mail and wire fraud) to carry-out the common purpose of the 2 Opioid Marketing Enterprise, i.e., to unlawfully increase profits and revenues from the continued 3 prescription and use of opioids for long-term, chronic pain. Through the racketeering activities of 4 the Opioid Marketing Enterprise, the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members sought to further the 5 common purpose of the Enterprise through a fraudulent scheme to change prescriber habits and 6 public perception about the safety and efficacy of opioid use. In so doing, each of the Opioid 7 Marketing Enterprise Members knowingly conducted and participated in the conduct of the 8 Enterprise by engaging in mail and wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and (d).

9 580. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise is an association-in-fact enterprise that consists
10 of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members.

11 581. Each of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members conducted and participated in
12 the conduct of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise by playing a distinct role in furthering the
13 Enterprise's common purpose of increasing profits and sales through the knowing and intentional
14 dissemination of false and misleading information about the safety and efficacy of long-term
15 opioid use, and the risks and symptoms of addiction, in order to increase the market for
16 prescription opioids by changing prescriber habits and public perceptions.

582. Specifically, the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members each worked together to
coordinate the Enterprise's goals and conceal their role, and the Enterprise's existence, from
prescribers and Plaintiffs by, among other things, (i) funding, editing, and distributing
publications that supported and advanced their false messages; (ii) funding key opinion leaders
("KOLs") to further promote their false messages; and (iii) tasking their own employees to direct
deceptive marketing materials and pitches directly at physicians.

583. Further, each of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members had systematic links to,
and personal relationships with, each other through joint participation in lobbying groups, trade
industry organizations, contractual relationships, and continuing coordination of activities. The
systematic links and personal relationships that were formed and developed allowed the Opioid
Marketing Enterprise Members the opportunity to form the common purpose and agree to
conduct and participate in the conduct of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise. Specifically, each of

the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members coordinated their efforts through the same KOLs and front groups, based on their agreement and understanding that the front groups and KOLs were industry friendly and would work together with the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members to advance the common purpose of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise; and each of the individuals and entities who formed the Opioid Marketing Enterprise acted to enable the common purpose and fraudulent scheme of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise.

7 584. At all relevant times, the Opioid Marketing Enterprise: (a) had an existence 8 separate and distinct from each Opioid Manufacturer and its members; (b) was separate and 9 distinct from the pattern of racketeering in which the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members engaged; (c) was an ongoing and continuing organization consisting of individuals, persons, and 10 11 legal entities, including each of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members; (d) was characterized by interpersonal relationships between and among each member of the Opioid Marketing 12 13 Enterprise; and (e) had sufficient longevity for the Enterprise to pursue its purpose and functioned 14 as a continuing unit.

15 585. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members conducted and participated in the
16 conduct of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity that
17 employed the use of mail and wire facilities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud) and §
1343 (wire fraud), to increase profits and revenue by changing prescriber habits and public
19 perceptions in order to increase the prescription and use of prescription opioids and expand the
20 market for opioids.

586. 21 The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members each committed, conspired to commit, 22 and/or aided and abetted in the commission of at least two predicate acts of racketeering activity 23 (i.e., violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343) within the past ten years. The multiple acts of 24 racketeering activity that the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members committed, or aided and 25 abetted in the commission of, were related to each other, posed a threat of continued racketeering activity, and therefore constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity." The racketeering activity 26 27 was made possible by the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members' regular use of the facilities, 28 services, distribution channels, and employees of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise, the U.S. Mail, and interstate wire facilities. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members participated in the
 scheme to defraud by using mail, telephones, and the internet to transmit communications and
 payments in interstate or foreign commerce.

4

The Conduct was More than a Typical Business Relationship.

5 587. There were strong relationships among those associated with the Opioid Enterprise 6 and sufficient longevity among Enterprise associates to pursue the Enterprise's common purpose. 7 The common purpose was to increase opioid revenues unlawfully by misrepresenting and lying 8 about opioids in order to changing prescriber habits and the perception regarding the safety and 9 efficacy of opioids for chronic pain and long-term use. The Enterprise's deceit was, in part, in its failure to disclose that increasing strength and dosing actually increased the risk of addiction and 10 11 overdose and that patients on opioids for more than a brief period develop tolerance, requiring increasingly high doses to achieve pain relief. 12

13 588. On March 1, 2004, McKinsey entered into a "Master Consulting Agreement" with
14 Purdue for "services that would be defined from time to time."⁴⁰³ The Master Consulting
15 Agreement was signed by then-McKinsey director Rob Rosiello."⁴⁰⁴

From 2004 through 2008, McKinsey advised Purdue on research and development, 16 589. business development, and product licensing related to Purdue's opioid products.⁴⁰⁵ Consistent 17 18 with its business model, McKinsey leveraged these projects into growth of its "Broader Strategy work" also underway with Purdue.⁴⁰⁶ Specifically, in October 2008, Purdue retained McKinsey 19 20 for broad strategy work after two board members "blessed" Purdue executive Craig Landau with doing "whatever he thinks is necessary to 'save the business" after the 2007 criminal plea and 21 introduction of generic competition to the older OxyContin.⁴⁰⁷ Purdue relied heavily on 22 23 McKinsey to help Purdue publicly portray itself as a good corporate citizen who could now be trusted and was even working on an "abuse-deterrent" or "ADF" form of OxyContin. 24

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⁴⁰³ MCK-MDL2996-0085849; PPLPC012000069192 ⁴⁰⁴ MCK-MDL2996-0085849, at 0085880.

- ⁴⁰⁴ MCK-MDL2996-0085849, at 0085880. ⁴⁰⁵ PPLPC013000116218; PPLP004401340
- 28 ⁴⁰⁶ MCK-MAAG-0117875 ⁴⁰⁷ MCK-MAAG-0117875

590. Over their many years of working together, McKinsey and Richard Sackler
 developed a close relationship. Indeed, one McKinsey partner, Maria Gordian, describes herself
 as a counselor to Richard Sackler in an "Ey 2009 Impact Summary."⁴⁰⁸


The Opioid Marketing Enterprise was more than a typical business relationship. 4 591. 5 Rather, the members of the Enterprise knew that opioids were addictive and causing serious harm 6 to people and communities but chose to work together to lie to prescribers and Plaintiffs about 7 these drugs in order to increase their bottom lines. McKinsey worked closely with the Opioid 8 Manufacturers to achieve these aims. McKinsey, as an advisor of multiple Opioid Manufacturers, 9 also had access to information about multiple players and was able to coordinate the fraud occurring across the Enterprise. As discussed below, McKinsey was particularly embedded in 10 11 Purdue's organizational structure and the relationship's longevity was sufficient to pursue the Enterprise's purposes. During the 2009-2014 period in particular, Purdue relied extensively on 12 13 McKinsey to develop its sales and marketing strategy for OxyContin.

14 592. The intent to defraud is evident in the McKinsey's attempts to strengthen its 15 relationship with Purdue and assist Purdue in selling opioids after Purdue's 2007 criminal guilty plea. As part of the guilty plea, Purdue admitted that its "supervisors and employees, with the 16 17 intent to defraud or mislead, marketed and promoted OxyContin as less addictive, less subject to 18 abuse and diversion, and less likely to cause tolerance and withdrawal than other pain medication."⁴⁰⁹ But rather than be deterred by this, McKinsey dove in. In a March 2009 self-19 20 assessment, Ms. Gordian described McKinsey's progress in having "continue[d] to expand the depth and breadth of [its] relationships with Purdue" and plans to "deepen[]" McKinsey's 21 22 "relationship with the Sackler family," including by "serving them on key business development 23 issues" and "expanding" McKinsey's relationship with members of Purdue's senior management team.410 24

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- 27 ⁴⁰⁸ MCK-MAAG-0118669
- ⁴⁰⁹ Information at pp. 5-6, *United States v. Purdue Frederick Co.*, No. 07-cr-29-JPJ (W.D. Va. May 10, 2007), Doc.
 5.
 ⁴¹⁰ MCK-MAAG-0118669

593. By August 2009, Richard Sackler had convened a meeting of Purdue board
 members and staff to discuss efforts to "reverse the decline in the OxyContin tablets market."⁴¹¹
 During the 2009-2014 period in particular, Purdue relied extensively on McKinsey to develop its
 sales and marketing strategy for OxyContin. McKinsey worked closely with Purdue on both the
 creation and implementation of OxyContin sales strategy. McKinsey's work for Purdue included
 consulting, review of product acquisition, evaluation of research and development, advising
 Purdue on the design of clinical studies, risk management, and product marketing.⁴¹²

594. On May 28, 2013, McKinsey entered into a "Statement of Services to the Master
Consulting Agreement" (the "2013 Agreement") with Purdue to "conduct a rapid assessment of
the underlying drivers of current OxyContin performance, identify key opportunities to increase
near-term OxyContin revenue and develop plans to capture priority opportunities."⁴¹³ The 2013
Agreement stated, "We have a long history of partnership with Purdue, and we would make best
efforts to leverage our understanding of your business—both in terms of content and culture."
The 2013 Agreement was signed by then-principal Arnab Ghatak who would "lead the team with



16	595.
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19	.414
20	596. Thereby, even after the 2007 guilty plea, Purdue, with McKinsey's aid, saw
21	growing profits from opioid sales. In 2015 alone, Purdue obtained \$3 billion in annual opioid
22	sales—a four-fold increase from its 2006 sales of \$800 million.
23	597. McKinsey's relationship with Purdue went far beyond a typical business
24	relationship. McKinsey worked closely with Purdue on both the creation and implementation of
25	
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27	⁴¹¹ PPLPC061000045395 ⁴¹² PPLPC029000547371
28	 ⁴¹³ Excerpt from U.S. Department of Justice Plea Agreement with Purdue Pharma L.P. October 20, 2020. 18, ¶88. https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1329576/download. ⁴¹⁴ PPLPC018001462324

OxyContin sales strategy, a strategy McKinsey knew had been based on misleading and
 defrauding doctors and patients alike about a dangerous and highly addictive drug.

598. Further, McKinsey had access to detailed prescribing information enabling it to determine if there were suspicious or problematic prescribing patterns. Rather than using this information to help its clients prevent diversion of controlled substances, McKinsey and the Opioid Marketing Enterprise used this information in furtherance of their scheme to defraud prescribers and Plaintiffs, target and increase sales to prescribers who were overprescribing, and continue to fuel opioid addiction and the resulting epidemic.

9

The Fraudulent Schemes

10 599. As detailed above, the operation of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise, included
11 several schemes to defraud that helped to further the goals its members—i.e., to expand the
12 market and increase profits and sales through the knowing and intentional dissemination of false
13 and misleading information about the safety and efficacy of long-term opioid use, and to increase
14 profits for the Enterprise Members via expanding the market for opioids.

15 **Fraudulent Marketing Scheme: Deceptive Messaging Regarding Opioid Use**

600. As described throughout, McKinsey sought to unlawfully increase profits and
revenues from the continued prescription and use of opioids for long-term, chronic pain by
changing prescriber habits and public perception regarding the safety and efficacy of opioids.
McKinsey's fraud specifically targeted prescribers and set out to convince them that they should
prescribe more and more opioids, overcoming what could otherwise be a check on opioid
manufacturers ability to increase sales of addictive products.

601. Despite McKinsey knowing that reformulated OxyContin could still be abused,
having advised Purdue on the design of tests of reformulated OxyContin as part of Purdue's FDA
submission,⁴¹⁵ in furtherance of the scheme to defraud, McKinsey spread messages that
prescribing opioids could provide "freedom" and "peace of mind" for its users and that physicians
could "tailor the dose."

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⁴¹⁵ McK-MAAG-0118669

1	602. After Purdue's 2007 criminal plea for illegally marketing OxyContin, McKinsey
2	created strategies to repair Purdue's reputation and boost OxyContin sales. In 2008, Purdue
3	submitted a New Drug Application for a reformulation of OxyContin, ostensibly to make it more
4	difficult to abuse by extracting the active ingredient from it or otherwise defeating the time-
5	release mechanism in OxyContin tablets—i.e., another product Purdue would later deceptively
6	promote as safer than and less prone to abuse than it was.
7	603. In June 2009, McKinsey helped Purdue prepare for an FDA advisory committee
8	meeting.
9	
10	
11	
12	604. McKinsey prepared for Purdue an "FDA Advisory Committee on Reformulated
13	OxyContin: Question & Answer Book" in September 2009, with questions including "Why
14	should we trust you?" In response, McKinsey recommended Purdue say "We acknowledge
15	mistakes made in the past[;]" "We have x, y and z measures in place that did not exist before[;]"
16	and "[a]t all levels, Purdue's focus is on maintaining the highest ethical standards and meeting the
17	needs of patients[.]" ⁴¹⁸ To the question of "Who at Purdue takes personal responsibility for all
18	these deaths?[,]" McKinsey recommended Purdue say, "We all feel responsible[.]"
19	605. McKinsey and the other Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members knew the changes
20	Purdue made would not make opioids non-addictive or prevent them from being used to create
21	and further substance abuse problems. For example, in 2009, the FDA noted in permitting ADF
22	labeling that "the tamper-resistant properties will have no effect on abuse by the oral route (the
23	most common mode of abuse)." Similarly, in approving reformulated OxyContin, the FDA
24	cautioned that the reformulation "is not completely tamper resistant and those intent on abusing
25	this new formulation will likely find a means to do so. In addition, the product can still be
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27	416 0002001 (459.45
28	⁴¹⁶ PDD8901645845 ⁴¹⁷ <i>Id.</i>

^{28 417} *Ia.* 418 MCK-MAAK-0152135

misused or abused and result in overdose by simply administering or ingesting larger than recommended oral doses."⁴¹⁹

606. Despite this knowledge, the Opioid Marketing Enterprise pursued messaging and a
strategy that was deceptive and was designed to deceive doctors in particular. Even after Purdue
pleaded guilty to offenses related to its marketing and distribution of addictive opioids, McKinsey
advised Purdue to market OxyContin to encourage more prescriptions (that it knew would lead to
abuse and overdose events) into higher dose prescriptions by a smaller number of loyalist
prescribers.

9 607. Far from the deception of doctors being an unforeseen consequence, McKinsey
10 intentionally set out to target doctors as a cog in the Enterprise's scheme to defraud. Indeed,
11 deceiving doctors was part of the marketing scheme, and doctors were utilized in furtherance of
12 the marketing scheme. Medical providers were not a break in the causal chain of harm to
13 Plaintiffs but were targeted players in the scheme to defraud and key links in the casual chain.

14 608. The marketing scheme involved using data to target high prescribers and training
15 marketers to make misleading statements with the goal to increase high dose prescriptions which
16 McKinsey and Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members knew were more likely to be abused.
17 Enterprise Members knew that overdoses were expected and that such overdoses would lead to
18 need for increased services.

19 609. Purdue's 2020 guilty plea acknowledged its role in using aggressive marketing to
20 convince doctors to prescribe opioids unnecessarily, fueling the drug addiction crisis. McKinsey
21 was the mastermind of marketing scheme following Purdue's 2007 guilty plea. McKinsey
22 developed and helped implement these strategies.

- 610. In an October 26, 2009 presentation, "OxyContin driving growth through
 stronger brand loyalty," McKinsey proposed tactics to turnaround declining sales, "[e]nhance
 loyalty to OxyContin among loyalist prescribers," "convert[ing] 'fence sitters' into more loyal
 OxyContin prescribers,"⁴²⁰ and "protect OxyContin's market share[.]"⁴²¹ In other words,
- ⁴¹⁹ FDA Summary Review, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2010/022272s000SumR.pdf
 ⁴²⁰ MCK-MDL2996-0126522

⁴²¹ Id. at 2

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McKinsey proposed increasing sales by pushing both willing and reluctant physicians to prescribe
 more OxyContin.

3 611. McKinsey recommended segmenting prescribers and tailoring messages and tactics to different segments. For prescribers dubbed "Early Adopting Experts" and "Proactive 4 5 Teachers," defined by a willingness to use extended release opioids, including in patients who 6 were not already using opioids, McKinsey urged emphasizing that its 7 tablet strengths provide flexibility to "tailor the dose" to customer needs.⁴²² Upon information and belief, this message 7 8 aimed to encourage prescribers to initiate and maintain patients on OxyContin long-term by reminding them they could increase the dose as patients became tolerant with long-term use 9 (rather than discontinue use when the drug lost its effectiveness). 10

612	Purdue adopted McKinsey's	proposal. ⁴²³
	1	
613	As detailed throughout, McKinsey and	Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members
were aware	of the catastrophic injury inflected on the p	oublic by selling harmful, addictive opioid
products. Y	et when promoting opioids and engaging in	doctor detailing, the Enterprise Members
intentionall	y hid the potential for abuse and addiction b	by marketing OxyContin's 12-hour dosing
as meaning	that users only need to take OxyContin twi	ce a day, thus requiring fewer pills.
614	. It was foreseeable that this marketing st	rategy would lead to greater addiction
because Ox	yContin wore off after 8 to 10 hours in mar	ny patients. Prescribing 12-hour dosing led
to "end of d	lose failure," which led to a vicious cycle th	hat became "the perfect recipe for
⁴²² <i>Id.</i> at 12.		
⁴²³ PPLPC023 PPLPC01200	0243668 (); PPLPC01200024508	
); PPLPC012000246009 (; PPLPC021000265092 (
⁴²⁴ PKY18312	3435	

addiction."425 As a result, what McKinsey marketed as "convenient" led to what was described as 1 "a [d]escription of Hell."⁴²⁶ 2 3 615. The marketing scheme worked. Nationwide, based on an analysis by the Los 4 Angeles Times, more than 52% of patients taking OxyContin longer than three months are on 5 doses greater than 60 milligrams per day—which converts to the 90 morphine equivalent dose 6 that the CDC Guideline urges prescribers to "avoid" or "carefully justify."⁴²⁷ 7 A key element of the marketing scheme that fueled the deadly epidemic of opioid 616. 8 abuse was doctor detailing using detailed prescriber data. Data Scheme: Use of Prescriber Data for Intentional Targeting of High Opioid Prescribers-9 10 **Not Diversion Prevention** 11 617. McKinsey was an advisor to DEA registrants and Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members, who had a legal duty to guard against diversion and report suspicious orders of 12 13 controlled substances. Rather than assisting in reporting suspicious orders, McKinsey used its position and access to detailed prescriber information to actually divert resources to target high 14 15 volume prescribers to sell more opioids. Distributors of controlled substances have a legal duty to report suspicious orders, 16 618. 17 and to report those that deviate substantially from a normal pattern and orders of unusual size and 18 frequency. See 21 U.S.C. § 823; 21 C.F.R. § 1301.74(b). These obligations included a legal duty 19 to maintain effective controls and procedures to guard against diversion of controlled substances 20 and a legal duty to maintain a system to identify and report suspicious orders of controlled substances. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 1301.7(a) (b); 1301.74(b). Rather than advising their registrant 21 22 clients on how to comply with their legal duties to maintain effective controls to guard against 23 diversion and how to operate a system to identify and report suspicious orders, in furtherance of the scheme, McKinsey and the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members used detailed data to target 24 25 prescribers to increase the opioid market. 26

 $\| _{427}^{10.} \text{CDC Guideline at 16.}$

 ⁴²⁵ Harriet Ryan, "'You Want a Description of Hell?' OxyContin's 12-Hour Problem," Los Angeles Times, May 5, 2016, available at http://www.latimes.com/projects/oxycontin-part1/.
 426 Id.

619. Consistent with the Enterprise's purpose of increasing profit by deceptively
 marketing opioids, McKinsey was tasked with "Identifying Granular Growth Opportunities for
 OxyContin," conducting an "assessment of the underlying drivers of current OxyContin
 performance," identifying "key opportunities to drive near-term OxyContin performance," and
 developing "plans to capture priority opportunities."⁴²⁸

6 620. McKinsey received physician-level sales data to develop its marketing strategy to
7 increase OxyContin performance after Purdue's 2007 guilty plea. Rather than using this access to
8 the granular data to avoid diversion and to prevent Enterprise members from targeting prescribers
9 with suspicious prescribing patterns, McKinsey used this information to help the Opioid
10 Marketing Enterprise members push more opioids on high volume prescribers in furtherance of
11 its schemes to defraud. The targets were chosen based on their history of prescribing high doses
12 of opioids in large quantities.

621. One of the services the Enterprise used in furtherance of this scheme concerned the
use of data to help Purdue meet its goals. McKinsey's analysis for the "Evolve to Excellence"
proposal shows that it had detailed information from which it could discern, as could Purdue,
whether a prescriber had problematic patterns suggesting operation as a "pill mill," including a
shift to other opioids after OxyContin's reformulation. Yet, McKinsey urged Purdue to target, and
seek to increase the prescribing of, all of these prescribers from whom it perceived Purdue could
obtain greater profits.

622. McKinsey found that Purdue did not "focus on the highest potential docs,"
measured both by the number of prescriptions and reimbursement considerations.⁴²⁹ A McKinsey
analyst urged McKinsey to recommend Purdue target "[1]itefrally, at least all" prescribers in the
top 20% of prescribers, "minus another few percent who are no sees[.]" McKinsey team lead
Arnab Ghatak replied that "they probably have 20% no see[], but i'd also assume there are not
many high writers that are no see."⁴³⁰ ("No see" prescribers are prescribers who do not accept
visits from pharmaceutical sales representatives. Thus, upon information and belief, McKinsey

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⁴²⁸ PPLPC030000770531

⁴²⁹ MCK-MDL2996-0364024 ⁴³⁰ MCK-MDL2996-0364267

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1	recognized that most of the highest volume prescribers, or "high writers" of prescriptions, were
2	willing to entertain sales visits from sales representatives.)
3	623. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise used data for intentional targeting of high
4	prescribers and not for diversion prevention. McKinsey advised Purdue to raise sales of
5	Oxycontin by focusing on high dose sales and deceptively messaging to physicians that
6	OxyContin would improve function and quality of life. McKinsey urged Purdue to maximize
7	sales by dictating which prescribers its sales representatives would target. For example,
8	McKinsey advised Purdue that it should take "specific actions" to increase sales of OxyContin,
9	including "Prescriber Targeting" and "Turbocharg[ing] Purdue's Sales Engine."
10	624. McKinsey targeted not just doctors but also nurse practitioners and physician
11	assistants, recommending Purdue "[d]ouble down on nurse practitioners and physician
12	assistants as they represent a growing market segmentation of prescribers."431
13	625. The Enterprise's scheme also explored ways to increase the amount of time sales
14	representatives spent in the field increasing opioid sales, and prioritizing OxyContin in incentive
15	compensation targets. ⁴³²
16	626. By April 24, 2014, the plan was working and McKinsey reported that Purdue's
17	"sales force is selecting an increasing percentage of high-value OxyContin prescribers as
18	targets."433
19	627. McKinsey ensured Purdue would benefit from the lessons learned by other
20	Enterprise members, stating that "its experience with other pharmaceutical companies suggests
21	that such a comprehensive Sales transformation program takes nine months."434 Likewise,
22	McKinsey recommended physician targeting to other Enterprise members, including Endo and
23	Janssen. ⁴³⁵
24	628. By targeting physicians based on their prescribing patterns, the Opioid Marketing
25	Enterprise was working toward the common purpose of deceptively convincing doctors to
26	⁴³¹ MCK-MDL2996-0303399
27	⁴³² PPLPC012000437346 ⁴³³ MCK-MDL2996-0104840; PPLPC035000220406
28	⁴³⁴ MCK-MDL2996-0104640, PPLPC053000220406 ⁴³⁵ MCK-MDL2996-0187168 ⁴³⁵ MCK-MDL2996-0130803; MCK-MDL2996-0135713

prescribe more opioids and thereby increase their own profits. By developing "Evolve to 1 2 Excellence," which was implemented as a plan to "turbocharge" opioid sales, McKinsey advised 3 that Purdue would see a greater return on its sales investment by focusing its targets, including on 4 prescribers with alarming prescribing patterns that raised red flags they were writing 5 "prescriptions" for non-medical use. The plan aimed at boosting sales of OxyContin by targeting 6 the highest volume opioid prescribers, which McKinsey and the other members of the Opioid 7 Marketing Enterprise knew and/or should have known would result in the expansion of the illicit 8 opioid market.

9 629. The Enterprise sought to grow opioid sales to prescribers who raised red flags of
10 diversion and orders it knew or should have known were likely to be diverted or fuel an illegal
11 market. Purdue had a legal obligation not to target these prescribers; rather, it was obligated to
12 report their conduct to law enforcement. Yet the Enterprise used access to prescriber data not to
13 report diversion but to enhance diversion.

14

Pattern of Racketeering Activity

15 630. McKinsey together with the other Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members engaged in a scheme to unlawfully increase sales of opioids—and grow their share of the prescription 16 17 painkiller market—through repeated and systematic misrepresentations about the safety and 18 efficacy of opioids for treating long-term chronic pain. As a unique consulting entity with 19 knowledge of both the addictive properties and abuse potential of opioids and with access to data 20 regarding internal prescribing behaviors of its targets, McKinsey perpetrated a number of 21 fraudulent schemes using the mails and wires, including advising Purdue to market more opioids, 22 in higher doses, to high volume prescribers while helping Purdue avoid mandatory prescriber 23 education regarding the risks of opioids. McKinsey fueled the epidemic alongside its clients. Through targeted marketing that McKinsey worked to develop, "turbocharge," and implement, 24 25 McKinsey substantially contributed to an explosion in the use of opioids across the United States. McKinsey is an enterprise that is engaged in and affects interstate commerce because the 26 27 company advised opioid manufacturers on the sale of opioid products across the United States, as 28 alleged herein.

1 631. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members devised and knowingly carried out this illegal scheme and artifice to defraud by means of materially false or fraudulent pretenses, 2 3 representations, promises, or omissions of material facts regarding the safe, non-addictive and 4 effective use of opioids for long-term chronic, non-acute, and non-cancer pain. They knew that 5 these representations deviated from the FDA-approved use of these drugs and were not supported 6 by actual evidence. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members intended that their common 7 purpose and scheme to defraud would, and did, deceive consumers, prescribers, regulators, 8 Plaintiffs, and other intended victims and they used the U.S. Mail and interstate wire facilities 9 with the specific intent to advance, and for the purpose of executing, their illegal scheme.

10 632. By intentionally concealing the material risks and affirmatively misrepresenting
11 the benefits of using opioids for chronic pain, the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members engaged
12 in a fraudulent and unlawful course of conduct constituting a pattern of racketeering activity.

13 633. To achieve the common goal and purpose of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise, the
14 Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members hid from the consumers, prescribers, regulators, and
15 Plaintiffs: (a) the fraudulent nature of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members' marketing
16 scheme; (b) the fraudulent nature of statements made by the Opioid Marketing Enterprise
17 Members regarding the safety and efficacy of prescription opioids; and (c) the true nature of the
18 relationship between the members of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise.

19 634. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members with knowledge and intent, to the
20 overall objective of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members' fraudulent scheme and
21 participated in the common course of conduct to commit acts of fraud and indecency in marketing
22 prescription opioids.

635. Indeed, for the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members' fraudulent scheme to work,
each of them had to agree to implement similar tactics regarding fraudulent marketing of
prescription opioids. This coordination was accomplished via their relationships with each other
and via McKinsey's relationships and contacts with key opioids manufacturers.

27 636. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members' predicate acts all had the purpose of
28 creating the opioid epidemic that substantially injured Plaintiffs, while simultaneously generating

billion-dollar revenues and profits for the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members. The predicate 2 acts were committed or caused to be committed by the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members 3 through their participation in the Opioid Marketing Enterprise and in furtherance of its fraudulent 4 scheme.

637. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members' scheme described herein was 5 6 perpetrated, in part, through multiple acts of mail fraud and wire fraud, constituting a pattern of 7 racketeering activity. McKinsey in particular used mail and wire transmission, directly or 8 indirectly, in furtherance of this scheme by transmitting deliberately false and misleading 9 statements to prescribers and the public.

McKinsey had a specific intent to deceive and defraud prescribers, regulators and 10 638. 11 Plaintiffs. For example, as alleged above, McKinsey made repeated and unequivocal statements through the mails and wires that were false and misleading. McKinsey advised Purdue to market 12 13 OxyContin based on the false and misleading notion that the drug can provide "freedom" and 14 "peace of mind" for its users, and concomitantly reduce stress and isolation.

15 639. Similarly, they caused to be transmitted through the mails and wires false and misleading statements regarding the addiction potential of opioids. Moreover, McKinsey had 16 17 direct involvement in marketing statements and thus caused the statements to be made, 18 notwithstanding that they knew they were false for the reasons detailed above.

19 640. The marketing scheme is especially egregious since the public relies on physicians 20 as a position of trust and authority in the community regarding their health and well-being. 21 McKinsey intentionally deceived physicians regarding the abuse potential of opioids. It intended 22 prescribers and the public to rely on its false statements. McKinsey intended reliance on these 23 false statements as it was their goal for doctors to prescribe more and higher quantities of these dangerous pills to the public. This scheme was therefore reasonably calculated to deceive not only 24 25 persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension but also educated physicians in a place of high 26 trust in the community.

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- 28

Predicate Acts

641. To carry out, or attempt to carry out, the scheme, the Enterprise Members, each of
whom is a person associated-in-fact with the Enterprise, did knowingly conduct or participate in,
directly or indirectly, the affairs of the Enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity within
the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1), 1961(5) and 1962(c), and employed the use of the mail and
wire facilities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud) and § 1343 (wire fraud).

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642. Specifically, the Enterprise Members have committed, conspired to commit, and/or aided and abetted in the commission of, at least two predicate acts of racketeering activity (i.e., violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343), within the past ten years.

10 643. The multiple acts of racketeering activity which the Enterprises Members
11 committed, or aided or abetted in the commission of, were related to each other, posed a threat of
12 continued racketeering activity, and therefore constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity."

13 644. The racketeering activity was made possible by the Enterprise's regular use of the
14 facilities, services, distribution channels, and employees of the Enterprise Members.

15 645. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members participated in the schemes by using
16 mail, telephone, and the internet to transmit mailings and wires in interstate or foreign commerce.

17 646. The Enterprise Members used, directed the use of, and/or caused to be used,
18 thousands of interstate mail and wire communications in service of their schemes through
19 common misrepresentations, concealments, and material omissions.

647. In devising and executing the illegal schemes, the Opioid Marketing Enterprises
Members devised and knowingly carried out a material scheme and/or artifice to defraud
Plaintiffs and prescribers and to obtain money by means of materially false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, promises, or omissions of material facts.

648. For the purpose of executing the illegal schemes, the Enterprise Members
committed these racketeering acts, which number in the thousands, intentionally and knowingly
with the specific intent to advance the illegal schemes.

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649. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members' predicate acts of racketeering (18
 U.S.C. § 1961(1)) include, but are not limited to the conduct described in the Factual Allegations
 section of this Complaint, and:

4 650. Mail Fraud: The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members violated 18 U.S.C. § 1341
5 by sending or receiving, or by causing to be sent and/or received, materials via U.S. mail or
6 commercial interstate carriers for the purpose of executing the unlawful scheme to design,
7 manufacture, market, and sell the prescription opioids by means of false pretenses,
8 misrepresentations, promises, and omissions.

9 651. Wire Fraud: The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members violated 18 U.S.C. § 1343
10 by transmitting and/or receiving, or by causing to be transmitted and/or received, materials by
11 wire for the purpose of executing the unlawful scheme to design, manufacture, market, and sell
12 the prescription opioids by means of false pretenses, misrepresentations, promises, and omissions.

13 652. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members' use of the U.S. Mail and interstate 14 wire facilities to perpetrate the opioids marketing scheme involved thousands separate instances 15 of the use of the U.S. Mail or interstate wire facilities in furtherance of the unlawful Opioid Marketing Enterprise, including essentially uniform misrepresentations, concealments, and 16 17 material omissions regarding the beneficial uses and non-addictive qualities for the long-term 18 treatment of chronic, non-acute, and non-cancer pain, with the goal of profiting from the 19 increased sales of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members' drugs that occurred because 20 consumers, prescribers, regulators, and Plaintiffs relied on the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members' misrepresentations. These uses of the U.S. Mail or interstate wires included, inter alia: 21 22 653. Marketing materials about opioids and their risks and benefits, which the Opioid 23 Marketing Enterprise Members sent to health care providers, transmitted through the internet and television, and published across the country, including in counties and cities and on Tribal 24 25 Reservations and to Plaintiffs;

26 654. Written representations and telephone calls among the Opioid Marketing
27 Enterprise Members and between the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members regarding the

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misrepresentations, marketing statements, and claims about opioids, including the non-addictive,
 safe use of opioids for chronic, long-term pain generally;

- 3 655. E-mails, telephone calls, and written communications among the Opioid
 4 Marketing Enterprise Members agreeing to or implementing the opioids marketing scheme;
- 6 656. Communications among the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members and between
 6 the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members and the media regarding the publication, drafting, and
 7 dissemination of treatment guidelines as part of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise;
- 8 657. Written and oral communications directed to prescribers, the public, and Plaintiffs
 9 that fraudulently misrepresented the risks and benefits of using opioids for chronic pain; and
- 10 658. Receipts of increased profits sent through the U.S. Mail and interstate wire
 11 facilities—the wrongful proceeds of the scheme.
- 659. Many of the precise dates of the fraudulent uses of the U.S. mail and interstate 12 13 wire facilities are not obtainable (e.g., each time a McKinsey trained marketer "calls" or reached 14 out to a physician using the mails or wires in furtherance of the marketing scheme). Because the 15 Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members disguised their participation in the Enterprise, and worked to keep the Enterprise's existence secret, many of the precise dates of the Opioid Marketing 16 17 Enterprise's uses of the U.S. Mail and interstate wire facilities (and corresponding predicate acts 18 of mail and wire fraud) have been hidden and cannot be alleged without access to the books and 19 records maintained by the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members. Indeed, an essential part of the 20 successful operation of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise alleged herein depended upon secrecy. Plaintiffs have, however, described the types of predicate acts of mail and/or wire fraud, including 21 22 the specific types of fraudulent statements upon which, through the mail and wires, McKinsey 23 engaged in fraudulent activity in furtherance of their scheme.
- 660. Below, Plaintiffs also describe examples of occasions on which the Opioid
 Marketing Enterprise Members disseminated misrepresentations and false statements to
 consumers, prescribers, regulators, and Plaintiffs, and how those acts were in furtherance of the
 scheme.
- 28

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From	То	Date	Description
Purdue	Prescribers	2007	Statements that pain relief from opioids improves patients'
	and		function and quality of life in advertising and a book
	Plaintiffs		
Purdue	Prescribers	Continuous	Telephonic and electronic communications by its sales
			representatives indicating that opioids will improve patients
		~	function
Purdue	FDA	September	Presentation prepared by McKinsey indicating that its
	advisory	2009	reformulated OxyContin will deter abuse
D 1	committee	2010	
Purdue	Prescribers	2010	Statements that the reformulated OxyContin will deter abus
	and	onwards	and therefore doctors can continue to safely prescribe opioid
Purdue	Plaintiffs Prescribers	2010-2020	Statements from Durdue at McKinger's direction that anioi
Purdue	and	2010-2020	Statements from Purdue at McKinsey's direction that opioid can provide "freedom," "peace of mind," and give patients
	Plaintiffs		"the best possible chance to live a full and active life"
Purdue	Prescribers	Advertising	Advertising from Purdue that "We sell hope in a bottle."
	and	produced	
	Plaintiffs	in 2016	
Purdue	Prescribers	2010	Statements that OxyContin's 12-hour dosing would allow
	and	onwards	patients to only need to take OxyContin twice a day, thus
	Plaintiffs		requiring fewer pills
Purdue	Prescribers	2013	Statements from Purdue at McKinsey's direction that
	and	onwards	OxyContin allowed physicians to "Individualize the Dose"
	Plaintiffs		and that the dose of OxyContin can safely be increased or
			tailored as the patients adapt to a certain dose
Endo	Prescribers	2009	Statements made on an Endo-sponsored website,
	and		PainKnowledge.com, indicating that patients who take
	Plaintiffs		opioids as prescribed usually do not become addicted
Endo	Prescribers	2009	Statements made on another Endo-sponsored website,
	and		PainAction.com, indicating that most chronic pain patients
	Plaintiffs		not become addicted to opioid medications
Endo	Prescribers	Various	Statements in pamphlets and publications described by End
	and		indicating that most people who take opioids for pain relief
	Plaintiffs		not develop an addiction
Endo	Prescribers	Various	Statements made on the Endo-run website, Opana.com,
	and		indicating that opioid use does not result in addiction
F 1	Plaintiffs	*7 •	
Endo	Prescribers	Various	Statements made on the Endo-run website, Opana.com,
	and		indicating that opioid dependence can be addressed by dosing
Enda	Plaintiffs Proceribers	Voriana	methods such as tapering Statements made on its website. Dain/Knowledge.com.that
Endo	Prescribers	Various	Statements made on its website, PainKnowledge.com, that
	and Plaintiffs		opioid dosages could be increased indefinitely
Endo	Prescribers	Various	Statements made in a publication antitled "Understanding
EIIQO	and	v arrous	Statements made in a publication entitled "Understanding Your Pain: Taking Oral Opioid Analgesics" suggesting that
	and Plaintiffs		Your Pain: Taking Oral Opioid Analgesics" suggesting that opioid doses can be increased indefinitely
Endo	Prescribers	Various	Electronic and telephonic communications to its sales
LIIUO	riescribers	v arrous	representatives indicating that the formula for its medicines
			"crush resistant"
			orubii robibialit

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Endo	Prescribers and Plaintiffs	2007	Statements that pain relief from opioids improves patients' function and quality of life in advertising and a book
Endo	Prescribers	Various	Telephonic and electronic communications by its sales representatives indicating that opioids will improve patients function
Janssen	Prescribers and Plaintiffs	Various	Statements on its website, PrescribeResponsibly.com, indicating that concerns about opioid addiction are overestimated
Janssen	Prescribers and Plaintiffs	2009	Statements in a 2009 patient education guide claiming that opioids are rarely addictive when used properly
Janssen	Prescribers and Plaintiffs	2009	Statements included on a 2009 Janssen-sponsored website promoting the concept of opioid pseudoaddiction
Janssen	Prescribers and Plaintiffs	Various	Statements on its website, PrescribeResponsibly.com, advocating the concept of opioid pseudoaddiction
Janssen	Prescribers and Plaintiffs	Various	Statements on its website, PrescribeResponsibly.com, indicating that opioid addiction can be managed
Janssen	Prescribers and Plaintiffs	2009	Statements in its patient education guide indicating the risk associated with limiting the dosages of pain medicines
McKinsey	Purdue (with prescribers as the	July 18, 2013	Discussion of McKinsey plan to increase calls to doctors' offices to fraudulently promote OxyContin, including via "phone, video and even Google like proprietary tools" ⁴³⁶
McKinsey	planned target) Purdue	April 24,	Plan to promote OxyContin to "no-see" physicians through
weitinsey	(with prescribers as the	2017	"remote interactions" including presenting "brand interaction and materials" "over the phone/internet" ⁴³⁷
	planned target)		
McKinsey	McKinsey	July 14, 2013	Internal emails interpreting "the Purdue situation" and discussing OxyContin sales strategy including sales benchmarks and "focus on the highest potential docs" ⁴³⁸
McKinsey	Purdue (with prescribers	September 23, 2013	Evolve 2 Excellence PowerPoint planning execution of the scheme and discussing targeted performance metrics including "sales management calls per day, calls per year a
	as the planned target)		adhering to target list ³⁴³⁹
McKinsey	Purdue	July 30, 2013	Presentation showing "Scope of potential OxyContin grown opportunities" with proposed process including "Generate

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1	target list" and using "Reps/DMs [to] perform call planning (including refining target list)" ⁴⁴⁰				
2 3					
4	661. Each of these fraudulent mailings and interstate wire transmissions constitutes				
4 5	racketeering activity and collectively, these violations constitute a pattern of racketeering activity,				
	through which the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members defrauded and intended to defraud				
6	consumers, prescribers, regulators, Plaintiffs, and other intended victims.				
7	662. These were not isolated incidents. Instead, the Opioid Marketing Enterprise				
8	Members engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by committing thousands of predicate acts				
9	in a five-year period, in the form of mail and wire fraud, and there remains a threat that such				
10	conduct will continue in the future.				
11	663. Each instance of racketeering activity alleged herein was related, had similar				
12	purposes, involved the same or similar participants and methods of commission, and had similar				
13	results affecting similar victims, including consumers, prescribers, regulators, and Plaintiffs. The				
14	Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members calculated and intentionally crafted the scheme and				
15	common purpose of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise to ensure their own profits remained high.				
16	In designing and implementing the scheme, the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members				
17	understood and intended that those in the opioid distribution chain rely on the integrity of the				
18	pharmaceutical companies and ostensibly neutral third parties to provide objective and scientific				
19	evidence regarding the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members' products.				
20	664. Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members' pattern of racketeering activity alleged				
21	herein and the Opioid Marketing Enterprise are separate and distinct from each other. Likewise,				
22	the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members are distinct from the Opioid Marketing Enterprise.				
23	665. The racketeering activities conducted by the Opioid Marketing Enterprise				
24	Members amounted to a common course of conduct, with a similar pattern and purpose, intended				
25	to deceive consumers, prescribers, regulators, and Plaintiffs. Each separate use of the U.S. Mail				
26	and/or interstate wire facilities employed by the Opioid Marketing Enterprise was related, had				
27	similar intended purposes, involved similar participants and methods of execution, and had the				
20					

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same results affecting the same victims, including consumers, prescribers, regulators, and
 Plaintiffs. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members have engaged in the pattern of racketeering
 activity for the purpose of conducting the ongoing business affairs of the Opioid Marketing
 Enterprise.

5 666. Each of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members aided and abetted others in the
6 violations of the above laws, thereby rendering them indictable as principals in the 18 U.S.C. §§
7 1341 and 1343 offenses.

8 667. As described herein, the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members engaged in a
9 pattern of related and continuous predicate acts for many years. The predicate acts constituted a
10 variety of unlawful activities, each conducted with the common purpose of obtaining significant
11 money and revenue from the marketing and sale of their highly addictive and dangerous drugs.
12 The predicate acts also had the same or similar results, participants, victims, and methods of
13 commission. The predicate acts were related and not isolated events.

14 668. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members' violations of law and pattern of racketeering activity directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs injury in their business and 15 property. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members' pattern of racketeering activity logically, 16 17 substantially, and foreseeably caused an opioid epidemic. The injuries of Plaintiff, as described 18 herein, were not unexpected, unforeseen, or independent. Rather, as Plaintiffs allege, the Opioid 19 Marketing Enterprise Members as a whole and McKinsey in particular knew that the opioids were 20 unsuited to treatment of long-term chronic, non-acute, and non-cancer pain, or for any other use 21 not approved by the FDA, and knew that opioids were highly addictive and subject to abuse. 22 Nevertheless, the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members engaged in a scheme of deception that 23 utilized the mail and wires in order to carry out the Opioid Marketing Enterprise's fraudulent scheme, thereby increasing sales of their opioid products. 24

25 669. It was foreseeable and expected that the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members
26 creating and then participating in the Opioid Marketing Enterprise through a pattern of
27 racketeering activities to carry out their fraudulent scheme would lead to a nationwide opioid

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epidemic, including increased opioid addiction and overdose and the injuries that occurred as a
 result.


3 <u>The Enterprise Was Well Aware of Risks of Abuse Before It "Turbocharged" its Marketing</u> 4 Scheme.


5 670. These devastating results were eminently foreseeable by the Opioid Marketing
6 Enterprise Members.

671. When Purdue pleaded guilty in 2007, it was evident that Purdue's behavior and
excessive prescribing was directly linked to a drug addiction crisis that caused severe and
extensive damage to America. Purdue's methods included "using aggressive marketing tactics to
convince doctors to unnecessarily prescribe opioids – frivolous prescriptions that experts say
helped fuel a drug addiction crisis that has ravaged America for decades."⁴⁴¹

12 672. McKinsey cannot deny knowledge regarding Purdue's 2007 guilty plea. At that
13 point, McKinsey knew that opioids were addictive. McKinsey knew that OxyContin was being
14 widely abused and causing harm to people and entities like Plaintiffs. And McKinsey knew that
15 Purdue had been fraudulently marketing OxyContin as less addictive, less subject to abuse, and
16 less likely to cause withdrawal. And yet, years later, in 2013, McKinsey orchestrated a scheme to
17 continue to aggressively promote opioids despite knowledge that people were still dying from
18 overdoses.

19 673. Thus, McKinsey continued to add fuel to this fire by persisting in aggressively
20 marketing to physicians and continuing to fuel the opioid crisis after Purdue's guilty plea. It was
21 foreseeable that continuing to do so would devastate American communities.





676. Similarly, news stories across the nation reported additional consequences of wide scale opioid addiction: needles littered around public property, posing costs to the governments and danger to residents.⁴⁴³

677. The foreseeability of the abuse and need for additional services that would be
required following the misleading marketing and increased prescribing and use of high dose
opioids is also evidenced by McKinsey's attempt to put a price tag on overdoses. McKinsey
suggested payment amounts for event-based contracts: \$6,000 to \$15,000 (paid to health insurers
for increased medical services). Indeed, McKinsey was well aware that increased prescriptions
would lead to overdoses and to an additional financial burden for social and health services.

10 678. McKinsey is liable for its successful efforts to increase OxyContin sales after
11 Purdue's 2007 guilty plea for misbranding the drug. Indeed, McKinsey's focus on increasing
12 opioid sales after Purdue's guilty was incendiary to escalating and perpetuating the opioid
13 epidemic by: (a) using data to specifically target high volume prescribers; (b) persuading sales of
14 higher doses of opioids; (c) tailoring marketing messages to conceal their addictive principles;
15 and (d) by reducing the training of sales representatives.

16 679. In 2012, when the consent decree expired (which obligated Purdue to submit
17 annual compliance reports regarding its marketing), McKinsey helped Purdue reengage in its
18 nefarious conduct of targeting and deceiving doctors about the abuse potential of opioids.

19 680. After Purdue's guilty plea, McKinsey identified physicians—that had already been
20 influenced by Purdue's misrepresentations and were thus already high prescribers—as optimal
21 targets for a massive marketing push to sell more OxyContin. McKinsey monitored the
22 prescription behaviors of individual doctors and utilized the prescriber-level data and urged
23 Purdue to allocate its time and resources to high prescribing physicians.

By November 2013, McKinsey had obtained the physician-level data it had
previously requested and continued to study ways to sell additional OxyContin prescriptions by
refining and targeting the sales pitch to them.

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^{28 443} *See, e.g.*, https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/regionals/south/2014/10/25/hypodermic-needles-litter-landscape-south-boston/pzgmgbyjYFCD967TePDyiM/story.html

In 2013, Project Turbocharge began. McKinsey proposed Project Turbocharge, a
 marketing strategy to increase opioids sales by hundreds of millions of dollars annually. With
 McKinsey's assistance, Purdue trained its sales representatives to operate using McKinsey's
 strategy for selling OxyContin. It is not coincidental to the Enterprise scheme that as soon as the
 constraints associated with its guilty plea and consent agreement ended, McKinsey assisted
 Purdue in turbocharging sales.

683. While McKinsey was pushing hard to turbocharge and promote the sale of opioids,
it anticipated and expected that people would die from opioid overdoses. It acknowledged this
when in 2017, it proposed that Purdue pay health insurers or other entities in the distribution
chain rebates "for every OxyContin overdose attributable to pills they sold."⁴⁴⁴

11 684. McKinsey cannot deny that it was not aware of the abuse and overdose potential of
12 opioids when it provided estimates for the future costs of overdose or opioid use disorder events.

13 685. McKinsey and the other Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members marketed a
14 product, through intentionally deceptive means, that it knew would result in consumer deaths and
15 harm to Plaintiffs. This is not an attenuated causal chain. Rather, aggressively marketing to high
16 prescribing individuals, and training to not fully disclose the risk of abuse, were integral parts of
17 the marketing scheme. Deceptive messaging to targeted prescribers who were likely to prescribe
18 more pills in a dose with an anticipated abuse potential was part and parcel of the scheme to
19 defraud.

686. As a result, Plaintiffs have shouldered the burden of these anticipated increased
services and harm to business and property that are inherently tied to opioid abuse and misuse,
and both the increased services and harms were reasonably and actually expected from increased
prescribing.

- 24 687. The Enterprise's goal was to increase opioid prescribing, and the Enterprise
 25 Members knew that doing so would also result in the need for increased medical services. It was
- 26

 ⁴⁴⁴ Walt Bogdanich & Michael Forsythe, *McKinsey Proposed Paying Pharmacy Companies Rebates for OxyContin Overdoses*, N.Y. Times (updated Nov. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/27/business/mckinsey-purdueoxycontin-opioids.html

also foreseeable that increased prescriptions would also result in increased costs to Plaintiffs and
 communities throughout the United States.

3	688. But for the increase in prescribed opioids, Plaintiffs would not have to expend
4	additional resources or suffered other harm to business and property as a result of harms
5	associated with opioid addiction. The Enterprise persisted in targeting prescribers to prescribe
6	high doses of opioids and knew that doing so would result in adverse health and social outcomes,
7	including overdoses, neo-natal complications, harm to communities like Plaintiffs, hazardous
8	waste in Plaintiff communities, as well as and increased expenditures on services to combat such
9	ill effects.
10	Plaintiffs' Business and Property Have Been Damaged by the Enterprise's RICO
11	<u>Violations.</u>
12	689. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise's misleading marketing and failure to prevent
13	prescription opioid diversion damaged public school district plaintiffs. The Opioid Marketing
14	Enterprise's misconduct has contributed to a precipitous rise in babies born addicted to opioids
15	and diagnosed with Neonatal Opioid Withdrawal Syndrome. Babies born with NOWS have a
16	significantly increased risk of developing severe intellectual disabilities that qualify them for, and
17	necessitate, special education and related services in school.
18	690. Plaintiffs have experienced vast harm to business and property directly,
19	proximately, and foreseeably caused by the racketeering enterprise. Plaintiffs are required by
20	federal law to provide special education services, and thereby incur the increased costs and
21	diversion of resources associated with providing these services to children who were born with
22	NOWS. Plaintiffs have also diverted resources to provide additional support to children
23	presenting emotional and behavioral challenges in school due to opioid addiction or opioid-
24	related death in their families.
25	691. The Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members' creation of, and then participation in,
26	the Opioid Marketing Enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activities to carry-out their
27	fraudulent scheme has injured Plaintiffs in the form of substantial losses of money and property
28	

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1 that logically, directly, and foreseeably arise from the opioid epidemic. The injuries to Plaintiff, 2 as alleged throughout this complaint, and expressly incorporated herein by reference, include: 3 a. Costs associated with providing special education and related services to 4 students who were exposed to opioids in utero and students born with NOWS; 5 b. Costs of providing mental-health services, treatment, counseling, 6 rehabilitation services, and social services to students with family members who are struggling 7 with opioid use disorder; 8 Costs associated with providing care for children whose parents suffer c. 9 from opioid-related disability, death or incapacitation; and Losses caused by diverting revenue and resources that otherwise would 10 d. 11 have been used to provide other educational services to other students and, because of the conduct of the Opioid Marketing Enterprise must instead be used to support students whose families are 12 13 struggling with opioid use disorder and provide special education and related services to students 14 who were exposed to opioids in utero and students born with NOWS. 15 692. These injuries to Plaintiffs were directly and proximately caused by the Opioid 16 Marketing Enterprise Members' racketeering activities, which were the logical, substantial, and 17 foreseeable cause of the injuries to Plaintiff. But for the opioid-addiction epidemic the Opioid 18 Marketing Enterprise Members created through their Opioid Marketing Enterprise, Plaintiffs 19 would not have lost money or property. 20 693. Plaintiffs have been injured by the Enterprise's conduct, and such injury would not 21 have occurred but for the predicate acts which also constitute acts taken in furtherance of the 22 conspiracy pursuant to Section 1962(d). By working to expand the opioid market, fraudulently 23 concealing the abuse potential of opioids, targeting high volume prescribers, and deceiving prescribers and the public in order to allow opioids to continue to remain on the market, the 24 25 Enterprise caused the expansion of opioid prescribing and caused a large number of people across the United States, and in Plaintiffs' communities to become addicted to opioids. This forced 26 27 Plaintiffs to expend, time, money, and resources to provide special education and related services 28 to students born with in utero opioid exposure and NOWS and social, emotional, and behavioral

supports to students whose families have been negatively impacted by opioid addiction. Indeed,
 McKinsey intentionally deceived doctors and public health workers in order to continue to grow
 the opioid market. The repeated fraudulent misstatements by the Defendants contributed to an
 explosion in the use of opioids across the country.

5 694. Plaintiffs were direct victims of McKinsey's misconduct. The Enterprise displayed a wanton disregard for public health and safety by intentionally deceiving doctors about the 6 7 addiction potential of opioids and by marketing higher doses to physicians. This in turn caused an 8 increase in opioid addiction among women, and an increase in children born with in utero opioid 9 exposure and NOWS. The harm created by McKinsey required Plaintiffs to expend financial and other resources to support and educate students born with such afflictions and support students 10 11 whose families struggled with opioid addiction. The expansion of this market was the goal of the Enterprise and was critical to its success. Therefore, the harm suffered by Plaintiffs to its property 12 13 and because it was forced to expend resources beyond ordinary costs of services to combat the 14 opioid epidemic, was directly foreseeable, and in fact, and intentional result of Defendant's 15 misconduct. In fact, McKinsey anticipated overdose events and actually estimated price premiums on these expected overdose events. McKinsey knew that the products it was marketing 16 17 were highly addictive and could lead to deadly overdoses yet continued to "turbocharge" sales by 18 fraudulently pushing the product on doctors through its deceptive marketing scheme.

19 695. The creation and implementation of the marketing scheme that McKinsey developed and deployed through its Enterprise, directly harmed Plaintiffs by imposing costs on 20 21 their businesses and properties. Plaintiffs' injuries are not solely the result of routine government 22 expenses. Instead, as a result of Defendant's misconduct, Plaintiffs have been and will be forced 23 to go far beyond what a public school district might ordinarily be expected to pay to educate and support students. This includes providing special education and related services to students born 24 25 with in utero opioid exposure and Neonatal Opioid Withdrawal Syndrome and social, emotional, and behavioral supports to students whose families are negatively impacted by opioids. As a 26 27 result of the conduct of the Enterprise, Plaintiffs have incurred and will continue to incur costs 28 that far exceed the norm.

696. The injuries to Plaintiffs were directly and proximately caused by these
 racketeering activities. These activities were the logical, substantial, and foreseeable cause of the
 injuries to Plaintiffs. But for the opioid epidemic the Opioid Marketing Enterprise Members
 created through their Opioid Marketing Enterprise, Plaintiffs would not have lost money or
 property, and the health and welfare of residents in Plaintiffs' jurisdictions would not have been
 harmed. Moreover, McKinsey's internal documents show that it actually did foresee many of the
 harms that resulted from its conduct.

8 697. There are no intervening acts or parties that could interrupt the causal chain 9 between Defendant's mail and wire fraud and Plaintiffs' injuries. McKinsey, in furtherance of the Enterprise's common purpose, caused to be made false and misleading statements directly to the 10 11 doctors (who consumers rely on to provide health advice) and the public. Doctors are not a break in the causal chain. Instead, the Enterprise members as a whole and McKinsey in particular 12 13 intentionally targeted doctors and sought to device them. That were the doctors were then 14 deceived and behaved as the Enterprise wanted, prescribing more and more opioids, was the 15 purpose of the scheme, not an intervening cause.

16

B. <u>Common Law Public Nuisance</u>

17 698. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as if they18 were fully set out herein.

McKinsey's conduct has created a foreseeable, ongoing, significant, unlawful, and
unreasonable interference with rights common to the general public, including the public health,
welfare, safety, peace, comfort, and convenience of the Plaintiffs' and their State Classes'
communities through its work in marketing, promoting, distributing, and selling massive doses of
opioids throughout the states where Plaintiffs and their State Classes are located, fueling an
opioid epidemic in those communities.

25 700. By its conduct, McKinsey has knowingly exacerbated an opioid epidemic that
26 affects entire communities, municipalities, towns, school districts, and states, including in
27 Plaintiffs' and their State Classes' communities. McKinsey knew, or reasonably should have

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known, that opioids would be used, possessed and/or diverted unlawfully nationwide, including in
 and around Plaintiffs' and their State Classes' school district communities.

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701. McKinsey's nuisance-creating conduct has been intentional and unreasonable and/or violated statutes imposing specific legal requirements for the protection of others.

702. As a direct and proximate result of McKinsey's intentional, unreasonable, and
unlawful conduct, the Plaintiffs and their State Classes have suffered damages, including, but not
limited to, expenditures to provide special education and other supports and services because of
learning disabilities after children's damaging exposure in utero to opioids and direct costs to
Plaintiffs and their State Classes for health care, disability benefits and workers' compensation.

10 703. By incurring pecuniary losses as a result of the increase in children born with
11 NOWS who qualify for special education services due in part to McKinsey's conduct, the
12 Plaintiffs and their State Classes have suffered harm that is different in kind to the harm suffered
13 by the general public in their respective states.

14 704. In marketing of and efforts to boost sales of opioids in Plaintiffs' and their State
15 Classes' communities, McKinsey violated federal law, including, but not limited to 18 U.S.C. § 2
16 and 21 U.S.C. § 846 with respect to Purdue's violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 823 and 21 C.F.R. §
17 1301.74.

18 705. McKinsey's conduct, if unabated, will continue to threaten the health, safety, and
19 welfare of the students and staff and taxpayers of the schools of the Plaintiffs and their State
20 Classes. The Plaintiffs and their State Classes have a clearly ascertainable right to abate this
21 nuisance and its effects and seek relief from it.

22

C. <u>Negligence</u>

23 706. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as if they
24 were fully set out herein.

707. McKinsey owed a duty of care to Plaintiffs, under which it was required to
exercise reasonable not to cause or encourage the over-marketing, excessive distribution, overprescribing, or sale of controlled substances, such as opioids, which were known at the time to be
addictive and known at the time to be a threat to public health.

1	708.	McKinsey breached its duty to exercise reasonable care by the conduct alleged in			
2	this Complair	nt.			
3	709.	McKinsey's conduct in breach of its duty caused loss and damage to Plaintiffs and			
4	the State Classes as alleged in this Complaint.				
5	710.	McKinsey's conduct as alleged was reckless and consciously indifferent to the			
6	consequences	of its actions and inactions and caused loss and damage to Plaintiffs and the State			
7	Classes as all	eged above.			
8	711.	As a direct and proximate result of its negligent conduct, McKinsey injured			
9	Plaintiffs and	the State Classes, causing them damages.			
10	D.	Negligence: Failure to Warn			
11	712.	Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as if they			
12	were fully set	out herein.			
13	713.	McKinsey had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the marketing, promotion,			
14	distribution, a	and sale of opioids manufactured by Purdue, Rhodes and other opioid manufacturers			
15	that were mar	keted, promoted, distributed, and sold pursuant to McKinsey's plans. McKinsey had			
16	an ongoing re	lationship with each as alleged above as it assisted each in implementing its plans.			
17	McKinsey's d	luty to exercise reasonable care included the duty to warn adequately of the potential			
18	dangers assoc	iated with the use of Purdue's, Rhodes' and other opioid manufacturers' opioids as			
19	alleged above				
20	714.	McKinsey knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that			
21	opioids were	highly addictive and inappropriate and unsafe for the treatment of chronic pain, and			
22	McKinsey kn	ew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known, the dangers associated			
23	with the use of	of opioids manufactured by Purdue, Rhode and the other opioid manufacturer it			
24	worked with.				
25	715.	McKinsey further knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known,			
26	that widespre	ad opioid addiction and abuse were harmful to men and women, including pregnant			
27	women, const	uming opioids, their children, their friends, families and communities, and those,			

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special education related services for children exposed to opioids in utero, as well as for health
 care costs associated with opioid addiction and abuse among their insureds.

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716. Nonetheless, McKinsey unreasonably persisted in spreading misinformation and burying the truth about the safety and efficacy of opioids. McKinsey breached its duty and failed to take reasonable precautions to warn of the dangers of opioids in presenting opioids to the public in conjunction with Purdue, Rhodes, and other opioid manufacturers it worked with. Further, McKinsey was reckless and consciously indifferent to the consequences of its actions and inactions.

9 717. By failing to adequately warn the public, including prescribing doctors, Plaintiffs, and the State Classes of the dangers of opioids, McKinsey's conduct directly injured Plaintiffs 10 11 and the State Classes. Because of McKinsey's misinformation campaign and failure to warn, Plaintiffs and the State Classes became obligated and have paid for federally mandated special 12 13 education related services for children exposed to opioids in utero, will do so in the future, and has paid for or otherwise reimbursed the cost of unnecessary and/or inappropriate opioid 14 15 prescriptions, as well as the health care costs associated, disability benefits, and workers' 16 compensation for its employees.

17 718. As a consequence of McKinsey's breach of its duty to warn, which was a
18 continuing duty, Plaintiffs and the State Classes have and will continue to suffer damages as
19 alleged above.

719. McKinsey, Purdue, and other opioid manufacturers acted as a joint enterprise with
the common purpose of deliberately failing to warn about the dangerous nature of prescription
opioids for the purpose of increasing widespread distribution of opioids across the United States
and increasing levels of addiction among millions of Americans.

24 720. McKinsey, Purdue, and other opioid manufacturers each had express or implied
25 authority to act for all with respect to the means of creating and executing said marketing strategy
26 to sell more prescription opioids by failing to warn of their dangerousness, thereby increasing the
27 market share of prescription opioids and increase levels of addiction among Americans.

721. McKinsey, Purdue, and the other opioid manufacturers with whom McKinsey
 contracted each had an equal right of control over the direction of the joint enterprise to create
 and execute said marketing strategy.

4 722. As a result of McKinsey, Purdue, and other opioid manufacturers' conduct through
a joint enterprise to create and executive a marketing strategy meant to flood the market with
prescription opioids, Plaintiffs and the State Classes were injured and sustained damages.

7

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E. <u>Negligence: Violation of Statutory Duties</u>

723. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as if they were fully set out herein.

10 724. Reasonably prudent prescription opioid manufacturers, and companies working
11 with them, that had accepted the responsibilities to plan and implement marketing, promoting,
12 distributing, and sales programs would not have misrepresented the risks of prescription opioids,
13 nor overstated their benefits, and would have implemented basic controls—required under federal
14 law—to prevent opioid diversion in the supply chain.

15 725. Instead, McKinsey planned and implemented the Purdue and Rhodes programs for the marketing, promotion, distributing, and selling of opioids that enabled Purdue and Rhodes to 16 17 systematically violate statutory duties related to marketing opioids. These duties required Purdue 18 and Rhodes to maintain effective controls against the diversion of their drugs, to design and 19 operate a system to identify suspicious orders of their drugs, to halt unlawful sales of suspicious 20 orders and to notify the DEA of suspicious orders. McKinsey thus enabled Purdue's and Rhodes' 21 failure to meet the standard of care established by statute by promoting the flow of excessive 22 quantities of prescription opioids into the communities in which Plaintiffs and the State Classes 23 provide public education to the children of their states and employ residents of their states. See, e.g., the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq; 21 C.F.R. § 1301.74(b). 24

25 726. Every registrant—including Purdue, Rhodes, and other opioid manufacturers—is
26 charged to be vigilant in deciding whether a customer, be it a pharmacy, wholesaler, or end
27 customer, can be trusted to deliver or use controlled prescription narcotics only for lawful
28 purposes. Specifically, drug manufacturers and distributors are required to maintain "effective

control against diversion of particular controlled substances into other than legitimate medical,
 scientific, and industrial channels."

3 727. McKinsey, in the ways alleged above, enabled Purdue, Rhodes, and other opioid manufacturers to breach their duties to exercise due care in the business of manufacturing, 4 5 marketing, and wholesale distribution of prescription opioids by filling unreasonably suspect 6 orders over and over again, without imposing proper controls to monitor, identify, investigate, 7 limit, and report suspicious orders for opioids. The very purpose of these duties was to prevent 8 the harms that have directly followed, including the diversion of highly addictive drugs for illegal 9 and/or non-approved purposes. Thus, the McKinsey-designed-and-implemented marketing, promotion, distribution, and sales strategies enabled Purdue, Rhodes, and other opioid 10 11 manufacturers to accomplish those violations and caused the ensuing harm. 728. Accordingly, McKinsey enabled Purdue, Rhodes, and other opioid manufacturers 12 13 to breach their statutory and regulatory established duties of care that were designed specifically 14 to prevent harms from the overuse, abuse, and misuse of controlled substances, including opioids,

15 by failing to use reasonable care, to the significant harm of Plaintiffs and the State Classes.

McKinsey was reckless and acted with conscious indifference to the consequences of its actionsand inactions as alleged herein.

18

Civil Conspiracy

F.

19 729. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as if they20 were fully set out herein.

730. McKinsey, Purdue, and other opioid manufacturers engaged in a civil conspiracy
in their unlawful marketing of opioids and/or efforts to boost the sale of opioids into Plaintiffs'
and the State Classes' school district's communities. McKinsey entered into an agreement with
Purdue and other opioid manufacturers to increase the sales of OxyContin by unfair, deceptive,
and unconscionable means, in violation of federal consumer protection and controlled-substances
laws and the state laws of Plaintiffs' respective states.⁴⁴⁵

 ⁴⁴⁵ The state laws that McKinsey engaged in conspiracy to violate include but are not limited to: Kentucky Controlled Substances Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ch. 218A; West Virginia Uniform Controlled Substances Act, W.Va. Code § 60A-3-308; W.Va. Code § 60A-4-401 through 403; and W.Va. Code § 60A-8-1 *et seq.*;

731. McKinsey, Purdue, and other opioid manufacturers, engaged in a civil conspiracy				
to commit fraud and misrepresentation in conjunction with their unlawful marketing of opioids				
and/or distribution of opioids into Plaintiffs' and the State Classes' communities.				
732. McKinsey aided Purdue and other opioid manufacturers in unlawfully failing to				
act to prevent diversion and failing to monitor for, report, and prevent suspicious orders of				
opioids.				
733. McKinsey aided Purdue and other opioid manufacturers in unlawfully marketing				
opioids in Plaintiffs' and the State Classes' communities in furtherance of that conspiracy.				
734. McKinsey aided Purdue and other opioid manufacturers in unlawfully creating a				
public nuisance in Plaintiffs' and the State Classes' communities.				
735. McKinsey's conspiracy and acts in furtherance thereof are alleged in detail in this				
Complaint, including, without limitation, in the public nuisance count and are specifically				
incorporated herein.				
736. McKinsey's overt acts in furtherance of this conspiracy include, but are not limited				
to, designing and implementing marketing messages that:				
a. Comprised untrue, false, unsubstantiated, and misleading marketing,				
directly and with and through third parties, in violation of 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e), thereby causing				
opioid drugs to be misbranded;				
b. Promoted other purported advantages of OxyContin and other prescription				
opioids, including but not limited to improved function and quality of life in violation of FDA				
regulations, including 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e);				
c. Promoted higher sales, higher dose sales, and targeted the highest volume				
prescribers of a highly abusable, addictive and dangerous drug;				
d. Promoted higher dose OxyContin prescriptions, known to pose greater				
risks; and				
e. Targeted the highest prescribing physicians, without addressing whether				
those prescribers may be engaged in abuse and diversion and should not be targeted, to induce				
them to increase prescriptions of OxyContin further.				

1	737. The conspiracy was the product of an agreement with McKinsey, Purdue, and
2	other opioid manufacturers operating in close collaboration. When McKinsey's role in the
3	conspiracy threatened to be exposed, upon information and belief, it took efforts to conceal its
4	participation by attempting to destroy inculpating emails and files.
5	738. McKinsey, Purdue, and other opioid manufacturers acted with a common
6	understanding or design to commit unlawful acts, as alleged herein, and acted purposely, without
7	a reasonable or lawful excuse, which directly caused the injuries alleged herein.
8	739. McKinsey, Purdue, and other opioid manufacturers acted with malice, purposely,
9	intentionally, unlawfully and without a reasonable or lawful excuse.
10	740. McKinsey's conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy described herein was not
11	mere parallel conduct. McKinsey encouraged Purdue, and other opioid manufacturers to act
12	directly against their commercial interests in not reporting the unlawful practices of competitors
13	to the authorities and in seeking to avoid "strict" regulation.
14	741. McKinsey's conspiracy as well as its actions and omissions in furtherance thereof
15	caused the direct and foreseeable losses alleged herein.
16	742. McKinsey's actions demonstrated both malice and aggravated and egregious
17	fraud. McKinsey engaged in the conduct alleged herein with a conscious disregard for the rights
18	and safety of other persons, even though that conduct had a great probability of causing
19	substantial harm. McKinsey's fraudulent wrongdoing was done with a particularly gross and
20	conscious disregard.
21	743. McKinsey's misconduct alleged in this case was ongoing and persistent for many
22	years.
23	744. McKinsey's misconduct alleged in this case does not concern a discrete event or
24	discrete emergency of the sort a school district would reasonably expect to occur and is not part
25	of the normal and expected costs of a public school district's existence.
26	G. <u>Aiding and Abetting</u>
27	745. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as if they
28	were fully set out herein.

746. The pleading of a separate claim for aiding and abetting in certain states does not
 waive any claim for vicarious liability under aiding and abetting principles under the laws of any
 state. Plaintiffs and the State Classes reserve the right to establish joint and several liability under
 aiding and abetting principles.

McKinsey gave substantial assistance and/or encouragement to Purdue, Rhodes, 5 747. 6 the Sacklers, and other opioid manufacturers regarding conduct McKinsey knew to be tortious 7 and/or in violation of a duty owed by Purdue, Rhodes, the Sacklers, and other opioid 8 manufacturers to third persons, including Plaintiffs and the State Classes. McKinsey assisted and 9 encouraged Purdue over many years to commit unlawful acts relating to the sales and marketing of Purdue's opioid products that McKinsey knew to be misleading and in violation of a 10 11 reasonable standard of care. McKinsey gave substantial assistance and/or encouragement to Purdue to use unlawful means to commit lawful acts as part of these marketing efforts and sales. 12

13 748. Further, McKinsey gave substantial assistance and/or encouragement to Purdue to
14 take actions that violated state laws, including but not limited to public nuisance and statutory
15 prohibitions through McKinsey's misleading and predatory marketing campaign.

749. McKinsey and Purdue knowingly made or caused to be made false or misleading
representations as to the characteristics, ingredients, uses, and benefits of opioids, generally, and
Purdue's opioids, specifically, by downplaying the risks of addiction and abuse, overstating the
efficacy, and misrepresenting the medical necessity of opioids, generally, and Purdue's opioids,
specifically.

750. McKinsey and other opioid manufacturers it assisted knowingly made or caused to
be made false or misleading representations as to the characteristics, ingredients, uses, and
benefits of opioids, by downplaying the risks of addition and abuse, by overstating the efficacy,
and by misrepresenting the medical necessity of opioids.

751. McKinsey acted with intent to facilitate the spread of misleading information by
Purdue and other opioid manufacturers, specifically with regard to the misrepresentations about
the addictiveness of opioids in its marketing and sales efforts.

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1		752.	McKinsey, Purdue, Rhodes, the Sacklers, and other opioid manufacturers acted
2	jointly		herance of the conspiracy.
3		753.	McKinsey, Purdue, and the Sacklers agreed to deploy unlawful sales and
4		U	tics to achieve their shared objective of maximizing revenue of a closely held
5	compa	-	
6		754.	McKinsey's support was a substantial factor in causing harm to third persons,
7		-	intiffs and the State Classes.
8	X.		<u>YER FOR RELIEF</u>
9			iffs, individually and on behalf of the State Classes they seek to represent,
10	respec	• 1	ray for the following relief:
11		1.	An order certifying the State Classes as defined above, appointing Plaintiffs as the
12	repres		es of their State Classes, and appointing their counsel as Class Counsel;
13		2.	An award of all economic, monetary, actual, consequential, compensatory, and
14	puniti		ages available under the law, including trebling of economic injury;
15		3.	An award of all equitable relief requested herein;
16		4.	Injunctive/equitable relief;
17		5.	An award of reasonable litigation expenses and attorneys' fees;
18		6.	An award of pre- and post-judgment interest, to the extent allowable; and
19		7.	Such other further relief that the Court deems reasonable and just.
20	XI.	JURY	<u> (DEMAND</u>
21		Plaint	iffs demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable.
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1	Dated: December 6, 2021	Re	espectfully submitt	ted,	
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